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By the nineteenth century British and Qing authorities had developed distinct understandings 
of piracy and means for its suppression. The British colonisation of Hong Kong in 1842 brought 
these two systems into contact. After establishing sovereignty over their new colony, British 
officials, by headquartering the Royal Navy’s East Indies and China Station at Hong Kong and 
establishing a Vice-Admiralty Court there, developed the means of projecting their authority 
over Hong Kong's surrounding waters and exercising state power at sea. The prevalence of 
piracy in British and Chinese sources, however, suggests that British maritime control was 
limited. Piracy threatened British and Qing interests in South China and became a basis for 
cooperation. Though British and Qing officials were often suspicious of each other’s motives in 
the nineteenth century, they nonetheless cooperated against a common foe: Chinese pirates. 
Anglo-Qing cooperation against pirates created a nexus between British colonial and 
consular authorities, officers of the Royal Navy, and local and metropolitan Qing officials that 
challenges traditional narratives of gunboat diplomacy. The relationship between Britain and 
China was far more complicated than the former using the threat of naval intervention to extract 
concessions from the latter. British naval hegemony complemented Qing deficiencies, while 
Qing officials' local intelligence and criminal justice system made them more efficient at 
punishing pirates. These complementary aspects of the British and Qing maritime states 
developed into a cooperative system in which British and Qing officials engaged with each 
other’s understandings of piracy, maritime control, and international law. This system 
 
 
developed and persisted despite misunderstandings and conflicts between its participants. Using 
records and archival materials in English and Chinese, this thesis looks at Anglo-Qing relations 
through the prism of their efforts in suppressing piracy. It argues that such efforts produced a 
‘collaborative imperial hydrarchy’, in which Royal Navy ships helped uphold Qing and treaty 
law in Chinese waters. Agents of the British and Qing empires cooperated in an attempt to 
establish control over the waters of South China. This thesis investigates the implications this 
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The number of pirates annihilated and captured are exceedingly many and a large number 
have been taken alive. This is sufficient evidence of sincere designs against a common foe 
 
- Ye Mingchen to Sir John Bowring in response to an international expedition against pirates 
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Piracy and Imperial Hydrarchy 
 
 
One night in early February 1800, a Chinese boat approached HMS Providence, a Royal Navy 
schooner that had anchored at Whampoa (Huangpu), thirteen miles downriver from Canton 
(Guangzhou). The officer on watch suspected that the boat’s crew were attempting to cut the 
anchor cable and opened fire injuring a crewmember named Jiang Yayou. A boat from the 
Providence overhauled the Chinese vessel, and during the encounter another crewmember, Liu 
Yashi, jumped overboard and presumably drowned. The customs superintendent (haiguan) at 
Canton requested that the Select Committee of the East India Company (EIC) at Canton 
forward the ‘yi [barbarian] criminals’ involved in the Providence affair to Canton for trial.1 The 
subsequent interactions between agents of the EIC, Royal Navy officers, and Qing officials 
reveal the discrepancies between British and Qing understandings of piracy, which forms basis 
of this thesis. 
Before 1834, the EIC mediated relations between Britain and Qing China (1644-1912). 
Now, the Royal Navy’s senior naval officer in China, Captain John Dilkes, as a servant of the 
British Crown rather than the Company, decided to personally intervene and ‘rest the dispute 
between the King of England and the Emperor of China’.2 The governor-general (zongdu, 
known in contemporary English sources as the viceroy) of the provinces of Guangdong and 
Guangxi, the governor (xunfu) of Guangdong, and the customs superintendent (known as the 
Hoppo), the highest Qing authorities at Canton, understood the Providence affair as one in 
 
1 Edict from the Haiguan, Jiaqing (JQ) reign 5th year/1st month/27th day (20 February 1800), Foreign 
Office Records (FO) Consulates and Legations, China: Miscellaneous Papers and Reports (233)/189, 
222-223, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, UK. Entry for 12 February 1800, India Office Records 
(IOR)/ Factory Records: China and Japan (G/12)/128, 30-31, the British Library (BL), London, UK. 
British sources give the date of the occurrence as the 11 February while Chinese sources record it 
happening on 10 February. I will provide Chinese names in pinyin when possible but will use 
contemporary romanisations of Cantonese names (e.g. ‘Canton’, ‘Hong Kong’) for places in the Canton 
Delta and others commonly used in English sources. 
2 Dilkes to the Select Committee, 22 February 1800, IOR/G/12/128, 69. On the sovereign and 
diplomatic powers of the EIC see Philip J. Stern, The Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the 





which ‘barbarian criminals in the dark mistook a boat for a pirate, and without carefully looking 
into the matter had the audacity to open fire without authority and injure a subject of China’. 
Furthermore, the Canton authorities believed that the sailors responsible ‘should follow the laws 
of the Celestial Empire and come for trial’.3  
Dilkes and George Thomas Staunton, an EIC clerk, attended the trial of those involved in 
the Providence affair. Though Dilkes never explicitly accused the Chinese attacked by HMS 
Providence of piracy, he nonetheless believed ‘the laws of all civilized Countries on this head… 
were nearly similar and he had no doubt but the persons who had made such an attempt on 
H.M. Vessel would be brought to punishment’. 4  In referencing the ‘laws of all civilized 
Countries’, Dilkes invoked the rhetoric around the pirate as hostis humani generis, ‘the enemy 
of all mankind’, a notion that had been developing in Europe since the time of Cicero. In this 
conception, pirates, by nature of taking to the seas to engage in indiscriminate plunder, were 
beyond the pale of civilisation and the laws governing it. As the European law of nations, which 
formed the basis of a universal system of international law, considered pirates as lawless figures 
outside of its order, any state had a right to suppress piracy.5 
Considering the Chinese who sailed by HMS Providence’s anchor cable among this class of 
criminal, Dilkes believed the Providence had a right to attack them and that the Chinese, rather 
than the officer who fired at them, were in the wrong. He thus tried to turn the trial of British 
subjects into an investigation of Chinese pirates. When Qing judicial officers refused to do so, 
he began interrogating witnesses himself, an act for which he and Staunton were evicted from 
 
3 Edict from the Governor-General, Governor, and Hoppo, JQ 5/2/8 (3 March 1800), FO 233/289. 
4 Entry for 24 February 1800, IOR/G/12/128, 73. 
5 See Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York: Zone Books, 
2009). Lauren Benton, ‘Toward a New Legal History of Piracy: Maritime Legalities and the Myth of 
Universal Jurisdiction’, International Journal of Maritime History 12, no. 1 (June 2011), 227. Alfred P. 
Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988), 11, 82-86. Christopher 
Harding, ‘“Hostis Humani Generis” – The Pirate as Outlaw in the Early Modern Law of the Sea’ in 
Pirates?: The Politics of Plunder, 1550-1650, ed. Claire Jowitt (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
20-24. On the universality of international law, emerging from the interaction between the law of 
nations and Europe’s interactions with non-European states, see Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo 






the court.6 The sailors of the Providence were the first British subjects to attend a trial in China 
in which they had their own interpreter. Though it did not go as Dilkes and Staunton had hoped, 
the result of the trial showed how British understandings of piracy and international law differed 
with and had an impact on the exercise of Qing law and helped change the dynamics of Sino-
Western relations at Canton.7 In the end, the provincial officials decided to drop charges against 
the sailors of the Providence but requested that ‘all Europeans might be forbidden to fire with 
Ball at Boats that approached the Ships with however suspicious a design’. Despite this 
prohibition, the Canton authorities did not entirely prevent British forces from taking actions 
against Chinese pirates and allowed the Royal Navy to ‘keep them at distance by firing blank 
Cartridges or apprehend the Crew and detain them on board for a subsequent examination by 
the Officers of Justice’.8 
The confusion in the HMS Providence affair reveals differing understandings of piracy 
between the British and Qing empires. The Canton authorities’ acknowledging that Jiang Yayou 
and Liu Yashi, whom the officer of the Providence mistook for pirates, were Qing subjects 
contradicted British understandings of pirates as stateless enemies of all. Qing officials did not 
believe the British had the right to attack Chinese subjects, piratical or otherwise. Captain 
Dilkes on the contrary believed that ‘the laws of all civilized nations’ justified a violent response. 
Despite these differences, Qing authorities, whose disparate and often inferior naval forces 
struggled to deal with the problem of piracy in Chinese waters, proved willing to allow Royal 
Navy ships to detain Chinese pirates and deliver them to Qing jurisdiction.9 Though British and 
Qing officials had different understandings of piracy and the extent of their jurisdiction over it, 
 
6 Staunton to the Select Committee, 13 March 1800, IOR/G/12/128, 124. 
7 Li Chen, Chinese Law in Imperial Eyes: Sovereignty, Justice, and Transcultural Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), 79-82. In 1757, the Qing restricted all foreign trade, with the 
exception of that of the Russians and Japanese, to the port of Canton. Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton 
Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
2007), 16. On international interactions at Canton see John M. Carroll, ‘The Canton System: Conflict 
and Accommodation in the Contact Zone’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 50 
(2010), 51-66. 
8 Entry for 22 March 1800, IOR/G/12/128, 139. 
9 On the inefficacy of Qing naval forces, see Robert J. Antony, ‘Pacification of the Seas: Qing Anti-




Chinese pirates were a common foe to both. Confusion, conflict, and compromise would 
characterize interactions between the British and Qing empires in dealing with piracy for the 
rest of the century.  
 
Common Enemy, Collaborative Solution 
This thesis argues that piracy, as a problem that threatened Qing order and British trade, 
provided an arena for cooperation between Britain and China in an age where the narrative of 
gunboat diplomacy often characterises Anglo-Qing relations.10 Few studies have looked at the 
interaction between Britain and China in suppressing piracy after 1810. The only book focusing 
on the topic remains Grace Fox’s British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832-1869, published in 
1940.11  Though thoroughly engaging with Admiralty records, Fox limited her research to 
English-language material, largely leaving out the Qing perspective and involvement. Murakami 
Ei, focusing on Fujian, looks at interactions between local Qing officials and the Royal Navy, 
claiming that the cooperation between the two amounted to the Qing administration’s co-opting 
of the power of the Royal Navy. 12  Jonathan Chappell looks Anglo-Qing interactions in 
suppressing piracy in China, focusing on its legal dimensions and its significance for changing 
Qing understandings of piracy. He notes that Hong Kong, as a British colony, played an 
 
10 On gunboat diplomacy in China see John Y. Wong, ‘The Limits of Naval Power: British Gunboat 
Diplomacy in China from the Nemesis to the Amethyst, 1839-1949’, War & Society 18, no. 2 (October 
2000), 93-120. On gunboat diplomacy more generally, see Thomas G. Otte, ‘Of Congresses and 
Gunboats: Military Intervention in the Nineteenth Century’ in Military Intervention: From Gunboat 
Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 36-37. Anthony Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat: The 
Victorian Navy and Supremacy at Sea, 1854-1904, revised edition (London: Conway, 2007), 14-17. 
The term ‘gunboat diplomacy’ was coined by James Cable in James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political 
Applications of Limited Naval Force (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971). 
11 Grace Estelle Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832-1869 (London: K. Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co., 1940). 
12 Murakami Ei, Haiyang shishang de jindai Zhongguo: Fujianren de huodong yu Yingguo, Qingchao de 
yinying [A Modern Maritime History of China: Fujianese Activity and British and Qing Responses], 
trans. Wang Shilun (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), Chapter Three. Idem, ‘Shijiu shiji 
zhongye Huanan yanhai zhixu de chongbian: Min-Yue haidao yu Yingguo haijun [Reassessing Order 
on the South China Coast in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Guangdong and Fujian Pirates and the 





important role in these developments.13 Hong-kay Lung’s MA thesis also discusses the British 
suppression of piracy around Hong Kong.14 All these works address aspects of what this thesis 
terms a ‘collaborative imperial hydrarchy’ in which British and Qing officials cooperated and 
coordinated their efforts against Chinese pirates to check criminality and jointly enforce law and 
order among the seafaring community off the coast of South China. Only Murakami focuses on 
cooperation between Britain and China, and he does not discuss the effect this had on both sides’ 
understanding of each other’s views on piracy and the wider worldviews from which these were 
derived. 
In the nineteenth century, the differing understandings and methods of handling pirates in 
the Qing and British empires adapted to each other as the two sides interacted to deal with the 
common problem of piracy. Britain, particularly after the colonisation of Hong Kong, and China 
both attempted to exert control over Chinese pirates. Neither proved capable of doing so 
unilaterally. Qing officials lacked a strong and organised naval force with which to suppress 
piracy. Britain’s Royal Navy was the most powerful navy in the world, but British officers 
lacked familiarity with the islets and inlets of the coast of Guangdong. Additionally, the dictates 
of maritime and international law limited the actions the British warships could take against 
pirates in foreign waters. 
As this thesis will show, British and Qing deficiencies in Guangdong were complementary. 
Qing officials’ familiarity with and sovereignty over the coast of China and its surrounding 
waters, when bolstered by the might of the Royal Navy, could be an effective check on piracy, 
a perennial problem in South China. Unfortunately, British warships, at least from the time of 
the Providence incident, raised suspicion. That the British acquired the headquarters of their 
East Indies and China Station at Hong Kong during the first Opium War (1839-1842) caused 
further mistrust. As piracy became more frequent and its effects felt by British and Qing subjects 
and authorities alike, however, British colonial officials at Hong Kong, diplomats at the treaty 
 
13 Jonathan Chappell, ‘Maritime Raiding, International Law and the Suppression of Piracy on the South 
China Coast, 1842-1869’, The International History Review 40, no. 3 (2018), 473-492. 
14 Hong-kay Lung, ‘Britain and the Suppression of Piracy on the Coast of China with Special Reference 




ports and Beijing, and Royal Navy officers discussed the matter of piracy with their Qing 
counterparts and cooperated in its suppression. Desperation and convenience may have 
motivated these interactions, but they brought British and Qing understandings of piracy into 
contact, requiring compromise between the two. 
 Despite possessing the might of the Royal Navy and a pretence to ‘rule the waves’ in the 
nineteenth century, Britain struggled to protect its colony of Hong Kong from the pirates who 
often really did rule the waves off the coast of South China in defiance of Chinese state authority. 
As in much of their territorial empire, British agents would need collaborators to exert power 
over the China Seas.15 Unlike territory on land, however, sea space, with few exceptions, could 
not be owned by a single entity. States could patrol and control areas of the sea without 
diminishing the rights of other states in the same space. 16  Rather than having to find 
collaborators among those under its sovereignty, Britain could collaborate with other, 
independent entities to exert power over sea space. In the waters around Hong Kong, the ideal 
candidate as a collaborator to control such space was the Qing Empire. To hold authority over 
the waters off the South China coast and wrest control from pirates, the British and Qing empires 
collaborated in suppressing piracy, and the regimes that each had developed to assert power at 
sea interacted and mutually influenced each other in the process. 
This thesis, using English and Chinese language materials, examines the Anglo-Qing 
collaboration against piracy. It sets these interactions in the broader context of the inter-imperial 
relations between Britain and China. To do so, it consults a variety of British naval, diplomatic, 
and colonial records as well as Qing sources from local and central government officials. 
Incorporating perspectives from London, Beijing, Hong Kong, Kowloon (Jiulong), Canton, and 
 
15 The classic introduction to collaborators in the British Empire is Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European 
Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’ in Imperialism: The 
Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 118-
140. On collaboration in Hong Kong see Law Wing Sang, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of 
the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009) and John M. Carroll, 
‘Colonialism and Collaboration: Chinese Subjects and the Making of British Hong Kong’, China 
Information 12, no. 1/2 (Summer/Autumn, 1997). 12-33. 
16 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 




the treaty ports of Guangdong, this thesis assesses the diplomatic, legal, strategic, and practical 
developments underpinning the Anglo-Qing collaboration in controlling the waters of 
Guangdong. It examines an often-neglected aspect of cooperation between the British and Qing 
empires in the nineteenth century. The common foe of the pirate brought about confrontation, 
compromise, and collaboration between the differing systems of international law and world 
order of imperial Britain and Qing China. 
 
Understandings of Piracy and Its Suppression in the British and Qing Empires 
By the nineteenth century, Britain and China had long histories of dealing with private prize-
taking at sea and had developed different understandings and means of suppressing it.17 Certain 
similarities between the British and Qing states’ interactions with pirates nonetheless stand out 
and would lay a foundation for cooperation against this common foe. For both, pirates were a 
menace to control and order and thus a matter to be dealt with by state power. Suppressing 
piracy entailed extending British and Chinese law seaward. In dealing with pirates, both polities 
developed a consistent vocabulary to describe piracy that had legal implications albeit in very 
different contexts. 18  British law, building on classical traditions, considered pirates hostes 
humani generis, stateless enemies of all under universal jurisdiction and believed that any state 
had a right to attack and try pirates.19 Qing authorities understood piracy differently. A sub-
statute of the Great Qing Code (Da Qing lüli) equates ‘great bandits who plunder on rivers and 
oceans’ with ‘mounted robbers’, criminals punishable by decapitation. In this conceptualization, 
 
17 David J. Starkey coined the term ‘private prize-taking at sea’ to describe maritime raiding and to 
dissociate ‘piracy’ from its cultural and political connotations during his keynote address at the 
conference ‘The Problem of Piracy: An Interdisciplinary Conference on Plunder by Sea Across the 
World from the Ancient to the Modern’ at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 24-26 June 2019. 
On the problematics of applying the term ‘piracy’ to Asian seafaring see Anthony Reid, ‘Violence at 
Sea: Unpacking “Piracy” in the Claims of States over Asian Seas’ in Elusive Pirates, Pervasive 
Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas, ed. Robert Antony (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 15-26. This work will use the term ‘piracy’ to describe any act of 
robbery at or from the sea. 
18 Patricia Risso, ‘Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century’, Journal of World History 12, no. 2 
(Fall, 2001), 298-299. 





Chinese pirates were like any other type of criminal in the Qing Empire and solely within the 
jurisdiction of Qing officials.20 The contrasts between British and Qing understandings of piracy, 
which came to a head during the Providence affair, were the result of differing legal 
conceptualisations of piracy and divergent maritime histories. 
 
From Pirates of the Caribbean to Ladrones of the Canton Delta 
Though British jurists saw piracy as a crime in international law, they prosecuted it as a crime 
under municipal law. 21  The Offences at Sea Act of 1536 established English Admiralty 
jurisdiction over ‘traytors, pirates, thieves, robbers, murtherers and confederates upon the sea… 
or in any haven, river, creek, or place where the admiral or admirals have or pretend to have 
power, authority or jurisdiction’. 22  Through this act, English (later British) authorities 
established a right to try any and all pirates at the Court of Admiralty in London. Municipal law 
had international implications. By 1696, Charles Hedges, a judge in the English Admiralty 
Court, asserted that: 
the king of England hath not only an empire and sovereignty over the British seas, but 
also an undoubted jurisdiction and power, in concurrency with other princes in states, 
for the punishment of all piracies and robberies at sea, in the most remote parts of the 
world.23 
 
British monarchs struggled to exercise this jurisdiction over pirates, especially with the 
expansion of their maritime empire. While early English maritime activity, particularly that of 
the Elizabethan ‘sea dogs’, shared many aspects in common with piracy, by the eighteenth 
century pirates competed with states for access to a globalising economy and became a problem 
 
20 Quoted in Robert J. Antony, Unruly People: Crime, Community, and State in Late Imperial South 
China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 199. Reid, ‘Violence at Sea’, 17. 
21 Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 
1800-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 119-120. 
22 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15. See Rubin, Law of Piracy¸ 37-38. 
23 Rex v. Dawson (1696) quoted in Rubin, Law of Piracy, 85. The ill-defined ‘British seas’ roughly 
comprised the English Channel. England claimed control over the whole of the English Channel in 






for the British Empire.24 The system of capturing pirates and sending them to the Admiralty 
Court in London proved ineffective and expensive. To facilitate the exercise of jurisdiction over 
pirates in the most remote parts of the world, in 1700, Westminster passed ‘An act for the more 
effectuall Suppression of Piracy’. The act permitted Vice-Admiralty commissions in ‘any Place 
at Sea or upon the Land of His Majesties [sic] Islands Plantations Colonies Dominions Forts or 
Factories’ to try pirates on the spot rather than sending them for trial at the Admiralty Court in 
London.25  The establishment of Vice-Admiralty Courts in Crown possessions beyond the 
British Isles facilitated the Royal Navy’s suppression of piracy in the waters around the 
territories of the expanding British Empire. 
The extension of British legal authority to territorial possessions overseas was partly a 
response to the emergence of an unruly class of seafarers that developed alongside the expansion 
of Britain’s maritime trade and empire. In the early seventeenth century, Richard Brathwaite, 
an upper-class English writer with Royalist sympathies, commented that the ‘sayler’ was ‘an 
otter; an amphibium [sic] that lives both on land and water’. For such an amphibium, ‘no coast 
holds it selfe to bee of more firme land’, and ‘affaires of state are above his sconce’. As a result 
of being ‘many times so long on sea’, the sailor often ‘forgets his friends by land’, and those of 
his ilk instead became ‘agents of maine importance in that hydrarchy wherein they live’.26 The 
unruliness and lack of terrestrial loyalty of hydrarchy, or seafaring society, meant its members 
often had piratical proclivities, particularly in the Atlantic Ocean.27 The British state responded 
to Atlantic pirates with the imposition of what Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker call 
‘imperial hydrarchy’, the extension of state power over seafarers. Various laws and regulations, 
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backed by violence, helped create the maritime state and its military and economic control at 
sea.28 
Britain expanded its imperial hydrarchy as piratical activity spread across the Atlantic and 
elsewhere. Endemic European wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw many 
seafarers apply for privateer commissions to engage in prize-taking on behalf of their state against 
enemy shipping.29 Many of these privateers exceeded their commissions and attacked the ships 
belonging to belligerent as well as neutral polities off the coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and 
even the South Seas of the Pacific Ocean. The movement of Caribbean pirates and privateers 
into African and Asian waters in often indiscriminate searches for prizes became known as the 
‘Pirate Round’. East India Company officers used complaints against the hydrarchy of the Pirate 
Round to expand their own resources and jurisdiction. London granted the EIC the right to 
establish courts to suppress interlopers, private traders who challenged the Company’s 
monopoly. The right to prosecute maritime activity that violated its monopoly allowed the EIC 
to exercise de facto jurisdiction over the waters off its territories. 
The East India Company established its first court with Admiralty jurisdiction in Calcutta 
(Kolkata) in 1693, a move that Company servants saw as affirming their sovereignty in India.30 
This court, under the auspices of a trading company, gained the right to try pirates in 1700 by 
the same act that allowed the British to establish Vice-Admiralty Courts anywhere in the empire 
to deal with ‘Persons committing Piracies Robberies and Felonies on the Seas in or neare the 
East and West Indies’.31 The suppression of piracy resulted in an extension of British imperial 
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hydrarchy into both the Atlantic and Indian oceans, maritime spaces under different legal orders 
as a result of their geopolitical situations. The existence of powerful Indian and other Asian 
sovereignties east of the Cape of Good Hope meant the British exercise of state power at sea 
could not be exerted as unilaterally or fully as in the Atlantic.32 
European wars in the mid-seventeenth to early-eighteenth centuries, which expanded 
seaward through colonies and attacks on shipping, turned islands in the Caribbean into bases for 
maritime raiders, legal or otherwise. This period is often known as the ‘Golden Age’ of piracy. 
In the golden age, figures such as Edward Teach (Blackbeard) and Bartholomew Roberts (Black 
Bart) gained particular notoriety among a cast of characters including the (in)famous pirate 
women Anne Bonny and Mary Read, as well as Henry Every (also spelled ‘Avery’) and William 
Kidd, who participated in the Pirate Round and acquired legendary wealth from plundering 
Mughal ships from India. The adventures of these swashbucklers persist in memory, and the 
pirates of the Caribbean have become archetypical in popular representation. Though the 
pirates of the Caribbean were later lionised and their figures continue to capture profits, albeit 
now through popular appeal rather than maritime plunder, they were a serious concern for the 
state.33 
The activities of the pirates of the Caribbean peaked after the Peace of Utrecht (1713), 
which ended the War of Spanish Succession. At the end of the war, Britain acquired the Assiento, 
the right to ship slaves to Spanish America. With thousands of Royal Navy personnel and 
privateers suddenly unemployed after nearly twenty years of uninterrupted conflicts between 
European powers, many took to plundering the reinvigorated and lucrative trade across the 
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Atlantic in goods and slaves. In response, Britain bolstered its authority and power in the 
Atlantic, effectively bringing an end to the golden age of Atlantic piracy by the late 1720s.34 
While Britain could exercise a control over the Atlantic through a unilateral imposition of 
maritime law, this was not the case in the Mediterranean and east of the Cape of Good Hope. 
In seas adjacent to polities adhering to their own maritime laws, British imperial hydrarchy had 
to adapt to and compromise with competing understandings of piracy. 
By the nineteenth century, maritime Britain had acquired a worldwide experience of 
dealing with non-European pirates with different systems of law and understandings of maritime 
plunder. Since the Middle Ages, ‘corsairs’ from ports in North Africa and the Mediterranean 
such as Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Salee, known as the ‘Barbary states’, had attacked the 
shipping of the Christian states of Europe, including that of the British Isles, and kidnapped 
Europeans as slaves and for ransom. In England, the predominately male victims of corsair raids 
were so numerous that complaints became a basis for hundreds, possibly thousands, of women 
to enter the public arena as petitioners and engage in political activities, which were otherwise 
closed to them.35 Piracy could prompt atypical political developments. Though many of the 
corsairs used the pretext of religious warfare to justify their depredations, European naval forces 
often treated them as pirates rather than belligerents. At the same time, in negotiating the release 
of prisoners and in attempts to check piratical attacks, European states treated the Barbary 
‘states’, which were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, as if they were sovereign 
entities.36 European officials were thus willing to compromise on their understandings of piracy 
as a universal crime not affiliated with any state in order to check piratical activity. Suppressing 
piracy was more important than strict adherence to international law. Ultimately, violence, 
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rather than negotiations, would put an end to the activities of the Barbary corsairs. British forces 
were involved in various attacks on the coast of North Africa in the nineteenth century in the 
name of suppressing the depredations of the corsairs, who suffered a massive setback with the 
French occupation of Algiers in 1830.37 Loosening the legal definition of pirates and their 
relations with sovereigns as well as recourse to violence and colonial expansion would also define 
British engagement with non-European piracy in waters further from home. 
From the time Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498, European 
maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and China Seas included privateering and piracy, 
encouraged by states as an auxiliary to trade. Maritime depredations by European ships 
catalysed the development of armed commerce in the Indian Ocean.38 Unable to challenge 
European forces at sea and struggling to exercise control over the hydrarchy of pirates and armed 
traders, Mughal rulers in India turned to Dutch, British, and French naval forces for assistance 
against pirates and the Portuguese. In doing so, the Mughals conceded the legitimacy of 
European maritime law in the waters off the Indian subcontinent. This concession, however, 
also gave European navies the responsibility of suppressing piracy and protecting trade. At the 
same time, the British and other maritime allies of the Mughals had to recognise and adapt to 
Mughal sovereignty, which underpinned European maritime rights.39 Mughal sovereignty and 
British imperial hydrarchy could be complementary in the Indian Ocean. The Maratha uprising 
against Mughal rule, beginning in the late-seventeenth century, threatened this system of co-
existence. 
To challenge the Mughals and their British and Dutch allies at sea, the Marathas allied with 
the Portuguese at Goa and hired Kanhoji Angre (a.k.a Angria) to lead their naval forces. 
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Claiming official sanction from the Marathas, Kanhoji seized merchant shipping near his 
territory. As the Marathas were at war with the Mughals, Kanhoji considered the ships of the 
Mughals’ allies, such as the East India Company, as legitimate prizes. Company officials viewed 
Kanhoji and his successors’ prize-taking as a form of piracy. By applying the label of piracy to 
the Angrian activity, British officers muddled the authority of the Angres, who were Maratha 
admirals rather than stateless sea rovers. Delegitimising Angrian authority helped justify British 
violence against the Angres’ forces and territories.40 The British experience with the Angres in 
India would inform imperial activity in the easternmost of the EIC’s territories in the Malay 
Archipelago. 
When English traders first arrived in Southeast Asia in the late sixteenth century, in addition 
to having to contend with indigenous polities and sovereigns, they had to deal with differing 
European ideas of control in the region. The EIC attempted to establish a presence there in the 
midst of a conflict between the Portuguese, who claimed a monopoly over maritime trade in the 
region, and the Dutch, who considered Portuguese overseas possessions as territories of Spain 
after the dynastic union of the Iberian states in 1580. The revolt against Spain in 1567 justified 
a Dutch challenge to Portuguese influence in the Malay Archipelago. In this context, Admiral 
Jacob van Heemskerck captured the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina in 1603 and took it to 
Amsterdam as a prize. Prize money was distributed among shareholders of the Dutch East India 
Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC). The VOC hired Hugo Grotius, one of 
the fathers of international law, as a legal counsel to help justify these actions. 41  Grotius 
challenged the Portuguese claim to sovereignty over the sea lanes and maritime trade of 
Southeast Asia established in the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Saragosa (1529). Grotius 
advocated instead for mare liberum (free seas), asserting that natural law gave all states the right 
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to free navigation of the seas. All states also had a responsibility to uphold this right against any 
threat. Grotius thus condemned Portuguese attempts to exclude other states from access to India 
and Southeast Asia as a form of piracy. By impinging on freedom of the seas, acts sponsored by 
sovereign entities, such as the Portuguese cartaz system, could be considered piratical according 
to Grotius.42 He established the precedent that if a state could prove that the maritime activities 
of another sovereign entity violated mare liberum, that state could suppress such activity as 
piracy. 
Though Grotius’ accusations were against Portugal, colonial powers in the Malay 
Archipelago would also direct such accusations against indigenous polities to justify recourse to 
violence.43 The polities of the many islands in the Malay Archipelago relied on trade, and 
sovereigns in the region considered using naval forces to attack such trade as a legitimate form 
of statecraft. Though such activities were more akin to privateering than piracy, European states 
adhering to the belief that only sovereigns of ‘civilised’ states could legitimately commission 
privateers often designated prize-taking activities sponsored by indigenous polities as piracy in 
order to delegitimise Southeast Asian sovereignties.44 By the eighteenth century, the maritime 
raiding of the Angres and local rulers in the Malay Archipelago led British imperial agents to 
shift the agency behind piracy from hydrarchy to sovereigns.45 The paradoxical association of 
polities with piracy, a crime by definition beyond the confines of a single state, enabled 
Company officers in Asian waters to become kingmakers, selecting which local rulers to 
recognise as sovereigns and which to delegitimise and attack as pirates. This was an important 
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development for the EIC in Southeast Asia, especially as Westminster sought to curb the 
Company’s expansionist activities. The India Act of 1784 forbade the EIC from declaring war 
without approval from the British government in London. In the Malay Archipelago, Company 
servants circumvented this restriction by applying the label of piracy to the maritime activities 
of Malay rulers to justify armed intervention.46 Sea raiding in Southeast Asia, legitimate or 
otherwise, violated Grotius’ concept of mare liberum and threatened trade, which became an 
important impetus for British imperial expansion.47 In the same way that the French dealt with 
the Barbary corsairs by colonising Algeria, the EIC engaged in an ‘imperialism of free seas’ using 
violence and territorial conquest as a means of dealing with piracy in Southeast Asia.48 
While the imperialism of free seas helped establish a British presence in Southeast Asia, 
suppressing piracy was not the Company’s only motivation for colonial activity in the region. 
As a trading company, the EIC’s principal motivations were profits and the quest for markets. 
Company activities in India and Southeast Asia were part of a broader ‘Cathaian project’, which 
had motivated British designs in Asia since the EIC’s founding in 1600. India and the Malay 
Archipelago were waystations, sources of goods and capital with which to access the largest 
market in the world: China.49 Company ships first reached China in 1637 during the transition 
between the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties, a conflict in which pirates played an 
important role. Piracy and upheaval dissuaded the EIC from making any earnest efforts at trade 
with China until 1717, after which the Company’s trade with China flourished, particularly as 
Britain’s voracious appetite for tea grew exponentially.50 To protect the valuable cargoes of its 
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East Indiamen, the Company turned to the Royal Navy. Though piracy was endemic in the 
waters around Canton, the only port open to European trade, Chinese pirates rarely threatened 
foreign ships. During Britain’s wars against Napoleon and the United States in the early 
nineteenth century, the EIC appealed to the Royal Navy for protection not against pirates but 
enemy warships.51 It was in this context that HMS Providence anchored at Whampoa. 
By 1800 the Royal Navy was the most powerful naval force in the world as would be proven 
just five years later at the Battle of Trafalgar. It had a long and distinguished history of 
suppressing different types of piracy in various contexts. HMS Providence and other Royal 
Navy ships in the Canton Delta carried this accumulated experience and the laws underpinning 
it to China; naval officers believed themselves justified in suppressing piracy off the China coast 
as they had in the Atlantic and Indian oceans. This belief helped motivate the actions of the 
officer of the Providence who fired at a Chinese boat in February 1800. Though it is uncertain 
whether the crew of the boat were pirates, the piratical activities of tens of thousands of other 
Chinese seafarers were less ambiguous and had created a situation of crisis in the waters off 
South China by this point. Like the buccaneers of America and the Barbary corsairs, these 
pirates had the dubious distinction of acquiring a unique designation: ‘ladrones’, from the 
Portuguese term for ‘thieves’. 52  Though the Royal Navy had dealt with pirates from the 
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Caribbean to the Straits of Malacca, its encounter with the ladrones was different. The scale of 
the piratical activities of the ladrones was unprecedented. While the number of pirates active in 
the Atlantic during the ‘golden age’ never exceeded 5,500, more than 70,000 ladrones were 
thought to be operating in South China in 1809.53 Furthermore, the ladrones were active off the 
China coast, where Qing authorities exercised an imperial hydrarchy built on laws and practices 
that differed from those of British diplomants and naval officers. On the China coast, the Royal 
Navy and other British representatives would have to reckon with Qing officials and laws in 
dealing with the problem of Chinese piracy. 
 
Controlling the Inner Seas 
Piracy was a problem for the Manchu leaders of the Qing from the time they began establishing 
their rule in China. The emperors of the Ming Dynasty attempted to ban private maritime trade 
by imposing strict regulations. Rather than suppress private trade, these bans encouraged 
smuggling and piracy and produced a class of merchant-pirates who engaged in commerce as 
well as plunder. The most successful of these merchant-pirates were Zheng Zhilong and his son, 
Zheng Chenggong, known in the West as Koxinga. As Ming rule weakened, Chinese officials 
turned to the Zhengs for support against the Qing. Zheng Zhilong accepted a pardon and 
received a naval commission from the Ming officials in 1628, which turned him and his followers 
into privateers of sorts of the Ming emperor.54 In 1646, Zheng Zhilong surrendered to Qing 
authorities who executed him in 1661. His son continued to resist Qing rule, attacking and 
plundering Qing ships and coastal settlements under the banner of Ming loyalism. For his loyalty 
to the deposed Ming, Zheng Chenggong received an imperial surname and the title of guoxingye, 
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from whence his moniker ‘Koxinga’ is derived.55 As Koxinga had official recognition from the 
Ming, Qing sources referred to him as a maritime rebel (haikou or haini) beyond the pale of 
imperial order. Nonetheless, Qing officials considered such maritime rebels within their 
jurisdiction and, like any other thief or bandit, punishable by execution or exile.56 Unlike British 
jurists, Qing authorities did not distinguish between pirates acting on private motives and those 
committing depredations with the sanction of a sovereign however dubious. Furthermore, they 
considered all maritime crimes in China as falling under their jurisdiction. 
Koxinga’s depredations constituted a maritime crisis for the Qing state. To deal with this 
threat, Qing officials reinforced the naval forces captured from the Ming and implemented a 
maritime ban (haijin) in 1656 in the hope of cutting off support and sustenance to Koxinga’s 
forces. Restricting maritime trade became an important measure in the Qing repertoire for 
dealing with waterborne threats. In the case of Koxinga, however, it proved ineffective. In 
desperation, the emperor resorted to the even more drastic measure of issuing an edict ordering 
the coastal population of the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangnan, and Zhejiang, some of 
China’s wealthiest and most populous, to withdraw thirty li (about ten miles) inland. This 
exodus from the coast was an unprecedented move in China’s maritime history and reveals the 
extent to which Qing rulers were willing to forego maritime activity and its profits in the interest 
of national security. The removal of the population from the coast and Qing aggression drove 
Koxinga from the mainland of China to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which he conquered 
from the Dutch in 1662.57 From Taiwan, Koxinga continued to menace the Qing Empire. 
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Eventually, like the Europeans against the Barbary corsairs, Qing officials decided violence and 
conquest was the only means of dealing with the Taiwan pirates. The Qing commander Shi 
Lang assembled a naval force of 300 ships and 20,000 men with which he conquered Taiwan 
in 1683. The expedition marked an apex in the development of Qing naval strategy and was 
singular as an instance in which the Qing state mobilised the people and resources of maritime 
China in the imperial interest.58 Though not an exercise in the imperialism of ‘free’ seas, as Qing 
authorities believed they had sole control over the waters off their coast, Qing officers could 
nonetheless use the suppression of piracy to justify imperial expansion. 
The conquest of Taiwan allowed Qing administrators to control the entire coast of China 
and project an imperial hydrarchy over seafarers in the seas adjacent. Through a variety of state 
measures, Qing authorities exerted control over the ‘inner seas’ (neihai) immediately off the 
coast of China. Though often ill-defined, the inner seas were treated as an extension of Qing 
territory, while Qing officials saw the outer seas (waihai) as beyond their control. The Qing 
inner seas were further divided into sectors roughly corresponding with the borders of provincial 
jurisdiction on land. While Qing maritime authority was limited to the inner seas, Chinese 
hydrarchy largely disregarded the borders of this space.59 Within the inner seas, Qing rulers 
relaxed maritime restrictions after the conquest of Taiwan. Emperor Kangxi lifted the bans on 
maritime activity in 1684 and sought to extract wealth from this relaxation by establishing 
maritime customs stations in the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. At the 
Guangdong customs station at Canton, Qing authorities relegated the collection of customs 
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duties from European traders to a collective of merchants known as the Cohong (gonghang) in 
1720. The Cohong mediated between foreign traders and the Qing government and acted as 
agents of Qing maritime control helping to regulate mercantile activity in China’s inner seas.60 
In addition to exerting control over maritime trade through customs stations, Qing 
administrators also sought to impose control over Chinese seafarers not engaged in commerce. 
In a testament to how Qing officials attempted to extend seaward means of control developed 
on land, they adopted the baojia system of registration and mutual surveillance and applied it to 
Chinese maritime society. In the baojia system, every ten households were grouped into a tithing 
(jia), under a tithing head (jiazong). Every ten tithings were grouped together into a watch (bao) 
under the responsibility of a watch leader (baozhang). Tithing heads and watch leaders played 
an important role in supporting local Qing administration by moralising to their wards and 
reporting suspicious activity.61 As a substantial portion of the population living on the coast and 
rivers of South China were boat-dwelling Dan (or Danjia, known in English sources as ‘Tankas’) 
and seafarers, Qing officials on the coast attempted to impose a system similar to baojia over this 
South China hydrarchy. In place of the household, Qing authorities used the boat as the basic 
unit of registration and control. Groups of ten vessels were assigned to an anchorage group, or 
aojia, and every ten anchorage groups were put under the responsibility of a port chief (aozhang). 
Qing policy required that the Dan be officially registered in 1729. In 1765, merchant and fishing 
vessels were also registered into the aojia system.62 Through maritime defences and naval patrols 
as well as customs controls and anchorage groups, Qing officials imposed an imperial hydrarchy 
over China’s rivers and inner seas. 
For a century after the defeat of the remnants of Koxinga’s pirate-rebels, the Qing 
government exercised a relatively effective imperial hydrarchy over the inner seas of China. 
Though piracy remained endemic, it only occurred on a small scale during this time. The 
combination of riverine and coastal defences, naval patrols, customs controls, and a system of 
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mutual surveillance succeeded in preventing Chinese hydrarchy from organising on any 
significant scale, and the inner seas remained largely peaceful for much of the eighteenth 
century.63 Qing officials were less successful, however, at controlling maritime developments 
beyond the inner seas. The outbreak of the Tayson rebellion in late eighteenth-century Vietnam 
provided a catalyst for uniting and organizing Chinese seafarers into a professional maritime 
force. Tayson leaders hired Chinese pirates as privateers to plunder the ships of Le rulers of 
Vietnam as well as Chinese shipping. As sailors in the Tayson navy, many Chinese pirates 
developed leadership and fighting skills in addition to receiving materiel from their patrons. The 
collapse of Tayson rule in 1802 saw many of the privateers return to China as pirates, 
precipitating the ladrone crisis.64 In the aftermath of the Tayson rebellion, Zheng Yi, his wife 
(whose name is often simply given as Zheng Yi sao, ‘the wife of Zheng Yi’), and their adopted 
son, Zhang Bao, helped organise the hydrarchy of South China into a massive pirate 
confederation of 2,000 ships and over 70,000 pirates divided into six fleets. The leaders of these 
fleets acted as de facto sovereigns on the South China coast, raising a substantial military force 
while collecting blackmail on ships and even towns amounting to a form of tax. The pirates 
created an alternate order to Qing rule in the Canton Delta.65 Unlike Koxinga’s pirates, the 
ladrones did not seem to act on behalf of an alternative sovereign and never sought to overthrow 
the Qing. As possibly the largest assemblage of pirates in history, they were nonetheless a dire 
threat to the Qing state. 
Qing officials initially sought to deal with the problem of Tayson privateers the same way 
they dealt with Ming privateers under the Zhengs. In 1788, Guangdong and Guangxi 
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Governor-General Sun Shiyi led a Qing force into Vietnam to bolster the Le emperor, a 
tributary vassal of the Qing, against the Tayson rebels. Unlike the conquest of Taiwan, however, 
Qing intervention in Vietnam resulted in a disastrous defeat, and the Qing emperor eventually 
recognised the Tayson ruler as a vassal and legitimate ruler of Vietnam. Qing commitment to 
the Tayson was tenuous, however. After the collapse of the Tayson state in 1802 and Emperor 
Gia Long’s establishment of the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945), Qing Emperor Jiaqing was 
quick to acknowledge the new Vietnamese ruler’s legitimacy.66 Continued maritime raids by 
Tayson privateers may have contributed to Qing ambivalence. 
Tayson privateers acted on behalf of rebels against a tributary relation of the Qing Empire. 
When the Qing emperor recognised Tayson legitimacy, his subordinates nonetheless considered 
these privateers ‘boat bandits’ (tingdao or tingfei) despite an awareness that they acted with 
Tayson complicity and commissions.67 After the disastrous intervention of 1788, Qing coastal 
authorities decided to attempt to adopt a policy of ‘sea war’ (haizhan) against the boat bandits 
and deal with the problem at sea rather than by attempting to intervene on land. In 1797, 
Emperor Qianlong allowed Qing naval forces to enter Vietnamese waters to suppress the boat 
bandits, declaring that ‘We came here to fight the Chinese pirates who are seeking refuge in 
your territory’.68 Qing naval forces proved unequal to those of the Tayson privateers. Qianlong’s 
successor, Jiaqing, forbade Qing naval forces from pursuing pirates into Vietnamese waters, 
helping establish a more definite Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary.69 Qing authorities also 
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made it easier for courts to try and punish pirates captured in the inner seas. Between 1795 and 
1801, Qing legal officers added a series of sub-statutes to the Qing Code distinguishing between 
grades of pirates and assigning them different punishments. They also facilitated the execution 
of pirates. Whereas under normal circumstances any execution required approval from the 
emperor, Beijing approved of ‘execution by royal mandate (wangming xianxing zhengfa)’ to deal 
with the pirate crisis. Under this extraordinary measure, high provincial officials could execute 
criminals by merely displaying a royal mandate banner, which gave them the authority to carry 
out expedited executions without giving offenders the normal opportunities to appeal to review 
processes in the Qing Code.70 When the measures of sea war and expedited executions proved 
ineffective for dealing with the boat bandits, authorities at Canton resorted to a policy of pardon 
and pacification (zhaofu), in which pirates were pardoned, offered military ranks, and employed 
to suppress other pirates, in 1799.71 
As the Tayson privateers reorganized into a massive pirate confederation, the combination 
of policies applied by Qing officials could not suppress or appease this large-scale organisation 
of Chinese hydrarchy. In 1804, Jiaqing appointed Nayancheng as governor-general of 
Guangdong and Guangxi to deal with the ladrones. In addition to constructing more war junks 
and costal fortifications, he also galvanised local initiatives to recruit braves (yong) and militia 
(tuanlian) as a paramilitary force to support Qing official efforts against the ladrones. In doing 
so, he resurrected a practice dating back to the Ming Dynasty. Nayancheng’s measures had 
limited success, however, and he was dismissed in 1805.72 The next governor-general, Wu 
Xiongguang, also attempted to defeat the pirates at sea but to no avail. Qing naval strategy and 
forces were simply no match for those of the ladrones.73 Wu’s successor, Bailing, put more effort 
into supporting local efforts for self-defence. The number of militia units in Guangdong 
quadrupled under Bailing. He also established a system of convoy and implemented a maritime 
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ban to cut off support to pirates. These measures, coupled with a series of natural disasters 
between 1808 and 1810 in the Canton Delta, which exacerbated animosity between the 
ladrones and the local inhabitants, helped Bailing’s naval offensives and offers of pardon achieve 
success. Zhang Bao and Zheng Yi Sao surrendered along with 17,318 men, women, and 
children as well as 226 ships, 1315 cannon, and 2798 other weapons in April 1810. A 
combination of Qing policy and other developments ended the crisis brought about by the 
ladrones.74 
Most of the policies adopted by the Qing against the ladrones, such as aggression on land 
and at sea, zhaofu, maritime bans, and raising local militia, had been applied in the past against 
Koxinga and other pirates. The governors-general in South China had not adapted to the new 
developments of the nineteenth century.75 One of these developments was the rising power and 
reach of the Royal Navy and the British Empire whose interests those ships represented. HMS 
Providence was a manifestation of British power in China. That the Canton authorities were 
willing to allow a British warship to detain pirates on their behalf suggests that in times of crisis, 
Qing officials could countenance cooperation with foreign navies in suppressing piracy. The 
nineteenth century, particularly after the British occupation of Hong Kong in 1841, would 
indeed see the development of an Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy in Chinese 
waters. 
 
Anglo-Qing Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy in the Nineteenth Century 
Despite disagreements during the Providence incident, some Qing officials sought British 
assistance against pirates as the ladrones crisis worsened. The Opium War and subsequent 
disruptions exacerbated the problem of piracy in South China. As this thesis shows, the 
colonisation of Hong Kong allowed the British officials to exert sovereignty, including the 
imposition of English, international, and maritime law, on an island off the coast of China and 
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project it over surrounding waters. By 1847, Hong Kong courts and the Royal Navy enabled 
colonial authorities to exercise a degree of authority in Chinese waters, disrupting Qing maritime 
control around Hong Kong. Though the British administrators displaced Qing authority in 
Hong Kong waters, even the Royal Navy struggled to bring order and suppress Chinese piracy. 
Furthermore, the criminal justice system of Hong Kong struggled to process the colony’s 
criminal population let alone that of the island’s surrounding hydrarchy. Colonial officers found 
a solution in cooperating with and extraditing pirates to Qing counterparts in Kowloon across 
Victoria Harbour from the island of Hong Kong. Seeing the efficacy of the Royal Navy in 
dealing with pirates, Qing officials began collaborating with British forces in suppressing piracy. 
This cooperation laid the foundations for a collaborative imperial hydrarchy between Britain 
and China in the Canton Delta. 
The cooperation between Hong Kong and Kowloon proved so effective that it spread 
elsewhere, extending the reach of British and Qing maritime authority along the China coast 
and even to waters beyond British or Qing jurisdiction. This collaboration for controlling 
Chinese hydrarchy, however, was haphazard and emerged out of necessity and convenience. 
Before 1858, British and Qing officials compromised in their understanding of piracy and the 
jurisdiction they could exercise over it, leading to misunderstandings. This misunderstanding 
would be a source of tension and, as this thesis argues, ultimately became a cause of the Arrow 
War (1856-1860). In addition to ceding Kowloon to Britain as an exercise of the imperialism of 
free seas, the ‘unequal’ treaties that ended the war helped codify aspects of Anglo-Qing 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy, giving it a firmer basis in treaty law. This law represented a 
compromise between British and Qing understandings of piracy. 
The treaties mandated cooperation and coordination between Britain and China against 
pirates. Out of these efforts, new strategies and policies for exercising collaborative maritime 
control emerged in the 1860s. This thesis shows that these developments produced a closer 
cooperation between Britain and China and required officials from both sides to engage and 
compromise with each other’s understandings and limits of imperial hydrarchy. Policies and 




various measures adopted by Britain and China to exert control over the seas of the coast of 
South China largely succeeded in suppressing piracy, a noteworthy example of successful 
cooperation between Britain and China. By the end of the nineteenth century, new concerns 
and priorities eclipsed piracy as focus of Anglo-Qing cooperation. In interacting against Chinese 
pirates, the British and Qing empires developed a collaborative imperial hydrarchy in which the 






Island of Sovereignty: 
British Hong Kong in Chinese Seas 
 
Trade was the principal British interest in China. Before the Opium War, the Royal Navy 
initially went to China to protect British shipping from enemy warships, bringing the politics of 
the Napoleonic Wars to the coast of China. Though Qing officials viewed the Royal Navy with 
suspicion, especially after its two attempts to occupy Macau (Aomen, also spelled Macao), the 
desperate situation caused by the ladrones drove local and even provincial authorities in 
Guangdong to seek the Royal Navy’s assistance against piracy. Britain provided ships and arms 
in support of Qing efforts against the ladrones. After the crisis receded, however, Qing 
prohibitions on opium and the system of regulating trade at Canton proved a larger impediment 
to British trade than pirates, obstacles British agents attempted to circumvent by smuggling and, 
ultimately, war. During the first Opium War (1839-1842), Britain occupied Hong Kong, 
establishing an imperial outpost off the coast of the Qing Empire. This chapter examines the 
implications the colonisation of Hong Kong had for British imperial hydrarchy off the China 
coast. British colonial governors introduced English and international law to their new colony 
and developed the means of projecting this law into Chinese waters from that island. 
The colonisation of Hong Kong marked a sea-change in British power in China. This 
colonisation, undertaken by the British state, which took over control of Sino-British relations 
from the East India Company in 1834, contributed significantly to the uniqueness of Hong Kong 
in the British Empire. Drawing from their experience elsewhere in Asia, British officials in Hong 
Kong initially sought to compromise with existing Qing laws when establishing the new colony. 
The desire of authorities in London and Hong Kong to insulate their subjects from Qing 
jurisdiction and law, as well as a need to establish control, led to an abandonment of these 
compromises. Colonial administrators precluded Qing attempts at exerting authority and 
control over the Chinese at Hong Kong, turning the colony into a literal island of British 




enforced by a governor with unprecedented authority, colonial agents sought to extend their 
control seaward. In addition to fending off impingement by Qing officials who had different 
understandings of the cession of Hong Kong and the implications this had for its surrounding 
waters, Hong Kong officials also had to contend with the unruly seaborne society in those waters. 
Through the powers of the governor of Hong Kong, the marine magistracy, the Supreme and 
Vice-Admiralty Court, and the Royal Navy, British authority was established over an island 
and its surrounding waters in the inner seas of the Qing Empire.  
 
Britain and Piracy in China on the Eve of the Opium War 
In the decades before the Opium War, Chinese hydrarchy in Guangdong expanded and became 
increasingly unruly. The inhabitants of what Dian Murray calls the ‘Cantonese water world’, 
which stretched from Swatow (Shantou) to the coast of Vietnam, had a precarious existence 
and faced discrimination and economic deprivation. The difficulties of living in the Cantonese 
water world were compounded by the ineffectiveness and land-bound biases of Qing rule and 
culminated in the ladrone crisis, which weakened Qing control of the southern coast and left it 
open to foreign invasion.1 Before bringing an invasion force during the Opium War, the Royal 
Navy and armed ships of the East India Company occasionally took actions against suspected 
Chinese pirates, as when the officer of HMS Providence fired on a Chinese boat in 1800. Two 
years after the Providence affair, Chinese merchants in Canton requested that the EIC Select 
Committee in Canton keep East Indiamen in neighbouring waters as protection against pirates.2 
As the ladrones threatened trade, the raison d’être for the British presence in China, the Royal 
Navy took increasingly drastic measures against piracy. The threat from the ladrones drove the 
naval officers to defy Qing restrictions and send warships further up the Pearl River Delta to 
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protect British shipping. In October 1804, Company servants at Canton offered to deploy armed 
ships to suppress piracy on behalf of the provincial authorities. Qing officials initially rejected 
the offer, fearing that acceptance of British support would reveal Chinese impotence against the 
pirate confederation.3 
By 1805, however, the situation had become so desperate that Emperor Jiaqing permitted 
British warships to anchor at the Portuguese settlement of Macau for the sole purpose of 
suppressing piracy. This concession is particularly surprising given the disturbance caused by 
the British attempt to occupy Macau in 1802. French belligerence in Europe provided a pretext 
for British intervention in Portuguese overseas possessions under the guise of protecting allied 
territory from French forces. Portuguese officials in Macau were wary. They protested the 
British occupation and turned to the Qing authorities for protection. Jiaqing responded by 
putting Macau under Qing protection in return for a Portuguese guarantee that no foreign forces 
would be allowed in the city without Qing consent.4 Qing authorities used the opportunity to 
reaffirm their sovereignty over Macau.5 Despite recognising the maritime threat posed by the 
Royal Navy, of which Portuguese officials warned, Qing officials were unable to deal with 
piracy on their own and began allowing British armed ships into the inner seas of the Pearl River 
Delta to suppress it.6 The EIC responded by fitting out the Antelope to cruise against pirates. 
When the ship arrived at Macau in May 1806, local Qing authorities were content to accept its 
presence despite protestations and warnings from the Portuguese.7 
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The Macanese authorities proved prescient in their suspicions. The introduction of a British 
naval presence in the Pearl River Delta catalysed British maritime aggression culminating in a 
second attempt to occupy Macau in 1808, once again bringing the Qing into confrontation with 
the British Empire.8 British belligerence did not stem solely from the geopolitical dimensions of 
the Peninsular War. In hopes of securing approval from India for the occupation of Macau, the 
EIC Select Committee at Canton reported that 
from the excessive corruption and weakness that exists in this provincial Government, 
all instructions or attempts to suppress the Ladrones are either evaded or are nugatory, 
and we believe they would most cheerfully see Macao in the possession of the English 
from an expectation that the Pirates would no longer be allowed to infest the Coast.9 
 
The suppression of piracy provided a sort of moral justification for intervention, though British 
policymakers were in reality far more concerned about the threat from France.10 A British 
squadron under Rear-Admiral William O’Brien Drury reached Macau on 11 September 1808. 
The Canton authorities responded by banning maritime trade with Britain, a method also used 
against pirates. The tactic succeeded. The China trade proved too valuable to the EIC, which 
sided with the Portuguese against Drury’s bellicosity. Drury withdrew from Macau on 20 
December. 11  The maritime threat from British warships subsided, but piracy remained 
problematic. In desperation, Qing officials turned again to the British, recently seen as invaders, 
for assistance. Although Emperor Jiaqing authorised Governor-General Bailing to attack British 
warships in Chinese waters on 29 April 1809, a representative of the magistrate ([zhi]xian) at 
Xiangshan, the administrative district adjacent to Macau, requested that Company officers send 
HMS Dedaigneuse up the Pearl River Delta to combat piracy the following September.12 The 
magistrate would permit the Dedaigneuse to ‘proceed above the Bogue (& he had authority to 
carry her beyond that Fort)’ to attack the ladrones from the river, while his forces would cut off 
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their retreat.13 By October, even the governor ([xun]fu) of Guangdong sought British naval 
assistance against the ladrones.14 Qing authorities also eventually accepted Portuguese help in 
the form of six ships, partly crewed by British sailors.15 British warships and seamen supported 
Qing officials’ ultimately successful efforts to suppress the ladrones. 
Chinese piracy persisted after the surrender of Zhang Bao and Zheng Yi Sao, and the British 
fear of recidivism among the ex-pirates proved warranted, as many former members of the pirate 
confederation continued their depredations.16 Even with the end of large-scale professional 
piracy, piratical depredations still occasionally befell Western ships, and had their effects on the 
China trade. On 26 May 1817, a group of Chinese pirates disguised as compradors, provisioners 
for foreign ships, boarded the American ship Wabash, attacked the crew, and plundered the 
vessel. The American consul, with the support of EIC representatives, pressured Qing 
authorities at Canton into making an inquiry and holding a trial. Qing officials acquiesced but 
used the opportunity to criticize the opium trade. While approving the execution of five Chinese 
as retribution for the five Americans killed, the governor-general refused to pay compensation 
for property lost on suspicion that the Wabash had been carrying in opium. The incident 
provided officials at Canton with a justification for enacting more stringent regulations on 
shipping to limit the import of opium.17 Qing bans on opium had existed since 1729, and the 
continued flow of the substance led to further bans in 1799 and 1836.18 Piracy contributed to 
the opium problem. Pirates themselves engaged in smuggling, and Qing impotence against 
piracy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries emboldened foreign merchants to 
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engage in smuggling as well.19 Qing measures against the opium trade represented a cognizance 
of and attempt to suppress a new type of ‘pirate’ – the foreign merchant.20 Perhaps the greatest 
crime perpetrated by these new pirates occurred in 1841, when one of their chieftains secured 
the cession of a small island off the southeast coast of the Qing Empire. These ‘pirates’ were 
agents of the British Empire, and the island they occupied was Hong Kong. 
 
The Cession of Hong Kong and Imposition of British Rule(s) 
More than fifty years before British authorities established a colony on Hong Kong, they had 
envisioned ‘a place of Security as a Depot for our Goods which cannot be sold off, or shipped 
during the short season that is allowed for Our Shipping to arrive and depart’ in China. They 
sought ‘to obtain a Grant of a small tract of Ground, or detached Island’ for such a depot.21 The 
negotiation for the cession of such a depot as well as expanded trading privileges fell to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cathcart, whom King George III appointed as royal ambassador to 
China. Cathcart set out for China on 21 December 1787 but died en route six months later.22 
His intended mission to China was instead completed by Lord George Macartney. In 1792, 
Henry Dundas, president of the East India Company’s Board of Control, dispatched Macartney 
on a mission to China with the same instructions to secure the session of a ‘depot’ for British 
trade in China. 23  Macartney obtained an audience with Emperor Qianlong, who British 
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23 ‘Instructions to Lord Macartney, Sept. 8, 1792’ in Appendix G of Morse, Chronicles, vol. 2, 237. 





accounts claimed behaved superciliously and treated Macartney with contempt. The emperor 
flatly rejected Macartney’s request for ‘a small Place either near Canton, or Macao; where 
[British] Merchants might dwell, and come and go at their Option’.24 British attitudes towards 
Qing policy thereafter became increasingly hostile. 
With the termination of the EIC’s monopoly over the China trade in 1833, the 
Superintendent of Trade replaced the Select Committee, the EIC body in charge of British 
affairs in Canton. The following year Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston sent Lord William 
John Napier, a distinguished captain in the Royal Navy and advocate of free trade, to China as 
the first chief superintendent of trade. Napier served as the first representative of the British 
government in China, Sino-British relations having previously been mediated through the EIC. 
As such, Napier saw himself as an equal to Qing officials and attempted to act accordingly. 
When he tried to negotiate directly with the governor-general instead of through the Cohong 
merchants, the Canton authorities responded with scorn. In a foreboding move, Napier waxed 
belligerent and called on HMS Andromache and HMS Imogene to bombard the Chinese forts at 
the Bogue. Portentously, he further suggested that the British send an expeditionary force to 
seize the island of Hong Kong. Napier was the first British official to call for military measures 
to secure the ‘depot’ that Cathcart sought and to suggest that it be located on Hong Kong. 
Napier’s bellicosity failed to impress Qing officials at Canton, who continued to reject calls for 
negotiation. Napier withdrew in disgrace to Macau where he later died of fever, the ‘Napier 
fizzle’ having achieved nothing but providing a martyr for the British cause of freer trade in 
China. 25  Napier’s pugnacity passed on to the British mercantile community in China. 
Increasingly frustrated with the restrictions of the Canton System of trade developed at that 
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port, they pressured Napier’s successor as superintendent of trade, Captain Charles Elliot, to 
take a more confrontational stance while their representatives in Britain requested that the 
British government engage in hostilities. British lobbying at home and in China culminated in 
the first Opium War.26 
During the Opium War, Cathcart’s charge of securing a territorial possession for use as an 
entrepôt was fulfilled by the Convention of Chuenpi (Chuanbi) negotiated between Elliot and 
Qing Imperial Commissioner Qishan. In the treaty, Elliot secured ‘the cession of the island and 
harbor of Hongkong to the British crown’, though details of the transfer of sovereignty remained 
to be negotiated.27 Within a week of the conclusion of the Convention of Chuenpi, the British 
flag was raised over Hong Kong on 26 January 1841 on the north shore of Hong Kong Island at 
a place later known as Possession Point.28 Shortly thereafter, Elliot proclaimed that ‘pending 
Her Majesty’s further pleasure, the natives of the island of Hongkong, and all natives of China 
thereto resorting, shall be governed according to the laws and customs of China, every 
description of torture excepted’. Elliot intended that the Chinese in Hong Kong would be 
governed separately from ‘all British subjects and foreigners’ who would ‘enjoy full security and 
protection, according to the principles and practice of British law.’ In this newly acquired 
Crown Colony, the Chinese inhabitants were to be put under a foreign (i.e. Qing) criminal 
justice system while ‘Her Majesty’s subjects, or other persons than natives of the island or of 
China… shall fall under the cognizance of the criminal and admiralty Jurisdiction’ of Britain.29 
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British Legal Posturing in Hong Kong 
Elliot sought to invert the system of extraterritoriality developed informally by the British 
community at Canton and apply it to Hong Kong. Extraterritoriality results from a legal 
compromise in which foreigners in a sovereign state remain under the jurisdiction of their own 
state. Supposedly, extraterritorial privileges could only be secured through bilateral treaty, with 
the default situation in international law being that such foreigners were under the jurisdiction 
of the state in which they were located. Officers of the East India Company, which functioned 
as the British judicial authority in its territories, made several attempts to negotiate 
extraterritorial privileges for British subjects in China, none of which were formally granted by 
the Qing. The Lady Hughes affair of 1784 marked a watershed in the British acceptance of this 
status quo. During the incident, the Qing executed a possibly innocent British sailor from the 
country ship Lady Hughes after a gunner from its crew had killed a Chinese boatman when firing 
a salute. After the execution, Britons in China began to see the Qing justice system as barbaric 
and arbitrary and refused to submit to Qing law. The execution outraged the British public, and 
Westminster moved to unilaterally declare extraterritorial jurisdiction over British subjects in 
Canton. In 1787, the British Parliament granted EIC supercargoes the right to send British 
subjects to England for trial and punishment.30 In 1833, Parliament passed ‘An Act to Regulate 
the Trade of China and India’ (3 & 4 William IV, c. 93), section six of which called for the 
establishment of ‘a Court of Justice with Criminal and Admiralty Jurisdiction for the Trial of 
Offences committed by His Majesty’s Subjects within the said Dominions [of the Emperor of 
China], and the Ports and Havens thereof, and on the High Seas within One hundred Miles of 
the Coast of China.’31 
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The court authorised by the act amounted to a British attempt to unilaterally declare 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. Such an act would have been a flagrant violation of Qing 
law. The Qing Code of 1646 declared that ‘all aliens who come to submit themselves to the 
government of the empire shall, when they commit offenses [on Chinese soil] be sentenced 
according to the Chinese Penal Code.’32 After 1744, however, the Qing seemed content to settle 
for a policy of ‘deferring to barbarian wishes’, allowing leaders of foreign communities to 
administer justice and asserting Qing jurisdiction only in cases of homicide involving Qing 
subjects.33 Such deferment to leaders of foreign communities in China was no innovation of the 
Qing. The concession of extraterritorial privileges in China dates back at least to the Tang 
Dynasty (618-907 CE). The Tang Code stipulated that in offences where both parties were 
foreigners, the case should be tried according to foreign laws. The Arabs trading at Canton were 
among the first to receive extraterritorial privileges in China.34 Qing authorities inherited the 
Tang willingness to allow foreigners to be governed by their own leaders and laws. 
Extraterritoriality was as much a Chinese as a British practice. 
Elliot’s application of the practice of extraterritoriality to the Chinese in Hong Kong 
represents an instance of what Lauren Benton terms ‘legal posturing’, a compromise between 
the legal regime of an imperial power and local politics in which the former is adapted to the 
latter.35 Elliot’s legal posturing adapted to two legal regimes: that of the Qing and that of the 
Canton System and the extraterritoriality informally practiced there. His declaring the rule of 
Qing law over the Chinese in Hong Kong represents an extreme case of legal posturing in which 
the pre-existing legal regime was retained almost entirely intact with the notable exception of 
the practice of torture. Though extreme, the British willingness to engage in such legal posturing 
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was evident as early as 1787 in Cathcart’s instructions to secure a British entrepôt, which 
contained a similar conditional: 
Should it be required that no native Chinese be subject to be punished by Our 
jurisdiction, or should any particular modification of this Power be exacted, it is not 
material to insist upon it, provided British Subjects can be exempted from the Chinese 
Jurisdiction for Crimes they may commit and that the British Chief be not held 
responsible if any culprit should escape the pursuit of Justice, after search has been made 
by British and Chinese Officers acting in conjunction.36 
 
It should come as no surprise that the instructions to the Cathcart embassy, which had been 
galvanized in part by the Lady Hughes affair, should contain such a clause protecting British 
subjects from Qing jurisdiction. The longevity of the concern over the perceived arbitrariness 
and barbarity of Chinese law manifested in Elliot’s legal posturing over fifty years later and had 
a profound effect on British perceptions of Chinese law.37 
Notably, where EIC authorities seemed content to allow Qing officials to retain jurisdiction 
over the Chinese in a British entrepôt, in Elliot’s Hong Kong, a Crown rather than a Company 
territory, ‘all native persons residing therein’ became ‘subjects of the Queen of England, to 
whom and to whose officers they must pay duty and obedience.’ Jurisdiction over the Chinese 
would be exercised ‘by the elders of villages, subject to the control of a British magistrate.’ 
British officials were thus ultimately responsible for governing the Chinese in Hong Kong 
‘according to the laws, customs, and usages of the Chinese.’38 The shift from a reliance on 
indigenous institutions and individuals to the British codification and administration of 
indigenous law reflects a broader trend of modern imperial governance. In Bengal, Company 
servants shifted from rule by contemporary local custom in the 1790s to an attempted 
codification of ancient law to be administered by EIC officials.39 George Thomas Staunton’s 
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translation of the Qing Code in 1810 made a similar system possible in China.40 The result was 
an adaptation of extraterritoriality for the Chinese in Hong Kong. While the Chinese in Hong 
Kong were still theoretically ruled by Qing law, they were under the jurisdiction of British 
officials, who would administer that law. In his legal posturing, Elliot adopted the 
extraterritoriality of the Canton System, but adapted it to reflect the ascendancy of British 
power in China. 
Elliot’s legal posturing proved premature. The Qing court rejected the Convention of 
Chuenpi, while Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston believed the concessions insufficient. 
British power in China was yet in the ascendant. ‘After all’, Palmerston declared, ‘our naval 
power is so strong that we can tell the Emperor what we mean to hold rather than that he should 
say what he would cede.’41 The rejection of the Convention of Chuenpi by both the Qing and 
British governments led to renewed hostilities. Despite the resumption of the war, British 
merchants, particularly the firm of Jardine, Matheson and Co., were quick to seize on the 
opportunity provided by the short-lived Convention of Chuenpi and began the process of 
establishing a British settlement on Hong Kong. By the time Henry Pottinger replaced Elliot as 
the superintendent of trade and British plenipotentiary in China, he noted that the ‘settlement 
had already advanced too far to admit its ever being restored to the authority of the Emperor 
consistent with the Honour and Advantage of Her Majesty’s Crown and Subjects.’42 Against 
the will of Palmerston’s successor, the Earl of Aberdeen, Pottinger decided to negotiate for the 
retention of Hong Kong in the Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing), the first of China’s ‘unequal treaties’ 
imposed by gunboat diplomacy.43  The stunning naval victories achieved by British forces, 
particularly HEICS Nemesis, an iron-hulled armed steamship, affirmed the British confidence 
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in the superiority of their civilization. After validation in the Treaty of Nanking, British 
authorities decided that even Elliot’s legal posturing, which gave British officials the right to 
administer Chinese law, ceded too much to Qing authorities. Early colonial administrators 
instead sought to make Hong Kong an island of British sovereignty off the coast of China. 
 
Establishing an Island of Sovereignty 
His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, 
etc., the Island of Hongkong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, 
Her Heirs and Successors, and to be governed by such Laws and Regulations as Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., shall see fit to direct.44 
 
Article III of the Treaty of Nanking gave British authorities the right, at least on paper, to govern 
Hong Kong as they saw ‘fit’. The task of overseeing this governance fell to the governor of Hong 
Kong, to whom Queen Victoria granted the power 
to enact with the advice of the Legislative Council of the said Island of Hong Kong all 
such Laws and Ordinances as may from time to time be required for the peace, order, 
and good government of Our Subjects being within the dominions of the Emperor of 
China, or being within any Ship or Vessel at a distance of not more than One hundred 
Miles from the Coast of China45 
 
In addition to holding authority over all British subjects in China and off its coast, the governor 
of Hong Kong commanded the obedience of ‘all our Officers and Ministers, Civil and Military, 
and all other, the Inhabitants of our Said Colony of Hong Kong.’46 The governor furthermore 
held ‘authority over H.M.’s Naval Forces in the China Seas’, specifically ‘that part of H.M.’s 
Naval Forces actually on the Coast of China, & so long as they remain on the Coast.'47 He also 
served concurrently, until 1859, as British plenipotentiary and superintendent of trade in China 
with authority over the consuls at the treaty ports and responsibility for relations between 
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Britain and China.48 When Henry Pottinger became the first governor of Hong Kong, he was a 
man of impressive authority. 
The unprecedented powers of the governor of Hong Kong reflected the anomaly of the new 
colony in the British Empire. Colonial Secretary Lord Stanley noted that ‘among the various 
colonial dependencies of the British Empire, there is no case which forms so remarkable an 
exception to ordinary rules as that of the island of Hong Kong.’49 Though Hong Kong was not 
the first Crown Colony established in Asia, the island’s position at the edge of the Qing Empire, 
as well as the tenuousness of the British position there (two and a half years passed between the 
defunct Convention of Chuenpi and the ratification of the Treaty of Nanking on 26 June 1843), 
necessitated greater central control than existed elsewhere in the British Empire.50 Each of the 
first three governors of Hong Kong had cut their teeth as Company servants in either India, 
Canton, or the Straits Settlements, and had more familiarity acting on behalf of the Company 
rather than the Crown. As governors of Hong Kong, however, their authority exceeded that of 
most colonial officials in Asia. Only the governor-general (later viceroy) of India had 
comparable authority. 51  Colonial officials in Hong Kong thus found themselves uniquely 
positioned to assert British sovereignty over the colony. Where EIC representatives engaged in 
legal posturing in establishing their jurisdiction over Asian territories and peoples, the unique 
status of Hong Kong and the prodigious authority wielded by its governors allowed the 
development the new colony’s legal system to follow a different route. 
As in the Convention of Chuenpi, the cession of Hong Kong in Article III of the Treaty of 
Nanking proved vague, and its execution would require further negotiation between Qing and 
British authorities. Misunderstanding between British and Qing officials over the fledgling treaty 
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system led to disagreements about their respective roles in the colony. At the heart of the debate 
was the position of Chinese in Hong Kong vis-à-vis colonial and Qing authorities. Shortly after 
the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, Pottinger was already struggling with the problem of crime 
on the island. He complained to Aberdeen that ‘I cannot yet see how a large and mixed Native 
Population is to be kept in order, unless our officers on the spot are vested with what may be 
termed Police Authority, in contradistinction to Judicial powers’. Pottinger thus initially seemed 
willing to accept the legal posturing in Cathcart’s orders, leaving the Chinese population of 
Hong Kong under Qing jurisdiction. However, he would consent only to continued Qing 
jurisdiction over the Chinese in Hong Kong on the condition that they submit to the colonial 
police. Under such an arrangement, it seems, the police in Hong Kong could arrest Chinese 
criminals but would have to deliver them to Qing courts for the administration of justice. 
Pottinger remarked of this unwieldy system that ‘the difficulty could be at once reconciled by 
allowing a Chinese Officer to reside on the Island to superintend the Police of the Chinese 
people’, but he further stated that he was ‘loath’ to accept such an arrangement.52 
Qiying (Keying or Kiying in English sources), the Qing imperial commissioner, willingly 
accepted Pottinger’s legal posturing with a notable caveat: 
There being no Chinese Officer established in Hongkong, it is out of the question to 
deny English Officers the police surveillance and restraint over [the Chinese in Hong 
Kong], but that the people of China should be unwilling to obey the Laws of England is 
a thing of the same nature as the refusal of the English Merchants and People to be 
forcibly ruled by the Law of China. 
 
Noting the intractability of the British mercantile community at Canton, Qiying foresaw a 
similar situation for the Chinese in Hong Kong. As a pre-emptive measure, he sought to ape the 
solution developed by British authorities to resolve incompatible legal systems at Canton and 
thus proposed a sort of extraterritoriality for the Chinese in Hong Kong. This compromise would 
be achieved by a continued Qing sovereignty over the Chinese population of Hong Kong despite 
the island’s cession to Britain. While the retention of Qing sovereignty in Hong Kong might 
 




have represented legal posturing on the part of the British colonial officials, Qiying seems to have 
assumed such an arrangement implicit in the cession of Hong Kong.  
As regards the Article in the Treaty which stipulates that Hong Kong shall come under 
the authority and government of England, this had reference to the cession of the ground 
for the merchants and people of the [sic] H.M.’s Country to repair their vessels and store 
their goods there; it was not therein provided that its Inhabitants should become English 
people.53 
 
Interpreting Article III of the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded the ‘Island of Hong Kong’ to 
British rule to refer literally to only the island and none of its inhabitants, Qiying seems to have 
believed that while Qing territory could be alienated, Qing subjecthood could not. As the 
Chinese in Hong Kong were still to be considered Qing subjects, they ‘ought to be governed by 
our Chinese Mandarins as before’.54 With such an understanding of the cession in Hong Kong, 
Qiying would have accepted the proposed arrangement in Cathcart’s instructions in 1787 as 
well as Pottinger’s subsequent legal posturing. 
Unfortunately for Qiying, the political circumstances of the legal posturing in Cathcart’s 
instructions had changed. While a docile EIC might have been willing to accept continued Qing 
sovereignty over the Chinese population of a Company depot, the British government, which 
had just won Hong Kong through victory in a war, proved less accommodating. With their 
empire in the ascendant, British policymakers became more brazen in pressing their ‘sovereign 
thinking’. Sovereignty over British subjects became a mark of imperial prestige. Accordingly, 
British law and jurisdiction came to be seen as integral to the British Empire and its civilizing 
mission.55 The establishment of British (more specifically, English) law was seen as essential to 
British rule, and the Victorians considered it an important aspect of civilisation.56 Qing retention 
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of jurisdiction over the Chinese population of a British territory would have been anathema to 
the British imperial project. The matter was eventually taken up to the law lords, the highest 
legal authorities in the British Empire.57 They concluded that the Chinese in Hong Kong 
continuing to reside there after the cession to the British Crown are no longer subjects 
of the Emperor of China. They are subjects of the Crown of England… 
The Island of Hong Kong having been conquered by H.M.’s Forces and ceded to her 
in full sovereignty by the Emperor of China, we apprehend that Her Majesty may make 
what Laws she pleases for the govt. of all persons resident within the Island, and that no 
parliamentary enactment would be required for carrying such Laws into execution.58 
 
British authorities thus rejected Qiying’s interpretation of the cession of Hong Kong and claimed 
absolute sovereignty over the entire population of the island. Though the Colonial Office 
initially rejected this ruling, the law lords’ interpretation of British sovereignty in Hong Kong 
ultimately prevailed, and the legal posturing of ‘home rule for the Chinese’ never became official 
policy.59 Rather than engage in legal posturing with Asian laws as they did in other possessions, 
British colonial officials fully implemented English law in Hong Kong.60 
Westminster’s insistence on British jurisdiction over the Chinese in Hong Kong drove 
Pottinger to backtrack on his earlier legal posturing and insist on British sovereignty over all the 
inhabitants of Hong Kong. His successor, John Francis Davis, insisted even more fervently that 
Britain have jurisdiction over the Chinese. Having intimate experience of Sino-foreign relations 
before the Treaty of Nanking, Davis strove to ensure that Hong Kong would not follow the 
example of the ‘Portuguese pseudo-colony of Macao’, which he believed was ‘not a Portuguese 
colony, as the Chinese are acknowledged sovereigns’. Instead, noting that Hong Kong 
‘possesses untried advantages which may convert it into a modern Tyre’, Davis proclaimed: 
There is a real British Colony (no Portuguese counterfeit) placed on the very threshold 
of China. There they may see commerce flourishing in the absence of restrictions, – 
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prosperity & power secure under the protection of equal laws, – and, in a word, all the 
best fruits of science & civilization have planted direct from the European headquarters.  
 
For Davis, the introduction of ‘equal’ (i.e. English) laws became more than a matter of British 
sovereign thinking; it would help fulfil the goals of the Opium War and subsequent Treaty of 
Nanking which ‘admitted, or rather compelled [China], for the first time in the history of the 
world, into the family of civilized nations.’61 
Essential to this admission into the ‘family of civilized nations’ was the acceptance of the 
‘law of nations’ as international law was known in the mid-nineteenth century. Though the law 
of nations initially emerged out of negotiations and reconciliation between different state 
systems on roughly equal terms, by the early-nineteenth century it had become entirely 
European-dictated through the exclusion of Asian polities from the family of civilized states. 
Control of membership in this family became the remit of European states. British naval 
supremacy, established after the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), meant that in the nineteenth century 
Britain became the senior member of the family, wielding the most influence over the dictates 
of the law of nations. As arbiters of international law, British authorities were able to pressure 
the legal practices of other states and empires to conform to a British model.62 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, Great Britain and its proxy, the EIC, had steadily expanded the British 
Empire in Asia. British and Company sovereignty allowed British officials to better dictate 
international and maritime law, often to the benefit of their empire. In such a legal context, Hong 
Kong held particular importance. As an island of British sovereignty, Hong Kong represented 
the furthest extension of an archipelago of British power, stretching from Calcutta across the 
Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea to the coast of China, where the British-enforced law 
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of nations held sway.63 While the extension of this archipelago into Southeast Asia allowed 
British imperial interests to challenge Chinese suzerainty there, Hong Kong punctured fabric of 
Qing sovereignty in the core zone of Chinese world order.64 
The colony of Hong Kong thus presented British authorities with a means of bringing 
English law and the law of nations to the China coast. The need to secure this advantage helps 
explain the British refusal to engage in legal posturing in Hong Kong as well as the promptness 
with which English law was introduced into the colony. Davis acted upon his enthusiasm to see 
the implementation of English law in Hong Kong and passed Ordinance No. 15 of 1844, 
establishing the Supreme Court in Hong Kong. The court would execute the ordinance’s 
stipulation that ‘the law of England shall be in full force in the said Colony of Hongkong’.65 The 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong heard its first criminal case on 2 October 1844. The wholesale 
implementation of English law in Hong Kong would prove problematic, however, and colonial 
officials, including Davis, ultimately did engage in legal posturing and reforms, but the principle 
of the sovereignty of English law over the population of Hong Kong remained firm.66 Despite 
having more or less established English law and sovereignty in Hong Kong, the colonial 
administration struggled to maintain order in the colony. Hong Kong’s proximity to China, 
where a different legal system existed, and the Qing inability to govern the Cantonese water 
world, exacerbated the problems of imposing English law on a predominately Chinese 
population. Establishing the foundations for a successful entrepôt and market off the China coast, 
the ‘modern Tyre’ of Davis’s aspirations, required controlling Hong Kong’s hydrarchy. 
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Sovereignty and Hong Kong Hydrarchy 
Though control of unruly seafarers in Hong Kong’s surrounding waters did not feature in British 
motivations for the island’s colonisation as it did in Southeast Asia, the ‘imperialism of free seas’ 
and that of free trade influenced British policy on the island. Having decided to retain Hong 
Kong as a British possession, the government there decided to establish the colony as a free port 
on the model of Singapore.67 As a free port open to ships of any state not at war with Britain and 
with low duties and harbour dues to encourage commerce, Hong Kong eventually developed 
the infrastructure to become an important node in networks of riverine, coastal, and oceanic 
shipping. By the time of the California Gold Rush in 1849, Hong Kong was well-positioned and 
well-endowed to serve as a centre of emigration that would transform the island.68 In its first 
years under British rule, however, Hong Kong failed to fulfil Pottinger’s promise that ‘within six 
months of Hongkong being declared to have become a permanent British Colony, it will be a 
vast Emporium of Commerce and Wealth.’69 The colony did not become fiscally self-sufficient 
until 1858. Instead, Hong Kong, which was occupied ‘not with a view to colonization, but for 
diplomatic, commercial, and military purposes’, served the British Empire most importantly in 
the last sense.70 
Hong Kong became an important naval base before it became an important port of trade.71 
British warships would play an important role in protecting colonial shipping. The Treaty of 
Nanking and the subsequent 1843 Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter, changed the nature of the Royal Navy’s relation with China. Article X 
of the supplementary treaty stipulated that Britain would station warship at each of the treaty 
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ports, effectively granting the Royal Navy a permanent presence in China. The following year 
the headquarters of the East Indies and China Station was moved to Hong Kong. The station 
became one of the most important commands of the Royal Navy, second in size only to the 
Mediterranean Station.72 With authority over the headquarters of the second largest division of 
the most powerful navy in the world, the governor of Hong Kong possessed the means of 
projecting British power over the Cantonese water world. 
 
Hong Kong Hydrarchy 
Situated at the eastern end of the mouth of the Pearl River Delta, Hong Kong lies in the 
transition between riverine and inner sea zone of the Cantonese water world, where sedentary 
agriculture supplemented by part-time fishing gave way to fishing as a livelihood and lifestyle, 
and riverine shipping was replaced by coastal shipping.73 That the Dan made up the largest 
proportion of Hong Kong’s population testifies to the island’s liminality. 74  The Dan likely 
descended ideologically if not literally from the Southern Yue people in the Chinese imagination. 
The Southern Yue took to living on the sea as a means of escaping the tyranny of the Qin 
Dynasty (221-206 BCE). By the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE), they were already known 
for their violence. Chinese society on land came to associate the Southern Yue’s successors, the 
Dan, with piracy and intractability and marginalised them as a result. Rejected by their cousins 
on land, the Dan participated in various maritime rebellions against the ruling dynasty, including 
that of Koxinga. 
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By Qing times, the Dan were still considered base people and were banned from taking the 
civil service exams, an important means of social advancement in late imperial China. Even after 
Emperor Yongzheng allowed the Dan to settle on land in 1729, they continued to suffer 
discrimination and to contest Qing rule. Dan seafarers undoubtedly constituted a substantial 
proportion of the crews of the Tayson privateers and the fleets of the ladrones, which ravaged 
the Cantonese water world in the early nineteenth century. Zhang Bao himself was Dan as was 
Guo Podai, leader of the second largest fleet in the confederation.75  The Dan thus had a 
prominent position in what was likely the highest level of organisation achieved by the 
hydrarchy of the Cantonese water world. Hong Kong played an important role in this 
organisation as a signal station for Zheng Yi Sao and Zhang Bao’s Red Flag Fleet, the largest of 
the confederation’s fleets.76 Even after Zhang Bao’s surrender, animosity between the Dan and 
their Qing rulers persisted. When the Qing Empire faced a new maritime threat in 1839, many 
Dan, ever ready to defy the dynasty, seized the opportunity to challenge Qing power and 
became the largest group of Chinese to collaborate with the British during and after the Opium 
War.77 
Some Dan, notably Lo Aqui (Lu Yagui) and Kwok Acheong (Guo Yaxiang), continued to 
act as collaborators after the cession of Hong Kong and became prominent figures in local society. 
Kwok served as an agent for the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company before 
establishing his own steam fleet. As a prominent figure in the Chinese community, Kwok often 
advised the colonial government of Hong Kong on matters regarding the island’s Chinese 
inhabitants.78 Lo Aqui also became a leader among the Hong Kong Chinese, helping to establish 
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the Man Mo (Wenwu) Temple, which became a centre of Chinese religious and social life in 
the colony. Within a decade of the cession of Hong Kong, Lo became the largest Chinese 
landholder in Hong Kong, controlling an area known to the British as the Lower Bazaar. In 
1845, along with Fung Attai (Feng Yadi), he took control of the opium farm, a lucrative 
monopoly sold by the colonial government as a means of generating revenue. Despite these 
contributions to the development of Hong Kong, Lo is perhaps better remembered for his 
criminality. He allegedly bribed Chief Magistrate William Caine to turn a blind eye to criminal 
activities, including pirate protection societies, in the Lower Bazaar. With control of the opium 
monopoly, Lo and Fung raised the price to render Hong Kong’s market uncompetitive while 
they continued to smuggle opium through Cumsingmoon (Jinxingmen) beyond Hong Kong’s 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, Lo used the revenue cruiser intended to enforce the opium monopoly 
to disrupt harbour traffic and engage in piracy. Despite these crimes and being labelled by the 
Qing as the foremost among the hanjian (treacherous Chinese) spies and collaborators, Lo 
nonetheless purchased an official degree and joined the ranks of the Qing gentry.79 
In many ways, Lo Aqui personifies the changes to Hong Kong’s hydrarchy resulting from 
the establishment of a British presence on the island. The removal of Qing authority presented 
the formerly marginalised Dan and other peripheral Chinese with new opportunities to gain 
wealth. While some of these paths to prosperity were legal, many occurred in the interstices of 
the new political order in Hong Kong and its environs. The disruption caused by the Opium 
War and the establishment of a British presence on Hong Kong made it easy for many criminals 
to evade punishment by taking advantage of the limits of Qing and British authority in the 
waters of the Canton Delta. Even before the first Opium War, Qing officials struggled to assert 
their control beyond the inner seas. Lack of coordination between regional naval commands 
and the absence of a unified maritime policy meant that Qing naval strategy focused on coastal 
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defence rather than building an effective fleet, which limited the Qing navy’s ability to police 
the surrounding seas. The British maritime invasion further weakened the tenuous grasp of Qing 
power over the seas off the South China coast. The destruction of the Qing navy and coastal 
defences in the south during the war severely disrupted the Qing ability to maintain order over 
Hong Kong’s surrounding waters and created a political vacuum that allowed piracy and 
maritime crime to flourish.80 Into this chaos, British colonial and naval officers attempted to 
impose their own imperial hydrarchy. 
 
British Imperial Hydrarchy around Hong Kong 
Having affirmed their sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong, British authorities sought to 
extend that control over the surrounding hydrarchy. The cession of the ‘island and harbor’ of 
Hong Kong in the Convention of Chuenpi suggests that Elliot negotiated the establishment of 
British control over what later became known as Victoria Harbour.81 Elliot seemed to affirm 
British control over Victoria Harbour when on 30 April 1841 he appointed William Caine as 
chief magistrate of the island and gave him the authority to ‘exercise authority according to the 
laws, customs and usages of China, as near as may be (every description of torture excepted), 
for the preservation of the peace, and the protection of life and property, over all the native 
inhabitants in the said island and the harbours thereof’. 82  Elliot further reinforced British 
authority over Victoria Harbour by appointing Lieutenant William Pedder, who previously 
served as the first officer of HEICS Nemesis, as Hong Kong’s first harbour master and marine 
magistrate. Pedder issued Hong Kong’s first port regulations the same day as his appointment. 
Enforcement of these regulations fell to the Royal Navy.83 
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Though Article III of the Treaty of Nanking makes no mention of Victoria Harbour, 
Pottinger and Davis nonetheless exercised a de facto sovereignty over that body of water. 
Pottinger confirmed Elliot’s appointment of Pedder as the ‘Marine Magistrate of the Island of 
Hong Kong and its dependencies’ with authority over ‘all persons… resorting or abiding in the 
Harbours of said Island.’ Where Caine was initially expected to enforce Chinese law, however, 
Pedder was authorised ‘to exercise Magisterial and police authority… according to the customs 
and usages of general British Police Law.’84 Caine and Pedder’s authority over Victoria Harbour 
marks a unilateral declaration of jurisdiction over an area initially under the authority of the 
colonel of Dapeng, often referred to as the ‘Taepang Commandant’ in British sources. 85 
Contentions as well as cooperation between the Hong Kong magistrates and the colonel and his 
civilian counterpart, the Kowloon deputy magistrate, discussed in the following chapter, 
persisted to the end of the century. Despite the repudiation of the Convention of Chuenpi and 
Elliot’s dismissal, Pottinger confirmed Caine and Pedder’s authority over Victoria Harbour after 
the Treaty of Nanking.86 Even before the treaty, British authorities were already concerned 
with precluding Qing activity in Victoria Harbour. Worried that Qing agents might infringe on 
British sovereignty over the harbour, Aberdeen advised Pottinger to warn the Chinese against 
‘erecting on the point of land opposite to Hong Kong any works which might prove 
inconvenient to the secure occupation of the Island’ or that ‘could in any degree affect the 
security of the anchorage at Hong Kong, or give them a command of the channel between the 
Island and the Main land’.87 British control of Victoria Harbour prevented Qing officials from 
attempting to exercise control over Victoria Harbour from Kowloon. 
Davis further consolidated British control over Victoria Harbour, and declared to Rear-
Admiral Thomas Cochrane, commander-in-chief of the East Indies and China Station, that the 
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Royal Navy was ‘justified in pursuing a very stringent and summary course within the limits of 
the Harbour of Hongkong’. Davis demarcated the limits of the harbour as lying ‘between Lye-
mun [Lei Yue Mun, Liyumen] pass on the East, and a straight line drawn from Green Island to 
Stone Cutter’s Island on the West, or perhaps a little beyond’.88 In giving the Royal Navy free 
reign in Victoria Harbour, Davis effectively occupied the area with the Queen’s ships. 
Headquartered at Hong Kong, the Royal Navy acted as an occupying garrison enforcing British 
control over the harbour. Victoria Harbour’s relation to Hong Kong became akin to that of the 
English Channel to Britain: a maritime zone under land-based state sovereignty. Colonial 
authorities seemed to understand Charles Hedges’s statement in 1696 that the ‘king of England 
hath… an empire and sovereignty over the British seas [i.e. the English Channel]’ as equally true 
of Queen Victoria and her namesake harbour in 1844.89 British officers could thus rule the 
hydrarchy in Victoria Harbour as an extension of the territory of Hong Kong with the 
magistracy, the marine police, and the Royal Navy all asserting authority over persons in the 
harbour. This degree of control would prove impossible south of Hong Kong as the southern 
coast faced the vastness of the South China Sea where territorial demarcation proved impossible. 
Despite the inability to effectively occupy the harbours and seas south of Hong Kong, Davis 
nonetheless remained adamant that Britain held sovereignty over them. On 20 November 1844, 
a British magistrate discovered ‘a Chinese Officer named Chingtung [Zheng Dong], and 
attached to the Office of the Singan Hien [Xin’an xian, the magistrate of Xin’an]’ attempting to 
sell passes to the ‘boat people’ inhabiting the southern coast of Hong Kong. Davis considered 
this ‘a violation of territorial sovereignty… [a]s these persons must pay taxes to us [i.e. the British] 
and also receive passes from us’.90 Qiying pointed out that ‘fishing boats of the coast, when going 
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out to the ocean to fish, customarily seek licences from local officials’, which helped Qing 
officials determine whether fisherfolk were ‘good or evil’. Such passes however should be issued 
from the district capital and Qiying admitted there was ‘something amiss’ in Zheng Dong’s 
attempt to sell them at Hong Kong.91 Qiying implied that the Qing still held authority over 
Chinese at sea. Citing the extraterritorial jurisdiction the British held over their subjects in China, 
he claimed the same rights in the case of Zheng Dong. Noting that the treaty stipulated that ‘in 
cases involving English and Chinese, the English are under England’s jurisdiction, and the 
Chinese are to be investigated and tried in China’, Qiying believed Zheng Dong was under Qing 
jurisdiction. He thus suggested that as ‘the clerk is Chinese, he should be investigated by 
Chinese officials’. If Zheng ‘inappropriately exercised power at Hong Kong, then he is in the 
wrong and should be punished according to the laws of China. If he acted under official orders, 
local officials are responsible for the crime’. Qiying thus requested that British officials hand 
Zheng over to the Kowloon authorities.92 Davis refused to release Zheng until Qiying confirmed 
that ‘he was not authorized to come over to HongKong’ and that only ‘Officers of my Sovereign, 
the Queen of Great Britain, can by the Law of England exercise authority in HongKong’.93 It is 
unclear whether Qiying understood this to mean that the British had jurisdiction over the seas 
around Hong Kong and those inhabiting them, as he still understood Zheng’s actions as a 
violation of British authority at Hong Kong rather than its surrounding waters. Davis, however, 
saw the admission as ‘the successful result of my zealous determination to establish Her 
Majesty’s sovereignty over the whole of this island’ which included the ‘boat people’ (likely the 
Dan) of the surrounding hydrarchy.94 
The Hong Kong government implemented its authority over the Chinese, including the Dan, 
in part through a system of registration. As early as April 1843, Pottinger had already suggested 
creating ‘a Registry Office, and to allow no person to reside on this Island who shall not be 
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registered in such an office’.95 The following June, he explained the system to Qiying, stating 
that ‘all persons registered are to be considered amenable to the Police Laws of the Island so 
long as they remain.’ Registration became a means for the Chinese in Hong Kong to become 
British subjects. As Pottinger further explained: 
The Island of Hongkong having been ceded in Sovereignty to The Queen of England 
who is to make such Laws and Regulations as Her Majesty may please to enact, the 
option will be given to all Chinese on the Island whether to quit the Island, being paid 
for their Lands and houses, or to remain as subjects of the British Crown, and as such 
entitled to British Protection, and subject to British Laws.96 
 
Davis would implement Pottinger’s proposals by passing the first registration ordinance in 
October 1844. Though it met with opposition and was amended to exclude Europeans, the 
clauses for the registration of Chinese remained after protests by both Europeans and Chinese 
in Hong Kong. The European community opposed registration in general, seeing it as an 
infringement of liberty. The Chinese resented the capitulation tax, which was intended to be $1 
per year but was mistranslated by Karl Gützlaff, a Pomeranian missionary and Chinese secretary 
for the colonial government, in the Chinese version to read $1 per month.97 Registration of the 
Chinese included the Dan and members of Hong Kong’s hydrarchy. Samuel Turner Fearon, 
appointed the first Registrar General in 1845, reported that in addition to issuing 9,900 
certificates of registration, he also ‘registered 383 boats, the crews of which amount to 2,150, 
making a total of 12,050 persons who have been registered under the Ordinance’ and thus under 
British sovereignty.98 
While registered Chinese became British subjects, most Chinese who came to Hong Kong 
before the 1850s were transient. The island’s original inhabitants and Chinese who became 
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British subjects became a minority among the Chinese in Hong Kong, many of whom merely 
sought temporary employment and a profit before returning to China. The predominance of 
male sojourners and low rate of female and family migration before the Taiping Rebellion 
testifies to the temporary nature of the presence of many Chinese on the island. The 
characteristic of transience also applied to the non-Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong with 
colonial officials seeing Hong Kong as a temporary station while many merchants saw the colony 
in the same light as sojourning Qing subjects.99 The floating population of Hong Kong came to 
be associated with crime and violence, particularly as crime remained rampant in the colony’s 
early years. In his report on the implementation of registration, Fearon claimed that ‘the shelter 
and protection afforded by the presence of the fleet soon made our shores the resort of outlaws, 
opium smugglers and indeed of all persons who having rendered themselves obnoxious to the 
Chinese laws, had the means of escaping hither’.100 Fearon’s accusations of criminality may have 
been directed at the Chinese, but the same could be said of much of the foreign community as 
well.101 The governor and Supreme Court held jurisdiction only over British subjects in Hong 
Kong and within one hundred miles of the coast of China. Article IX of the Supplementary 
Treaty allowed colonial officials to extradite the criminals described in Fearon’s report to Qing 
courts. The criminals in Hong Kong’s literal floating population, namely the Dan, remained 
problematic nonetheless. The Royal Navy and marine magistracy held control over Victoria 
Harbour through virtual possession but lacked authority over piracies committed by Chinese 
who were not British subjects, a substantial portion of the hydrarchy around Hong Kong. 
British authorities filled the gap in authority over maritime crime by non-British subjects 
with the establishment of a Vice-Admiralty Court in Hong Kong. In a letter of the Privy Council 
of 23 January 1846, Queen Victoria authorised the High Admiral of the United Kingdom to 
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‘appoint a Vice Admiral Judge and other proper officers for a Court of Vice Admiralty in our 
said Island of Hong Kong’.102 The court, which extended British jurisdiction seaward, opened 
on 14 January 1847.103 Whereas more than fifty years passed from the time the East India 
Company took possession of Prince of Wales Island (Penang) in 1786 to the establishment of a 
Vice-Admiralty court in the Straits Settlements in 1837, the same process took less than a 
decade in Hong Kong.104 That a Vice-Admiralty Court in Hong Kong opened so soon after the 
establishment of a colony there attests to the problems presented by piracy and the eagerness of 
British authorities to gain control over the maritime space around the island. Rather than having 
to try cases of piracy at a court in the Straits Settlements, ships of the East Indies and China 
Station could deliver pirates for trial in Hong Kong. The proximity of the Vice-Admiralty Court 
in Hong Kong made ships more effective as vectors of British law at sea. 105  Admiralty 
jurisdiction, which included the right to try cases of piracy enabled British officials to exert 
authority over all criminals in Hong Kong’s hydrarchy, regardless of their nationality. 
 
By 1847, British authorities had established their control over Hong Kong and had the means 
of extending it seaward. In addition to holding control over the whole of Victoria Harbour, 
British officials were able to impose their authority over the waters surrounding their island of 
sovereignty on Hong Kong. In refusing to engage in any legal posturing or to cede any 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to Qing officials over the Chinese in Hong Kong, the colonial 
government made itself the sole authority on the island. Through the registration ordinance, 
Chinese in Hong Kong became British subjects and thus completely under the rule of the 
extensive authority of the governor. The government of Hong Kong thus had full control of the 
island, including the coasts from which it could project this power and territorialise the 
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surrounding seas. This authority was achieved by the ships of the Royal Navy with the East 
Indies and China Station headquartered at Hong Kong. The Vice-Admiralty Court facilitated 
the conversion of the ships of the station into to vectors of British maritime law in the China 
Seas. Empowered to suppress piracy through Hong Kong’s courts, the marine police and Royal 
Navy could impose state control over the waters surrounding the British colony. Even with 
these legal mechanisms and a powerful fleet, however, British officers struggled to control Hong 
Kong’s maritime population. To deal with the pervasive problem of piracy, they would need 
collaborators, not only in the form of Chinese supporting the colonial administration, but from 
Qing officials. From their island of sovereignty on Hong Kong, colonial authorities, with the 
support of the Royal Navy, would create an imperial hydrarchy that could collaborate with that 





The Foundations of Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy 
 
If British authorities proved unable to exercise an effective control over the waters around Hong 
Kong, Qing officials were even less capable of exerting the powers of their maritime state over 
the Cantonese water world. The Qing encounters with Koxinga, the Tayson privateers, and the 
ladrones revealed that the hydrarchy of the China Seas often possessed better naval organisation, 
equipment, and skills than the state. The victories of British naval forces during the first Opium 
War further exposed the weakness and inefficiency of the Qing state at sea while also destroying 
much of the force upon which Qing officials relied to enforce their authority off the China coast, 
particularly in the Canton Delta. Just as the Qing state survived the threat from various waves 
of professional and political pirates, however, it would withstand, at least for the time being, the 
maritime menace of British Empire. Though threatened by the presence of the Royal Navy in 
China, Qing authorities, as this chapter argues, began to collaborate with British state 
representatives in China against piracy. After establishing a presence at Kowloon, Qing 
authorities realised that British power in Hong Kong complemented their authority. From Hong 
Kong and Kowloon, British and Qing officials cooperated to control a common foe. 
In response to the colonisation of Hong Kong and its disruption of Qing maritime authority, 
Beijing established an outpost of state power at Kowloon on the mainland side of Victoria 
Harbour. Officials stationed at what would become the Kowloon Walled City helped enforce 
Qing maritime control and interacted with British agents to maintain order and uphold the 
stipulations of the treaties. British authorities’ insistence on their colony of Hong Kong as an 
island of sovereignty proved problematic for Qing attempts to exercise authority in the 
surrounding waters. Hong Kong, easily accessible from Qing territory and under a separate, and 
often inefficient regime, became a haven for criminals and fugitives, including pirates. Neither 
the Qing authorities at Kowloon nor British colonial officials at Hong Kong could deal with 




of cooperation against piracy thus began to emerge. This chapter will explore the foundations 
and development of a system of cooperation against piracy between Hong Kong and Kowloon. 
The Qing and British empires made strange bedfellows, brought together by pirates on the 
South China coast who fulfilled the definition in the law of nations as hostes humani generis.1 
Qing and British authorities had different motives for suppressing piracy. For Qing officials, 
piracy caused disorder, which undermined their sovereignty and legitimacy. They were 
furthermore concerned that the pirates might assist or provoke British actions against the Qing 
state. Pirates also threatened trade, the raison d’être for the British presence in China. From 
Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, Qing and British agents devised means of suppressing piracy. 
British authority in the colony of Hong Kong found a rough analogue in the Kowloon authorities, 
whose post placed Qing authority on a firmer basis on the mainland side of the harbour and 
served as a point for the projection of state power seaward. Given that piracy proved a problem 
for British and Qing interests and that neither side had the capability to unilaterally suppress it, 
the common enemy of all mankind created grounds for a collaborative imperial hydrarchy 
between the Hong Kong and Kowloon authorities over the waters in the region. This system of 
cooperation would be replicated elsewhere on the coast of South China. 
 
‘An Important Office on Our Maritime Frontier’: The Making of the Kowloon Authorities 
Qing officials were not passive as British authorities built an island of sovereignty at the heart of 
the Cantonese water world. While the colonial government established control over Hong Kong 
and concurrently it into surrounding waters, Qing authorities responded to the intrusion by 
bolstering their authority in the region, particularly at Kowloon. The Qing military presence 
here originated in 1668 with the construction of a signal station during the conflict with 
Koxinga’s pirates. In 1810, local officials built a wooden fort in Kowloon with a garrison of fifty 
men. Even then, however, Kowloon was not considered a strategically important location.2 The 
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situation changed on 7 July 1839 when a group of American sailors and British lascars murdered 
a Qing subject, Lin Weixi, on the peninsula. In accordance with the British stance towards Qing 
jurisdiction that had developed after the Lady Hughes incident, the British superintendent of 
trade, Captain Charles Elliot, refused to hand over any culprits to Chinese justice and instead 
tried the lascars in Hong Kong. Elliot invited Qing officials to send witnesses to the trial, but 
they refused, believing that the case ought to have been tried by a Chinese tribunal.3 
Frustrated with British intransigence, Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu sent the lieutenant-
colonel (canjiang) of Dapeng, Lai Enjue, to the Kowloon fort to restore peace to the surrounding 
seas and cut off supplies to the British ships anchored in Victoria Harbour. The move proved 
prescient. Aggravated by the British refusal to extradite Lin Weixi’s murderer, Commissioner 
Lin sent a Qing fleet to demand the rendition by force, culminating in the Battle of Chuenpi on 
3 November 1839. The engagement marked the beginning of hostilities during the first Opium 
War. In retaliation, Lai’s forces opened fire on the British ships in Victoria Harbour, forcing 
their withdrawal. Lai’s actions against the British won him a promotion to the rank of colonel 
(fujiang). The colonel of Dapeng, became the highest-ranking Qing military official to ever be 
stationed in the Hong Kong region. The relocation of the headquarters of the Dapeng colonel 
to Kowloon remained in place for the duration of the first Opium War and indeed to the end of 
the century.4 The post proved an important one for Qing China, particularly after the British 
occupation of Hong Kong.  
Following the Convention of Chuenpi, Lai Enjue became the Qing representative whose 
post was closest to the new British colony of Hong Kong. As early as 28 January 1841, two days 
 
3 Eitel, Europe in China: The History of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (London: Luzac & 
Company, 1895), 101. 3 & 4 Wil. IV c. 93 defines lascars as ‘Asiatic Sailors… being Natives of the 
Territories under the Government of the East India Company’. The Statues of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, 3 & 4 William IV. 1833 (London: His Majesty’s Printers, 1833), 901-902. 
4 Eitel, Europe in China, 108-109. Xiao, Jiulong, 55. Rudolph Kröne, ‘A Notice of the Sanon [Xin’an] 
District, Read before the [China Branch of the Royal Asiatic] Society, February 24th, 1858’, Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 7 (1967), 118. A fujiang was the second highest-ranking 
officer commanding a battalion of the Green Standard Army. Robert Antony, Unruly People: Crime, 






after British forces formally took possession of Hong Kong, Rear-Admiral Gordon Bremer wrote 
to Lai asking him to withdraw his troops from Hong Kong and not impede fishermen and 
merchants from going there.5 Despite these demands, Lai remained at the Kowloon fort. The 
proximity of Lai’s headquarters to Hong Kong allowed him to observe British activity there and 
provide his superiors with intelligence. In June 1841 he reported that despite the cession of 
Xianggang, a village on the southwest of what was later called Hong Kong Island, it was clear 
that British agents intended to annex the entire island and were developing Qundailu on the 
north of the island. He further reported that British officials had appointed a ‘false district 
magistrate’ tasked with catching thieves and prohibiting gambling and that British authority in 
Hong Kong was bolstered by the assistance of ‘treacherous Chinese’.6 Lai’s ability to gather 
intelligence about British activity exceeded mere observation of developments in Hong Kong 
and the movements of warships in surrounding waters. He was also able to furnish information 
about developments elsewhere in the British Empire, reporting rumours of the withdrawal of 
British ships from Guangdong to Meng’ala (Bengal), which his superiors attributed to setbacks 
at Zhilalaba (Jalalabad) during the contemporaneous first Anglo-Afghan War.7 Lai Enjue thus 
became an important source of information contributing to an emerging Qing understanding of 
British India and its threat to the Qing Empire.8 
Lai’s post entailed more than merely observing and gathering intelligence regarding British 
activity. He also interacted with British officials. Though Lai denied the legitimacy of British 
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authority in Hong Kong, authorities there nonetheless attempted to turn the colony into an 
island of British sovereignty, but their control over the Chinese in Hong Kong remained 
incomplete. Despite Elliot’s claim that all Chinese in Hong Kong had become British subjects 
and his legal posturing to co-opt local leaders into colonial governance, the government proved 
unable to deal with criminals among the Chinese population of the new colony. During ‘the year 
1842/1843’ British officials in Hong Kong sent ‘certain Criminals’ to the ‘Chinese Officer 
Commanding at Cowloon’. The governor believed that the arrangement was ‘satisfactory and 
perhaps shows as much good will [sic] and zeal as could be expected from officers who have 
their own District Duties to look after’.9 Though Lai Enjue may have rejected British authority 
in Hong Kong, he nonetheless willingly accepted the rendition of criminals from the ‘false 
district magistrates’ across the harbour. As the Treaty of Nanking that ended the first Opium 
War and formally ceded Hong Kong to Britain was not signed until 29 August 1842 and not 
officially ratified until the following June, Lai may have accepted the extradition of these 
criminals when China and Britain were still at war. In times of peace, Lai and his forces would 
have been expected to act as a local constabulary. They would have had the task of patrolling 
the surrounding areas and reporting any crimes to superiors and assisting in making arrests. 
While the Qing military often shouldered the responsibility for dealing with serious cases of 
banditry, including piracy, when ten or more individuals were involved, less severe crimes as 
well as general police authority would have instead been a task for civil officials.10 
Before the British government decided to completely exclude any Qing jurisdiction over 
the Chinese population of Hong Kong, Governor-General Qiying asserted that Chinese 
criminals in Hong Kong should ‘be sent to the Chinese Mandarins resident at Kowlung 
[Kowloon] for trial and punishment’. Accordingly, he ‘resolved to send a Seunkeen [xunjian or 
deputy magistrate], or inferior district officer, to reside at Kowlung, for the purpose of 
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controlling the Chinese, and investigating the crimes they are accused of on the nearest spot’.11 
Pottinger proved amenable to this move responding that: 
I quite approve of Your Excellencies sending a seunkeen or inferior District officer for 
the purpose of investigating the crimes and settling the disputes of the Chinese people 
residing on Hong Kong, and I will instruct it to be notified that all Chinese persons 
having complaints against Chinese may apply to him if they like. When foreigners are 
parties in disputes of course the British Officers must in all cases investigate, and where 
the Chinese are found in the wrong, they will be sent with the evidence to Kowlong to 
be punished according to the Laws of the Empire.12 
 
Though, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the law lords rejected this arrangement, the Qing 
government nonetheless sent officials to Kowloon. Emperor Daoguang approved of Qiying’s 
suggestion that a deputy magistrate be stationed in Kowloon. The emperor ordered the 
personnel of the deputy magistracy of Guanfu in Xin’an to ‘move their residence to Kowloon 
and change the office into the Kowloon deputy magistracy’. Daoguang further approved the 
appointment of Xu Wenshen as an experimental deputy magistrate for three years. As the 
deputy magistrate at the new yamen in Kowloon, Xu would ‘have no responsibility for 
collecting taxes, but would observe entry and exit [of ships] and be in charge of [maintaining] 
mutual peace between Chinese and barbarians’.13 
Deputy magistrates represented the lowest level of Qing official administration. The Qing 
state saw such lower-ranking officials as aides to county and district magistrates. In addition to 
shouldering the task of local administration, deputy magistrates were expected to handle 
taxation, census registration, and law enforcement on behalf of the magistrate. While the 
number of counties remained relatively constant throughout the Qing dynasty, the number of 
sub-county posts fluctuated. The creation and relocation of sub-county posts became a means 
of extending the reach of the Qing state to more local levels.14 The relocation of the Guanfu 
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deputy magistracy to Kowloon was a Qing attempt to establish civil authority close to the British 
colony of Hong Kong. While such a move may have been a traditional response to a novel 
problem, the Kowloon deputy magistrate’s yamen was unique from other xunjian in Guangdong. 
Most sub-county posts were established in market areas along significant trade routes, but the 
Kowloon deputy magistracy sat opposite to what Lord Palmerston infamously considered ‘a 
barren Island with Hardly a House upon it’.15 Even after Britain formally took possession of 
Hong Kong and Qing officials had sent Xu Wenshen to Kowloon, the island remained a 
‘commercial Depôt’ and had not yet become a ‘Mart’16. In a list of the ‘principal Trading-places’ 
in the Xin’an district, made by Rudolph Kröne of the Rhenish Missionary Society in 1858, none 
are in Kowloon.17 In other circumstances, the commercial insignificance of Kowloon would 
likely not have warranted the post of a deputy magistrate. 
The duties of the deputy magistrate at Kowloon included ‘inspecting licences for entering 
and exiting’ Hong Kong. All ships going to Hong Kong were expected to present their licences 
to the Kowloon deputy magistrate who would ensure that any merchant going there had only 
come from one of the treaty ports. While many deputy magistrates would have been tasked with 
monitoring shipping, only the Kowloon deputy magistrate had orders to do so ‘along with the 
English’. In his interactions with British officials in inspecting shipping, the deputy magistrate 
had the potential to become an important mediator between the Qing and British empires. The 
significance of the Kowloon deputy magistrate in Anglo-Qing relations allowed him to 
transcend the characterisation of lower-ranking members of the Qing bureaucracy as ‘trifling 
officials’ (weiyuan), a fact Emperor Daoguang recognised when he presciently declared that the 
deputy magistrate’s yamen in Kowloon would become ‘an important office on our maritime 
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frontier’.18 That the deputy magistrate was stationed next to the colonel of Dapeng further 
enhanced the importance of the position. Military posts in Qing-era Guangdong were often 
located next to yamens, allowing the military to provide additional support for civil officials 
charged with maintaining peace and order.19 The stationing of the Kowloon deputy magistracy 
next to the highest military authority in the district reflected the significance of the office. 
The Dapeng colonel and the Kowloon deputy magistrate, known collectively in British 
sources as ‘the Cowloon authorities’, played an important role in Anglo-Qing relations at a local 
level.20 Their proximity to Hong Kong meant that they interacted frequently with Hong Kong 
officials and were affected by developments across the harbour. After reporting that ‘when there 
are disturbances in Hong Kong, they echo through Mount Jiulong [i.e. Kowloon]’ the colonel 
of Dapeng and the deputy magistrate of Kowloon proposed making new defence arrangements. 
Despite the sudden increased importance of Kowloon, the Kowloon authorities complained that 
their post was ‘garrisoned by low-ranking soldiers who are incapable of thwarting any threat’. 
Noting Kowloon’s dire situation from poor defences and there being ‘no yamen or barracks’ 
there, Qiying suggested to the emperor that: 
We should increase our attentions to defence and expand [the wooden Kowloon fort 
into] a walled city made out of brick, surrounding it with many guns. Within, we should 
build a yamen and barracks. This is not only so that troops can be stationed and drilled 
to increase our prestige; as the walled city would be close to the barbarian den, its 
resources might be used to check barbarian activities. It seems this would also greatly 
benefit maritime defence.  
 
Citing the example of the walled city at Qianshan erected in response to the Portuguese 
settlement at Macau, Qiying concluded that ‘Kowloon’s proximity to Hong Kong is equivalent 
to Qianshan’s closeness to Macau, so it is exceedingly important that we build a walled city to 
facilitate defence’.21 The construction of the Kowloon Walled City was finished the following 
year. It was one of only four walled cities in Xin’an District. Considering that the deputy 
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magistracy of Guanfu, which was relocated to Kowloon, was based in a rented civilian residence, 
the construction of a yamen for the Kowloon deputy magistrate within a walled city reveals the 
increased significance Qing authorities gave to the post.22 The Qing government saw low-
ranking bureaucrats as ‘officials close to the people’ and was aware that such officials were the 
main symbols of imperial authority for most of the empire’s subjects. 23 Qing authorities would 
have understood the significance of the imposing cannon and crenulations of the Kowloon 
Walled City and the effects it would have on surrounding inhabitants, including those of British 
Hong Kong. The extension of the Qing state via a deputy magistrate backed by a substantial 
military force and stationed in an impressive fortress, however, had a limited effect on the 
prevalence of crime in the region. 
 
Limits of the Qing and British Imperial Hydrarchies in Guangdong Waters 
 
British Disruption to Qing Imperial Hydrarchy 
The first Opium War created chaos in the Pearl River Delta. The introduction of British as well 
as non-Cantonese Qing forces into the region during the war produced a xenophobic response 
from local gentry and villagers. As a result, local leaders mobilised militia against the British 
aggressors, but sought to keep such forces active to deal with the social unrest caused by the 
disruption of the British invasion. Many of the militiamen came from or later joined secret 
societies and became bandits and outlaws.24 The increase in social unrest and banditry may have 
been only part of a broader trend in the breakdown of Qing order in South China, which began 
in the late eighteenth century. Demographic, economic, and ecological pressures resulted in 
increased lawlessness, which predated, but may have been exacerbated by, the war.25 Under 
such conditions, piracy became particularly problematic as it not only affected Qing subjects, 
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but also threatened British interests, which could be upheld by the naval superiority 
demonstrated during the first Opium War. Qing officials thus had a powerful motivation to 
suppress piracy; their attempts to do so revealed some of the limits of Qing imperial hydrarchy 
in the waters of Guangdong. 
Zhang Bao and Zheng Yi Sao’s surrender in 1810 ended the threat to Qing authority from 
large-scale, professional piracy for a time. Piracy nonetheless continued to be a problem not least 
from Qing officials’ failure to rehabilitate pacified pirates, many of whom returned to criminal 
activity. River banditry became such an issue immediately after the disbanding of the South 
China pirate confederation that a sub-statute permitting summary execution of bandits was 
approved for Guangdong the year after Zhang surrendered. The hiring of Dan ‘water braves’ to 
resist the Royal Navy during the first Opium War and their subsequent demobilisation after the 
peace contributed to an increase of piracy in Guangdong after the signing of the Treaty of 
Nanking.26 Emperor Daoguang’s lament in 1833 that ‘the navy is a nihility’ and that ‘cases of 
piracy are perpetually occurring, and even barbarian barks anchor in our inner seas’ seemed eerily 
predictive of the situation a decade later.27 By mid-1843, even British observers were aware that 
‘reports of Piracy among the Chinese have become more frequent’.28 Though the nihility of the 
Qing navy and the prevalence of piracy were no doubt brought about in part by the Royal 
Navy’s destruction of much of the Qing fleet and coastal defences in Guangdong, British naval 
officers were initially reluctant to shoulder the responsibility of suppressing piracy. When 
Chinese fishermen requested that Captain Henry Chads of HMS Cambrian provide protection 
against pirates, he responded that ‘all applications for assistance to suppress piracy must come 
from the Chinese Government authorities and even then I cannot act without their personal 
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cooperation’. 29  British naval officers initially expected Qing officials to carry the onus of 
suppressing piracy in the Chinese waters. 
When pressured by British officers to take stronger actions against pirates, Qing officials 
initially resorted to similar tactics to those that proved ineffective in dealing with the ladrones. 
In response to Governor Pottinger’s suggestion that Britain and China cooperate in suppressing 
piracy, Guangdong Governor Qigong sent ‘the military representative responsible for the 
garrison from Kowloon to Nan’ao, Colonel Lai [Enjue]’ to Hong Kong.30 Lai reported that he 
had sent letters to various naval commanders to ‘cooperate with the commanders of the three 
inner river routes’ to cruise against pirates. He also stated he would request that the magistrate 
of Xiangshan, the district on the western side of the Pearl River Delta opposite Xin’an, to order 
Zhong Changfeng, a naval commander, to sail a fleet to Dapeng. Together, he and Zhong would 
make an expedition to the ‘outer seas’ to suppress piracy. Notably, Lai stated the expedition 
‘will not distinguish between maritime borders’ and that two interpreters would accompany this 
expedition, hinting at a willingness to cooperate with British naval forces.31 Lai’s suggestions 
were reminiscent of the strategy of ‘sea war’ that Qing officials had adopted against the Tayson 
privateers in the late eighteenth century. While Lai and Zhong’s expedition could transgress 
maritime boundaries, a division between the outer seas and inner rivers and their respective 
commanders, which precluded a coherent and coordinated overall naval strategy, seems to have 
persisted. In short, Lai’s proposed strategies for suppressing piracy failed to account for many of 
the shortcomings of Qing tactics against piracy half a century earlier.32  
Despite Lai’s enthusiasm for an expedition to the outer seas to suppress piracy, archival 
evidence suggests that most Qing naval engagement with pirates occurred relatively close to 
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land. In reports on piracy in the Guangdong provincial archives before 1858, the seas or rivers 
in which the pirates are engaged or captured are almost always reported as within the 
jurisdiction of a particular district on land. Chinese naval forces seemed reluctant to stray any 
significant distance from the coast. Lai may have been exceptional in preferring to engage pirates 
in the outer seas; he was promoted to the highest naval authority in the province for allegedly 
leading 40 ships and capturing 438 pirates in 1844. His successors as colonel of Dapeng did not 
share his enthusiasm for naval actions. The construction of the Kowloon Walled City reveals 
the emphasis Qing officials placed on maritime defence rather than offensive naval strategy. 
That Kröne was unable to ‘ascertain how many war-junks the Hip-toi [i.e. commandant at 
Kowloon] has under his command at the various stations of the district’ suggests that Lai’s 
successors did not possess a large naval force. The ‘Mandarin at Fuk-wing [Fuyong]’, the only 
other deputy magistrate in the Xin’an district, could not even afford the upkeep of a single ‘war-
junk’, further suggesting a lack of Qing naval capacity. In fact, desperate for revenue, the 
Fuyong deputy magistrate hired out his junk ‘for mercantile purposes’, but ‘the hirers… 
converted it into a pirate boat’, further exacerbating the problem of piracy.33 The apparent 
dearth of naval vessels contrasted with the fortifications of the Kowloon Walled City shows that 
the colonels of Dapeng preferred the protection of a brick fortress over the wooden walls of war 
junks. 
The Kowloon authorities’ preference for coastal fortifications over warships may not have 
been unfounded. Qing naval forces often proved inferior to those of pirates. On multiple 
occasions, pirates succeeded in capturing various types of Qing warships. In May 1849, after 
hearing that a patrol boat had been captured by pirates, Guo Chaofan of Xiangshan sent Mao 
Feipeng in a ‘fast boat (kuaichuan)’ to recover the vessel. Guo reported that ‘because Mao was 
outnumbered, the pirates successfully resisted arrest, injured Mao, and arrogated the fast boat’. 
After this humiliation, Guo ordered local civil and military leaders to assemble a squadron in 
retaliation. This force captured the pirates on ‘the sea of Duzigang’ within Xiangshan’s 
 





jurisdiction.34 In addition to capturing patrol boats and fast boats, pirates could also capture Qing 
tuo ships. On 4 and 5 January 1855, pirates successfully captured two such vessels belonging to 
none other than the Dapeng colonel, Tan Jiao. Tan resorted to requesting for British assistance 
in the form of a steamsnip. The steamship engaged the pirates in the seas near Shanwei, east of 
Hong Kong, reportedly killing several dozen pirates and capturing nine.35 In this instance, 
Britain’s superior naval technology aided Qing efforts against pirates supplementing the 
inadequacies of the Qing navy and the emphasis on coastal defence in suppressing piracy. British 
forces, however, were not always so keen on assisting in the suppression of piracy. Indeed, 
British wariness of Chinese justice and insistence on sovereignty over Hong Kong made colonial 
officials reluctant to hand suspected pirates over to Qing authorities, which the Qing saw as 
impeding criminal justice. 
British refusals to surrender alleged criminals to the Kowloon authorities prevented the 
execution of Chinese justice, thus depriving Qing officials of opportunities for their punishments 
to have the intended didactic effects. British interference in Qing criminal justice through 
harbouring alleged pirates impinged on Qing sovereignty over subjects in Guangdong waters. 
This interference disrupted an important means of suppressing piracy, namely the deterrent 
effect of the public beheading of pirates and display of their severed heads at the location of their 
crimes.36 Such was the case of Huang Xinguang, who allegedly led a band of eight pirates and 
plundered a Chinese ship, injuring two crew members in the process on 10 June 1844 near 
Denglongzhou (later known as Kellett Island) in Victoria Harbour. Huang was eventually 
detained by Chief Magistrate William Caine. When ‘the Mandarin of Kowlung’ requested 
Huang’s rendition, Governor Davis insisted to Caine that Huang was ‘not to be given up to the 
Chinese authorities unless such evidence is produced before you as according to English Law 
would justify an indictment being preferred against him’.37 
 
34 Memorial by Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen, DG 29/4/23 (15 May 1849), FO Guangdong 
Provincial Archives (931)/1011, TNA. 
35 Report by Xiao Ding’an, Xiangfeng (XF) reign 5/4/23 (7 June 1855), FO 931/957. 
36 Antony, Unruly People, 244, 249. 




The Dapeng colonel, Shen Zhenbang, protested against the British detention of and refusal 
to surrender Huang to Qing jurisdiction. Shen stated that since ‘piracy is listed among the most 
grievous of crimes’ and ‘the complainant Lai Yuanqing has already acknowledged that it was 
Huang Xinguang who led the pirates in the robbery, we need Huang to be detained by Chinese 
officials, so that he can shed light on his accomplices’. In his interactions with the Kowloon 
authorities, however, Caine claimed that Huang was a resident of Hong Kong and refused to 
release him to the Kowloon authorities. Caine went so far as to insist that Huang’s trial take 
place in Hong Kong, and that witnesses be sent to there for the purpose. Seeing Caine’s actions 
as a violation of the treaty stipulation that ‘when Chinese commit crimes, they should be under 
Chinese jurisdiction’, Shen appealed to Caine’s superior, Governor Davis, submitting a ‘request 
that Huang Xinguang be given up by Chief Magistrate Caine and delivered to Kowloon for 
investigation with the complainant Lai Yuanqing to see whether case is true or false’.38 From 
the existing correspondence it seems clear that in some instances, British distrust of Chinese 
justice and their refusal to hand over criminals blocked the course of Qing criminal justice, an 
important component of its imperial hydrarchy. 
 
Limits of British Imperial Hydrarchy 
While British officials in China may have harboured doubts about the fairness of Chinese justice 
and the effectiveness of the Qing imperial hydrarchy, they also struggled with projecting state 
power seaward. Even on the island, British sovereignty at times appeared illusory. As early as 
May 1842, before negotiations over the Treaty of Nanking began, the Canton Register reported 
that ‘all there is of bad and worst in China have flocked and are flocking to Hong Kong’.39 
Alexander Johnston, deputy superintendent and acting governor of Hong Kong, confirmed the 
negative impact of the flow of disreputable figures to Hong Kong when he reported that ‘crime 
of the most serious nature has increased’. As crime proliferated from the beginning, the British 
criminal justice system on Hong Kong Island lacked the capacity to deal with it. In his report, 
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Johnston further stated that there were ‘confined in the Jail of this Island several persons charged 
with capital offences, and against whom there is clear evidence of guilt’. As he did not consider 
himself ‘authorized to award a sentence of the requisite severity, they remain untried’.40 The 
situation remained unchanged after the establishment of a Supreme and Vice-Admiralty Court 
and a police force. Hong Kong’s criminal justice system struggled to process the proliferation of 
crime in the colony. Reflecting on the early years of the colony, Ernst Johann Eitel, a missionary, 
sinologist, and inspector of schools in Hong Kong in the late nineteenth century, remarked that 
the ‘scum of the criminal classes of the neighbouring districts looked upon Hongkong as their 
Eldorado and upon English law as a mere farce’.41 Governor Davis complained that ‘for Piracy 
the punishments are much too light’.42 Considering the punishments meted by English law too 
lenient to deter crime, law enforcement officers in Hong Kong resorted to harsher forms of 
punishment. The severity of such punishments in a colony intended as a model of British good 
governance came to the attention of Westminster. The House of Commons debate over the use 
of flogging as punishment in Hong Kong checked its prevalence and severity. 43  The 
unwillingness to compromise on English justice in Hong Kong hampered the colonial 
government’s ability to deter crime, enforce the law, and fully assert its sovereignty over the 
population. 
Westminster’s insistence on the implementation of English law in Hong Kong, echoed by 
local colonial officials, strained the criminal justice system of the colony in other ways as well. 
Chief Magistrate Caine’s insistence that all cases of Chinese felony be tried by a jury flooded 
the Supreme Court with trivial cases. As early as 1847, the Supreme Court had so many cases 
that the chief justice could not attend to all of them, creating a substantial backlog. According 
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to Christopher Munn’s estimates, some 175,000 individuals, mostly Chinese, appeared before 
Hong Kong’s courts in the first three decades of the colony’s existence.44 Trying so many 
Chinese, almost all of whom had little to no knowledge of the English judicial procedures or 
language used in court, put enormous pressure on Hong Kong’s criminal justice system. Given 
the variety of dialects spoken in southern China, finding interpreters sometimes proved 
impossible. The struggles of the Supreme Court were further compounded by the difficulty in 
finding reliable witnesses, many of whom would have been Qing subjects with no familiarity 
with the English language or judicial practice. The insurmountable problems faced by the 
Supreme Court resulted in three-quarters of all cases failing to secure a conviction.45 Even 
though the Supreme Court’s conviction rate was low, criminals still overburdened Hong Kong’s 
jails; Hong Kong’s prisons were almost always overfilled to 70 percent above capacity. As an 
attempt to relieve pressure, five hundred and seventy-six prisoners in Hong Kong were 
transported to British colonies, mostly in the Straits Settlements. As these colonies began to 
show reluctance to accept convicts from Hong Kong, colonial officials resorted to other 
measures to ease the strain on the colony’s packed prisons. Early in 1857, one hundred and 
twenty-three Chinese prisoners were deported to Hainan due to the crowded conditions in 
Hong Kong’s jail.46 
Despite its inefficiencies and incapacities, the criminal justice system in Hong Kong 
nonetheless proved a heavy financial burden on the colonial government and metropolitan 
Britain, which subsidised the colony until 1858.47 For a colony that early governors envisioned 
as ‘a vast Emporium of Commerce and Wealth’ and ‘a modern Tyre’, the heavy expenses of 
criminal justice seemed to undermine the British project in Hong Kong. By 1845, colonial 
officials were aware that ‘the charge of Convicts in gaol is likely to press very heavily on this 
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Colony’.48 James William Norton-Kyshe, registrar of the Hong Kong Supreme Court, pointed 
out that by the end of the decade ‘the Judicial Establishment, Police, and Gaols cost upwards of 
£21,000 per annum, or within £3000 of the entire revenue of the colony’.49 While many British 
officials in Hong Kong recognised the necessity of a functional criminal justice system, their 
parsimony may have helped prevent its successful execution. Fiscal pressures further increased 
the strains resulting from British attempts to enforce English law in Hong Kong. The colonial 
government’s struggle to maintain order in and assert sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong 
resulted in similar deficiencies in British imperial hydrarchy in surrounding waters. 
The British inability to realise their island of sovereignty created problems in their attempt 
to project their power seaward. Though the Vice-Admiralty Court had the right to try, imprison, 
and even exile or execute pirates, the issues plaguing Hong Kong Supreme Court and criminal 
justice system in general also affected the Vice-Admiralty Court. In a testament to the gravity 
of the problem of piracy in Hong Kong, however, it proved a notable exception to the general 
inefficiency of Hong Kong’s courts in securing convictions. In Munn’s survey of Hong Kong 
court cases, piracy prosecutions, which involved over a quarter of all defendants, produced a 
conviction rate of 72 percent. Such a high rate of conviction stands in stark contrast to the 
Supreme Court’s general conviction rate of about one quarter. Unfortunately, the efficiency of 
the Hong Kong Vice-Admiralty Court in convicting pirates contributed substantially to the 
pressures on the colony’s criminal justice system as it clogged the jails.50 This efficacy may have 
resulted from the caution of the Royal Navy, which often functioned as a police force for 
Britain’s maritime authority in Chinese waters, in engaging pirates. Despite the Royal Navy’s 
long tradition in suppressing piracy, which it considered an act for enforcing international law, 
the Queen’s ships confronted pirates in China with an unusual timidity. On 8 March 1845, Rear-
Admiral Cochrane issued orders that Royal Navy ships should 
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not interfere directly or indirectly with any Ship, Vessel, or Boat they may fall in with 
belonging to Chinese Subjects under the supposition that she may be a Pirate or have 
been engaged in any unlawful act, unless that she shall have within view attacked some 
British Vessel or Subject, or on such proof of the fact as would satisfy a Court of 
Admiralty in England; in which case the said vessel only is to be detained or interfered 
with.51 
 
The uncharacteristic meekness of the Royal Navy in suppressing Chinese piracy resulted from 
a variety of restraints on its actions in China, including respect for China’s territorial waters, the 
nature of Chinese piracy, and the divided command of the China squadron of the East Indies 
and China Station. 
While British Admiralty jurisdiction extended over pirates on the high seas, in foreign 
territorial waters, i.e. those within three miles of the coast, pirates fell under the jurisdiction of 
the polity off whose shores they were operating. In the case of China, piracy in territorial waters 
and rivers fell under the jurisdiction of the Qing Empire. Within this maritime zone, with the 
exception of the seas less than three miles off the coast of Hong Kong, the Royal Navy could 
only take action against pirates with the consent of Qing authorities.52 International law thus 
substantially impaired British actions in a significant sphere of Chinese pirate activity. Even in 
places where the British officers considered they had the right to suppress piracy, such as 
Victoria Harbour and Hong Kong’s territorial waters or the high seas more than three miles from 
the coast, the nature of Chinese piracy rendered its suppression difficult. Unlike piracy in the 
Atlantic Ocean, where pirates who went ‘upon the account’ became a professional group 
dedicated to maritime plunder and violence, the majority of Chinese pirates were non-
professional.53 Most Chinese who committed piracy were fisherfolk or other types of seafarers 
who turned to piracy only as a last resort in times of hardship. By 1848, the sea lords were aware 
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that ‘the distinction between fair trader and the pirate is not always marked in the East and 
strong general measures for the suppression of piracy are subject to abuse and must be regulated 
with caution’.54 Worries about attacking innocent Chinese on the pretext of suppressing piracy 
led the Admiralty to reiterate Rear-Admiral Cochrane’s orders from four years earlier 
restraining Royal Navy actions against suspected pirates. Naval commanders in China often 
found themselves frustrated by the Admiralty’s restrictions on the suppression of piracy. In a 
memoir of his naval career, John C. Dalrymple Hay, who on served on the East Indies and China 
Station in the 1840s, recounts an instance where he was ‘sent by the senior officer to examine a 
reported piratical craft’ in Hong Kong. Along with Daniel Richard Caldwell, the translator and 
later registrar general who frequently accompanied Royal Navy expeditions against pirates, he 
was ‘confident of her bad character, but the Admiralty orders forbade us to capture any vessel 
unless we saw her commit an overt act of piracy’. Hay explicitly stated that he considered such 
orders ‘senseless regulation’ hindering the Royal Navy from effectively suppressing piracy.55  
The Royal Navy’s effectiveness was further hampered by divisions between civilian and 
naval authorities. In Hong Kong, as in many parts of the British Empire in the nineteenth century, 
civilian administrators and naval commanders often had conflicting interests. Britain had two 
centres of authority for suppressing piracy in China: the governor of Hong Kong and the 
Admiralty. The absence of the commander-in-chief of the East Indies and China Station from 
this nexus created points of contention and rivalry. Holding authority over the Queen’s ships on 
the China coast, the governor could command ships to engage in gunboat diplomacy to further 
or protect British interests.56 In exercising this control, however, the governor deprived the 
admiral of ships necessary for strategic and convoy purposes. On their part, the commanders-
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in-chief often proved reluctant to act on the governor or other civil authorities’ behalf. Pottinger 
and Rear-Admiral William Parker clashed over the governor’s authority over the Royal Navy 
in China, including the extent to which Pottinger could command ships of the East Indies and 
China Station to attack pirates. Parker’s successor, Rear-Admiral Thomas Cochrane saw piracy 
in Hong Kong as a matter to be dealt with by the marine police rather than the Royal Navy. He 
believed that ‘neither the stationing nor cruizing [sic] of Vessels of War (had I them at my 
disposal) would produce any good results’ against pirates. As Chinese ‘pirates are very clever, 
their Boats most commonly not to be distinguished from ordinary fishing boats whose character 
they can assume at the shortest notice’, they would easily avoid detection by Royal Navy 
patrols.57 Divided command and conflicting interests as well as reluctance on the part of the 
Admiralty and naval commanders in engaging Chinese pirates reduced the Royal Navy’s 
capacity to suppress piracy and uphold British maritime authority around Hong Kong. Hay 
recollected that ‘the depredations of the pirates increased in audacity, when they found the 
Chinese Navy dared not, and the British Navy would not use its force against them,’ all to the 
detriment of the British colony of Hong Kong.58 
As early as October 1842, when Alexander Johnston reported that ‘crime of the most serious 
nature has increased’ in Hong Kong, he noted that the prevalence of crime in the British colony 
seemed part of a larger trend in the Pearl River Delta. Johnston observed that ‘piracy has greatly 
increased in the Canton River and among the neighbouring Islands, from the absence, during 
the last three years, of the usual Chinese Authorities formerly employed to suppress it’. 59 
Johnston acknowledged the important role the ‘Chinese Authorities’ played in suppressing 
piracy when he noted the proliferation of the problem in their absence. Many other colonial 
officials and naval officers in and around Hong Kong shared Johnston’s recognition of Qing 
officials’ importance to maintaining order in the China seas and sought the cooperation of Qing 
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officers in efforts against piracy. Such cooperation would lay the foundation for a collaborative 
imperial hydrarchy between the British and Qing empires on the China coast. 
 
Establishing a System of Cooperation for Suppressing Piracy 
The Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, signed on 8 October 1843, provided details for many 
of the agreements reached in the Treaty of Nanking and laid an important cornerstone for 
Anglo-Qing cooperation in suppressing piracy in Article IX. The article stipulated a system of 
reciprocal rendition of criminals: 
If lawless Natives of China, having committed crimes, or Offences, against their own 
Government shall flee to Hongkong or to the English Ships of War or English Merchant 
Ships for refuge; they shall if discovered by the English Officers, be handed over at once 
to the Chinese Officers for trial and punishment; or if, before such discovery be made 
by the English Officers, it should be ascertained, or suspected, by the Officers of the 
Government of China whither such criminals and Offenders have fled, a 
communication shall be made to the proper English Officer, in order that the said 
criminals and Offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and, on proof or admission, 
of their guilt, delivered up. 
 
Qing officials were expected to do the same if ‘any Soldier or Sailor or any other persons,—
whatever his Caste or Country,—who is a Subject of the Crown of England’ fled as a fugitive 
into Qing territory. The treaty required Qing officials to hand such fugitives ‘to the nearest 
British Consular, or other Government Officer’. 60  Though British authorities declared a 
particular subsection of the Chinese in Hong Kong their subjects and denied the Qing any 
jurisdiction over them, Article IX addressed the issue of criminals among the Chinese in the 
colony who were not British subjects. The treaty gave Qing officials a degree of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over their subjects in Hong Kong by requiring colonial authorities to hand over any 
fugitives among them to ‘Officers of the Government of China’. Given that British observers 
seemed to believe the worst elements of Chinese society were flocking to Hong Kong and even 
that Qing officials were intentionally sending criminals to Hong Kong to sabotage the colony, 
Qing officials through Article IX could potentially claim jurisdiction over a large number of the 
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Chinese who were not British subjects there.61 This potential for extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
Qing officials over Chinese fugitives in Hong Kong could undermine British sovereignty over 
the island. 
Though Article IX formally established a system of reciprocal rendition of fugitives between 
British and Qing authorities, the practice predated the treaty. As noted before, as early as 1842 
British officials were already sending Chinese criminals arrested in Hong Kong to Kowloon. If 
reports on the criminal nature of the Chinese coming to Hong Kong are true, it is likely that 
many of the criminals that Caine sent to Lai Enjue had committed crimes on the Chinese 
mainland before going to Hong Kong. According to European international law of the time, as 
there was no treaty stipulation for Qing extraterritoriality over Chinese criminals in Hong Kong 
who were not British subjects, such criminals ought to have been under British jurisdiction. 
Considering the pressures on Hong Kong’s fledgling criminal justice system, the rendition of 
criminals, including fugitive Qing subjects, to Kowloon may have been a necessary measure for 
reducing the strain on the colony’s courts and prisons. Article IX may have merely been an 
attempt to codify and perhaps justify of the ongoing practice by colonial officials of handing 
Chinese criminals who were not British subjects over to the Kowloon authorities to alleviate 
pressures on Hong Kong’s criminal justice system. It also shifted the burden of apprehending 
British subjects who committed crimes and fled to China to Qing authorities, perhaps further 
relieving British law enforcement officers of responsibility over Britons in China. The practice 
of handing over criminals to Chinese justice may have affected the Qing perception of their 
sovereignty over the Chinese in Hong Kong as revealed in Qiying’s negotiations with Pottinger 
over the matter. While Article IX may have undermined British pretensions of an island of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, it also provided a basis for Anglo-Qing cooperation in suppressing 
Chinese piracy. This cooperation produced a collaborative imperial hydrarchy in which British 
and Qing officials and forces complemented each other’s efforts to establish control over the seas 
off the South China coast. 
 




Given the increased prevalence of piracy in and around Hong Kong after the Opium War, 
it is likely that many of the criminals handed over to the Kowloon authorities before the 
ratification of the Supplementary Treaty were pirates. British officials would have considered 
such a rendition of pirates in accordance with international law practices of the time. The notion 
of universal competence over piracy, whereby pirates as enemies of all mankind according to 
the law of nations could be tried in any tribunal, would have given Qing authorities the right to 
exert jurisdiction over Chinese pirates captured by the British forces. Qing officials, however, 
would have had little familiarity with the law of nations upon which universal jurisdiction over 
pirates was founded.62 Though they likely would have believed Chinese pirates were under their 
jurisdiction anyway, their own criminal justice system was straining, and some officials might 
have been hard pressed to accept the additional burden of dealing with fugitives handed over 
by authorities in Hong Kong. The colonial government’s praise of the Kowloon authorities for 
accepting Chinese criminals apprehended in Hong Kong despite having ‘their own District 
Duties to look after’ suggests Lai Enjue and Xu Wenshen were burdened enough by their own 
affairs.63 The added responsibilities of accepting Chinese fugitives from Hong Kong further 
increased pressures on the Kowloon authorities. Nonetheless, in establishing a system whereby 
British officials had obligations to hand Chinese criminals over to Qing jurisdiction, Article IX 
provided a legal means for the British rendition of Chinese pirates to Qing authorities in treaty 
law, which served as international law in China.64 The Royal Navy in China could still act as 
‘vectors of law thrusting into ocean space’, but with the authority to deliver Chinese pirates to 
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Qing authorities, Her Majesty’s ships could become vectors of Qing rather than British law in 
the Chinese waters.65 
On 19 February 1843, Pottinger wrote to Qigong proposing cooperation in suppressing 
piracy. In response, Qigong sent Lai Enjue to Hong Kong.66 This is likely the context in which 
Lai delivered his plans for suppressing piracy discussed above.67 Pottinger concluded from his 
correspondence with Qing officials that they ‘civilly declined’ to cooperate with British efforts 
in suppressing piracy. In reporting Lai’s aforementioned proposal for suppressing piracy and his 
imminent expedition against pirates to Rear-Admiral Parker, Pottinger requested that the 
admiral 
issue the necessary instructions to all Her Majesty’s Ships at this Station to aid the 
Chinese Cruizers on application being made for assistance in seizing and conveying to 
Kowloon any suspected Boats that may be traced or followed into this Harbor. 
Should the suspected Boats run in close and anchor, and their Crews desert them, the 
Chinese Authorities will, in such cases, go to the Chief or Marine Magistrates, and those 
Officers &c. able to render the required assistance from their own limited 
Establishments will apply either to one of Her Majesty’s Ships, or to the Military 
Authorities on shore, according to circumstances.68 
 
While there do not appear to be any records of Lai’s expedition, that Pottinger offered to 
cooperate and ordered Royal Navy ships to send any captured boats to Kowloon shows his 
willingness to allow the Queen’s ships to act as vectors of Qing law in the seas around Hong 
Kong. Lai’s sending interpreters with his expedition suggests he was willing to accept such 
British assistance. Another example of this willingness on the part of British forces to assist Qing 
officials in suppressing piracy occurred on 20 March 1845, when acting Harbour Master 
Alexander Lena supported a Qing expedition against pirates at Aberdeen (Xianggangzai), on 
the southwest coast of Hong Kong. The Kowloon authorities reported the pirates to Lena and 
offered to send two armed boats and a guide. A combined British and Chinese force succeeded 
in capturing the pirates at Aberdeen as well as another suspicious boat near Green Island, at the 
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western edge of Victoria Harbour. This expedition was perhaps the first instance of successful 
Anglo-Qing cooperation in suppressing piracy.69 
 
The cooperation between Lena and the Kowloon authorities developed into a modus vivendi 
for suppressing piracy. Such cooperation in which Royal Navy ships acting with intelligence or 
support from the Kowloon authorities became an effective means of suppressing piracy and 
revealed complementary aspects of the deficient British and Qing imperial hydrarchies in the 
seas around Hong Kong. The Kowloon authorities, often lacking the naval strength to confront 
pirates could rely on ships of the most powerful navy in the world. Meanwhile, Royal Navy 
officers, hampered by restrictive Admiralty orders and uncertainty regarding the identity of 
Chinese pirates, could act with more confidence when guided by intelligence from Qing officials. 
Furthermore, by ceding Admiralty jurisdiction in many cases of piracy to Qing authorities, 
colonial officials could bypass Hong Kong’s unwieldy courts as well as relieve the strains on the 
colony’s criminal justice system. Though the Qing criminal justice system was also under 
pressure to deal with rampant criminality in Guangdong, several substatutes in the Qing Code 
developed during the ladrone crisis made it fairly efficient at trying and sentencing pirates. The 
crime of piracy was considered so grievous that pirates could be summarily executed by royal 
mandate. While the substatute’s main purpose was to suppress piracy and banditry by making 
it easier to execute criminals, which as public spectacle had a deterrent effect, it also had the 
benefit of reducing the demand for space in Guangdong’s crowded prisons. 
British colonial and consular officials were likely aware of the efficiency with which the 
Qing criminal justice system processed and punished pirates. The British perception of Chinese 
law as barbaric and lacking nuance, particularly after the Lady Hughes affair, stemmed partly 
from the frequency and alleged arbitrariness of executions. Though British commentators may 
have questioned the fairness or legitimacy of Qing justice, they were certainly aware of its 
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efficacy.70 The difficulties British officials had in Hong Kong’s courts in securing convictions 
could be circumvented by sending criminals, including pirates, to Kowloon and allowing them 
to be tried by Qing justice instead of English legal procedures, which proved unwieldy in China. 
Article IX thus had profound implications for suppressing piracy. As previously mentioned, the 
Qing and British imperial hydrarchies were complementary. Britain had a powerful navy but 
lacked familiarity with the situation of Chinese pirates and an effective means of prosecuting 
them. On the other hand, the Qing Code had substatutes facilitating the trial and punishment of 
pirates but lacked the naval power necessary to defeat them. Article IX allowed Royal Navy 
ships to become vectors of Qing law in the waters off the China coast. In capturing pirates, Her 
Majesty’s ships turned them into the ‘Natives of China, having committed crimes, or Offences, 
against their own Government’ fugitive aboard ‘English Ships of War’ mentioned in the treaty. 
They could thus be handed over to Qing authorities. Realising the efficacy of such a system, 
British officials, including naval commanders, and the Kowloon authorities began to cooperate 
more in the suppression of piracy. Their cooperation created a system in which the 
complementary aspects of their respective state powers at sea combined to impose order over 
the increasingly unruly seaborne society around Hong Kong. As the collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy between the British and Qing maritime states developed on both sides of Victoria 
Harbour, a similar modus vivendi of cooperation between British and Qing officials developed 
elsewhere along and indeed even beyond the China coast. 
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‘The Mandarin Proved Himself a Gallant, Active, and Efficient Ally’:  
Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy beyond Victoria Harbour, 1845-1856 
 
By the mid-1840s, the Kowloon authorities, colonial officials in Hong Kong, and Royal Navy 
officers had developed a modus vivendi for collaboration for suppressing piracy in Victoria 
Harbour and the waters around Hong Kong in order to check the problem of piracy. Piratical 
activity, however, was not confined to this vicinity. Chinese piracy pervaded the entire China 
coast from Hainan in the south to the waters off Shandong in the far north.1 The British presence 
on the China coast exacerbated the problem, as the predacious, parasitic nature of piracy meant 
that it often increased in correlation with the expansion of trade. The increased trade at the 
treaty ports opened by the British led to a correspondent increase in piracy. The disruption to 
existing maritime activity caused by the opening of the treaty ports caused many seafarers in 
South China to resort to piracy.2 The changes particularly affected Victoria Harbour, where 
British officers ordered the batteries at Tsim Sha Tsui (Jianshazui) dismantled in the Convention 
of Chuenpi.3 In the place of Chinese fortifications, Henry Pottinger erected British batteries, 
one becoming known as Fort Victoria. At the end of the war, the Kowloon Peninsula opposite 
Victoria Harbour from Hong Kong Island became neutral ground, and Hong Kong officials 
prohibited the construction of any fortifications in Tsim Sha Tsui, the southern tip of Kowloon 
closest to the island.4 The removal of the Qing military presence from Tsim Sha Tsui meant that 
the Kowloon authorities often had to rely on the Royal Navy to suppress piracy in surrounding 
waters. While the situation for Qing authorities was less dire at the treaty ports, local officials 
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nonetheless often turned to the Royal Navy for assistance against pirates. This chapter looks at 
the development of collaborative imperial hydrarchy beyond Victoria Harbour, assessing its 
significance for British and Qing understandings of each other’s jurisdiction over piracy. 
Treaties made collaboration more feasible at other ports in China besides Hong Kong. 
Article II of the Treaty of Nanking opened ‘Canton, Amoy [Xiamen], Foochow-fu [Fuzhou], 
Ningpo [Ningbo], and Shanghai’ to British trade and allowed Britain to ‘appoint 
Superintendents or Consular Officers’ to act as intermediaries between Qing authorities and 
British subjects at these treaty ports.5 The treaty thus established British authorities along the 
China coast. Article X of the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, signed the following year, 
stipulated that ‘at each of the five Ports to be opened to British Merchants, one English Cruiser 
will be stationed’.6 The posting of a consul and a warship at the provincial capital of Canton in 
such close proximity to a British colony and the headquarters of the Royal Navy’s East Indies 
and China Station made the Canton Delta a particularly if not uniquely dense region of 
authority, British as well as Qing. The concentration of British and Qing power in the most 
crime-ridden region of Guangdong helped encourage the development of the cooperative modus 
vivendi for suppressing piracy beyond Hong Kong and Kowloon.7 
Outside Hong Kong’s territorial waters, British authorities could not legally exercise 
jurisdiction over sea space within three miles of Chinese territory. The efficacy and aggression 
of the Royal Navy, particularly in the vicinity of its headquarters, however, meant that British 
warships often acted against pirates in waters and even territories beyond British maritime 
jurisdiction. Unable to exclude the superior British sail and steamships, many Qing officials often 
recreated cooperative system that had developed around Victoria Harbour elsewhere along the 
China coast. By 1847, Rear-Admiral Samuel Hood Inglefield ordered that ‘in the event of any 
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of H.M. Ships, and Vessels under my Command, capturing Chinese Piratical Vessels’, the 
pirates were ‘to be given up to the Chinese Authorities at the nearest Port of Trade’.8 The 
system of delivering pirates to Kowloon developed at Hong Kong could be replicated at each of 
the treaty ports. As this chapter shows, Anglo-Qing cooperation in suppressing piracy also 
extended to Chinese islands and territories outside of Hong Kong’s control. It was also practiced 
beyond the maritime jurisdiction of both the British and Qing empires in foreign territorial 
waters and came to include other participants. These interactions against pirates, while effective, 
also produced misunderstandings regarding the limits of British and Qing authority in the China 
Seas. Despite the developments mentioned in previous chapters, collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy remained problematic and failed to resolve differences between British and Qing 
understandings of piracy. 
 
Suppressing Piracy on Chinese Islands 
Qing authorities recognised that the ‘numerous islands scattered along the coast… are favourable 
places for pirates and other potential dangers’.9 Hong Kong and its surrounding islands were 
particularly notorious as pirate haunts. The infamous pirates Zheng Yi Sao and Zhang Bao used 
Hong Kong as a signal station. Piracy was so prevalent in Hong Kong and its surrounding islands 
that the Portuguese referred to them as the Ladrones, a title later used to describe the followers 
of Zheng and Zhang in the early nineteenth century.10 Even as British officials struggled to deal 
with Hong Kong pirates, piracy persisted in the other islands of the Ladrone group and others 
in and around the Pearl River Delta. Most of these islands lay beyond British control. When 
Dapeng Colonel Lai Enjue reported that Hong Kong Governor Henry Pottinger wanted to 
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construct fortifications at Chaguoling, across the Lei Yue Mun Passage from Hong Kong, 
Guangdong Governor Cheng Yucai asserted that 
The Treaty of Nanking clearly provides that only the island of Hong Kong has been 
ceded to England to administer. The island is the limit of British jurisdiction and 
administration. The area within the shores of the island is under the authority of Hong 
Kong. Areas beyond the shores of the island should be considered the territory of China. 
 
Though Cheng conceded that ‘islets, harbours, and promontories contiguous with Hong Kong’ 
could be considered under British administration, he insisted that areas ‘separated from Hong 
Kong by a stretch of sea’ were under Qing jurisdiction.11 British naval activity nonetheless 
extended to such areas. 
 
Cheung Chau 
The island of Cheung Chau (Changzhou), which lies to the southwest of Hong Kong just 
beyond the three-mile limit of the colony’s territorial waters, was by Qing and British standards 
outside Hong Kong’s jurisdiction.12 It proved particularly problematic for British authorities in 
early colonial Hong Kong. As early as 1844, Governor John Davis was already complaining to 
Qing officials about pirates from Cheung Chau, offering ‘to request His Excellency the Rear 
Admiral of Her Majesty’s Squadron to cause one of his vessels to proceed thither for proofs 
against any of the inhabitants who may be concerned in piracy, which is equally opposed to the 
laws of China and England’.13 By invoking the notion of piracy as a crime against international 
law, Davis hoped to justify British naval intervention on an island beyond Hong Kong’s 
jurisdiction. Governor-General Qiying responded that ‘Cheung Chau is not contiguous with 
Hong Kong… it is outside the extent of the island of Hong Kong and should be under Chinese 
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administration’. He thus refused British assistance to suppress piracy at Cheung Chau but agreed 
to send Lai Enjue there to deal with the matter.14 
If Lai ever went to Cheung Chau, his actions there did not have much effect. Less than a 
month after Davis’s complaint about Cheung Chau pirates, Colonel Farquharson and ‘the two 
young D’Aguilars’, sons of Major-General George D’Aguilar, commander of British forces at 
Hong Kong, were sailing in a lorcha from Macau to Hong Kong when they were attacked by a 
‘large piratical boat with 100 men’. The pirates killed the crew of the lorcha but spared the 
British officers after they ‘gave up everything arms & merchandises’.15 The attack brought the 
issue of Cheung Chau pirates back to the fore. Davis complained to Rear-Admiral Thomas 
Cochrane about the ‘piratical attack… near the Island of Chang-chow [Cheung Chau], a few 
miles from the Western extremity of Hongkong’. 16  He noted that Qing authorities were 
‘powerless against these common enemies’ and proposed to Cochrane that the Royal Navy send 
an expedition ‘as secretly as possible to the Island of Chang-chow, a notorious nest of pirates, 
and already denounced to me by His Excellency Keying’. Secrecy would have been necessary 
as such an action clearly violated Qing sovereignty, though Davis justified naval measures 
against pirates as ‘common enemies’ of Britain and China. Cochrane agreed to send ‘2 Launches, 
2 Barges and a Gig, fully armed and manned… with the addition of 40 Soldiers’ to Cheung 
Chau.17 
Several days later, in a response to Davis’s report of the attack on Farquharson and the 
D’Aguilars, Qiying acknowledged Davis’s intentions to coordinate with Cochrane to protect 
Hong Kong and its surrounding waters from piracy. He reported having sent orders to the 
colonel of Dapeng to work with Xin’an officials to endeavour to capture the pirates. Without 
commenting on the measures Davis proposed to take against pirates, Qiying expressed the view 
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that ‘matters of theft affecting a foreign state should be dealt with by prefectural authorities who 
must hasten to apprehend pirates and who must not be allowed to escape by bribes or 
unconventional measures to continue to trouble the seas’. He thus ordered local officials from 
Dongguan and Panyu to also cooperate in arresting pirates. Qiying seemed to believe the matter 
of Chinese pirates, even when their victims were British, ought to be dealt with by Qing officials 
rather than the Royal Navy. He nonetheless gave the matter of piracy gravity, considering its 
suppression a condition for ‘mutual peace between Chinese and foreigners’.18 
Despite Qiying’s tacit disapproval, Cochrane’s expedition to Cheung Chau and subsequent 
investigations against the Cheung Chau pirates yielded fruit. Major-General D’Aguilar, as the 
lieutenant-governor, named Beng Yasong, Beng Ya, and Zhang Sanfu, who lived in the 
jurisdiction of the mandarin of Fuyong in Xin’an, as pirates. D’Aguilar remarked that ‘if the 
pirates are allowed to thus flee the net of the law, it will be difficult to ensure the security of the 
lives of people on land and water and their shipping’. He then requested that Qiying issue orders 
to the Kowloon authorities to capture the pirates and return stolen goods.19 Qiying responded 
that the ‘colonel of Dapeng has reported that Beng Yasong and many of his accomplices come 
from the western approaches of Xin’an and that orders had been issued for their arrest’. He 
further stated that ‘the lairs of the pirates have been searched’ and that ‘orders have been sent 
to the colonel of Dapeng to consult with civil officials to lead an expedition’ against the pirates.20 
The British expedition to Cheung Chau, and the resultant information regarding pirates there, 
upon which Qing authorities promised to act, marked an extension, however indirect, of the 
modus vivendi for collaborative imperial hydrarchy beyond the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. The 
indirect collaboration established at Cheung Chau in 1844 laid the foundation for cooperation 
against pirates on other islands in the Pearl River Delta. 
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Other Outlying Islands 
While Qiying did not seem to mind the actions of the Royal Navy outside of Hong Kong’s 
territorial waters, his successor as governor-general, Xu Guangjin, was much more stringent. 
When Davis’s successor, Governor Samuel George Bonham, offered to help suppress piracy at 
Cheung Chau in 1848, Xu refused to permit British forces to attack Chinese subjects on Chinese 
territory.21 British naval commanders blamed Xu’s obstruction of naval action as well as other 
restrictions on the Royal Navy for a subsequent increase in piracy on the China coast.22 The 
worsening problem of piracy eventually forced Qing and British authorities to engage in 
exceptional measures, such as the expeditions against Chui Apo and Shap-ng-tsai discussed 
below. The problem also drove the Royal Navy to take measures of questionable legality on 
other islands beyond Hong Kong’s jurisdiction. 
On 26 November 1849, Lieutenant Luard, in a pinnace from HMS Hastings, accompanied 
by a boat carrying Daniel Caldwell, pursued a piratical junk to the ‘Island of Lantoa [Lantau, 
Dayushan]’ a Chinese island more than three miles from Hong Kong and thus outside of British 
jurisdiction. The pirates ran their ship aground and fled. Luard and Caldwell captured the junk 
and took it back to Hong Kong.23 Such unilateral action by the Royal Navy against pirates on 
a Chinese island violated Qing sovereignty and Governor-General Xu’s prohibition of British 
actions against Chinese subjects on Chinese territory. Despite Xu’s condemnation of the Royal 
Navy’s suppression of piracy beyond Hong Kong’s immediate vicinity, local officials, such as 
the Kowloon authorities, nonetheless proved willing to cooperate in circumventions of Xu’s 
restrictions against the British suppression of piracy. 
By 1850, piracy had become so problematic that Qing officials began to take the initiative 
in inviting the assistance of the Royal Navy for suppressing it. The Kowloon authorities led the 
way, with the colonel of Dapeng requesting the assistance of a British steamship to go after 
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pirates at Kat-O (Ji’ao, now known as Crooked Island), an island in Mirs Bay (Dapeng Wan), 
well to the northeast of Hong Kong Island. On 3 March, Colonel Wen of Dapeng sent an officer 
to Hong Kong to report that: 
certain pirates were reported to be lying some distance east of [Hong Kong], but that 
the monsoon was too strong to allow his own vessels to move up to the spot with 
sufficient rapidity; and, as he much feared that, unless apprehended at once, they might 
take alarm, and retreat to a hiding-place elsewhere, he requested that a British steamer 
might be sent to cut them off; and he declared his willingness to reimburse the expense 
of the fuel which she might consume.24 
 
Believing the pirates pointed out by Wen to be under the command of Chui Apo, who was 
suspected of having murdered two British soldiers in Hong Kong, Governor Bonham requested 
that Captain J.W. Morgan immediately send ‘a Vessel of War to proceed in quest of these 
Freebooters’. Bonham believed such an expedition would not only ‘prove of infinite advantage 
to the interests of the Native Shipping, so entirely unable to cope with these marauders’, but 
also ‘perhaps be the means of bringing to justice the alleged murderer Chui Apoo’.25 In response, 
Morgan sent Commander William Nicholas Love Lockyer of HMS Medea to ‘receive on board 
Mr. Caldwell of the Police Establishment, a Mandarin from the Cowloon side’, and go after the 
pirates.26 
HMS Medea reached Kat-O on the evening of 4 March and opened fire on the junks there. 
By the end of the evening, Lockyer reported that one hundred and fifty pirates ‘were destroyed 
by our Shells and Musketry’, and five were captured ‘with considerable loss on their side’. At 
the behest of the Kowloon mandarin who accompanied the mission, four junks were returned 
to their former owners. The next morning, a party of marines along with Caldwell and the 
Kowloon mandarin landed at Kat-O to ‘scour the Island, and they succeeded in capturing 15 
Prisoners’. Lockyer proudly concluded that ‘we succeeded in destroying a much greater 
number of these Pirates than we could have hoped for, and with little, or no danger to the 
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town,—only one Fisherman having been killed by our Shot’. In all, of the nine hundred pirates 
alleged to be on board the fleet at Kat-O, twenty were taken prisoner, 220 were reported killed, 
and 660 supposedly escaped.27 British officers handed the twenty prisoners from the expedition 
over to the Kowloon authorities. Xu Guangjin, despite his reluctance to allow the Royal Navy 
to take actions against Chinese subjects on islands in the Qing Empire, nonetheless approved of 
the expedition to Kat-O, stating to Bonham that ‘your honourable country’s good intentions 
and amicability are sufficiently evident, which pleases me. Your Excellency has given orders to 
provide assistance in times of trouble. My intentions do not differ’.28  The initiative of the 
Kowloon authorities thus produced an exercise of collaborative imperial hydrarchy beyond the 
waters of Hong Kong over which Qing provincial authorities expressed approval. The Chinese 
Repository celebrated that ‘at last the rulers have called in the assistance of western power and 
skill to help them, and accepted the offers made by the English authorities to assist in abating 
the nuisance’ of piracy.29 The outcome of the expedition to Kat-O met with Qing and British 
approval. This willingness to allow British intrusions on Chinese maritime and terrestrial 
sovereignty had a precedent in the expeditions against two of the most notorious Chinese pirates 
in modern Chinese history – Chui Apo and Shap-ng-tsai. 
 
Suppressing Piracy in Chinese Waters and Territory: The Expeditions against Chui Apo 
On 25 February 1849, Captain Frederick Augustus Hippolito da Costa of the Royal Engineers 
and Lieutenant James Dwyer of the Ceylon Rifles were murdered in the village of ‘Wong ma 
Kok’ (Huangmaojiao) near Stanley (Chizhu), on the southeast corner of Hong Kong Island. 
Governor Bonham wrote that ‘the perpetrators are known to be men of piratical habits’.30 In 
response, HMS Fury went to Stanley to ‘intercept all Chinese boats leaving that place, which 
is infested by pirates’ and to assist the military and police in apprehending the murderers. On 28 
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February the Fury, with ‘Capt W.’ of the Hong Kong Police and Chief Magistrate Charles 
Hillier, went to the nearby island of Lamma (Nanya) to make interrogations, but to no avail.31 
From later depositions, Hong Kong officials decided that Chui Apo (Xu Yabao) had led a band 
of villagers against da Costa and Dwyer, who entered the house of ‘Lo-yaong-shing alias Lo-
Assee’ and harassed Lo’s daughter-in-law, ‘Lo-chow-she’. Lo-yaong-shing identified Chui Apo 
as ‘an occasional resident of the village, a known pirate; a native from Sun-chuen-phai in Kwei-
sheen [Xincun in Guishan]’.32 The colonial officials declared Chui Apo and six others ‘guilty of 
Wilful Murder’ and issued a warrant for their arrest. The Hong Kong government offered a 
reward of $500 for Chui’s apprehension.33 
Shortly after issuing the notice for Chui Apo’s apprehension, Bonham requested the 
extradition of the murderers of da Costa and Dwyer. Xu Guangjin replied that the murderers 
were natives of Guishan and Xin’an and that ‘those districts should deal with the matter 
themselves’, adding that he had ‘issued orders to officials in those districts to make a serious 
effort to capture and punish the criminals’.34 Five months later, however, the Guishan and 
Xin’an officials had not succeeded in bringing Chui Apo to justice, and Bonham again 
demanded Chui’s extradition along with that of the six other criminals mentioned in the warrant 
for his arrest. Bonham criticised Xu’s inaction as a violation of Article IX of the Supplementary 
Treaty of the Bogue, complaining that ‘I have made utmost efforts in upholding this article and 
ordered many criminals to be arrested and handed over to the Kowloon authorities. Your 
Excellency has not sent a single criminal to my officers’.35 Xu responded that he would ‘permit 
strict orders to be issued for another sincere effort at investigating and arresting the pirates’. He 
emphasised, however, that because Chui Apo and his confederates ‘have repeatedly committed 
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crimes in China, they should be dealt with by Chinese officials. It is the same as the fact that 
when subjects of your honourable country commit crimes here, they cannot be delivered to 
China for trial’.36 While denying the British jurisdiction over Chui Apo, Xu admitted that Chui 
was a pirate. British authorities took this admission as marking Chui Apo and his associates as 
hostes humani generis and justifying actions against them. 
A series of disappearances and piratical attacks on British ships during the summer of 1849 
caused unease in Hong Kong and pressured British officials to redouble their efforts against Chui 
Apo and other pirates. On 4 July, pirates captured the Kim-hok-tye, a Singapore merchant ship, 
at Hainan.37 By September, the Sylph, a clipper belonging to Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the 
Cowasjee Family, had also gone missing. On 5 September, Captain William Edward Norton 
Troubridge, the senior naval officer at Hong Kong, sent Lieutenant Lockyer, commanding 
HMS Medea, to make inquires along the Guangdong coast. At Dianbai, the Medea engaged a 
fleet of allegedly piratical junks and captured five of them. The Medea returned to Hong Kong 
on 12 September.38 Several days earlier, Jardine, Matheson & Co. had hired the Peninsula and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company’s steamship Canton to go after pirates. Captain 
Troubridge sent Lieutenant Mould and a party of sailors and marines in a cutter from HMS 
Amazon to accompany the Canton. Shortly after leaving Macau on 9 September, the expedition 
encountered a suspicious junk that ran aground. Sailors from the Canton and Amazon pursued 
the fleeing Chinese ashore, killing several of them. The next day, at Dianbai, the Canton 
responded to an attack on its boats by firing on a group of junks, destroying two and taking 
several prisoners. The expedition then proceeded to Naozhou and Haikou where Lieutenant 
Mould met with local mandarins. At the latter location, the mandarin requested that the 
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prisoners be handed over, but Mould refused. The Canton returned to Hong Kong on 15 
September and delivered twenty-five prisoners to the colonial magistrate.39 Some of these were 
forwarded to Qing authorities.40 
The expeditions by HMS Medea and the Canton clearly violated Qing sovereignty. The 
seas off Dianbai ‘(i.e. White Lightning town), on the sea-coast, about 150 miles southwest from 
Canton’, were well beyond Hong Kong’s territorial waters.41 Britain had no jurisdiction over 
Chinese at Dianbai or its harbour. The landing of men near Macau to pursue pirates on 9 
September violated the Qing Empire’s territorial sovereignty. In reporting the expeditions to Xu 
Guangjin, however, Bonham justified the actions by citing them as retaliation for piracy against 
British ships. He stated that as Qing forces were incapable of preventing pirates from harassing 
British ships and Hong Kong, he was justified in sending warships to take actions against pirates. 
In the same letter, he noted that Chui Apo was a pirate leader and again requested his extradition 
as well as that of other pirates to Hong Kong.42 Bonham thus attempted to use the figure of Chui 
Apo as both a pirate and murderer of British subjects to expand Hong Kong’s jurisdiction and 
justify a wider range of activity by the Royal Navy, even at the expense of Qing maritime and 
terrestrial sovereignty. As the murderer of da Costa and Dwyer, Chui Apo, according to 
Bonham, fell under Hong Kong’s jurisdiction. As a pirate, he justified the Royal Navy’s actions 
in Chinese waters and territory. 
Xu Guangjin responded to Bonham’s assertiveness by pointing out that Qing officials had 
captured 901 pirates since March 1849, and he ‘again sent secret orders to the district officials 
and garrisons along the coast to make plans to investigate and capture pirates’. He also insisted 
that after Chui Apo was captured, ‘he would be severely interrogated and punished to the 
utmost of the law as an example’.43 Xu’s orders did not deter Chui whose piratical activities 
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continued unabated. On 27 September 1849, in response to reported depredations by Chui Apo, 
Captain John C. Dalrymple Hay of HMS Columbine set out to engage the pirates. The next day, 
Hay encountered Chui’s fleet at ‘Tysami’ (Daxingwei). HMS Columbine was joined the next 
day by the Canton, this time hired by ‘Mr. Watkins who had chartered her for the purpose of 
looking after the Coquette, missing vessel’. With the assistance of the Canton, the men of HMS 
Columbine reportedly succeeded in destroying two junks and killing two hundred and fifty 
pirates. The remaining junks were either abandoned or fled to Bias Bay (Daya Wan). At this 
point, seeking reinforcements, Hay sent the Canton back to Hong Kong to request the assistance 
of HMS Fury ‘and such other disposable force’ as Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Augustus Collier 
could spare.44 
HMS Fury proceeded on 30 September to join the Columbine at ‘Byas Bay, 40 NMiles to 
the eastward’ of Hong Kong, well beyond the colony’s maritime jurisdiction.45 The next day, 
the ships encountered Chui Apo’s fleet up a creek and opened fire, destroying a number of junks 
and killing some four hundred pirates. When the pirates fled ashore, marines were landed in 
pursuit. Captain Hay and Lieutenant Holland led the marines to ‘scour the heights’ but met no 
opposition.46 The ship’s log of HMS Fury recorded sending ‘armed Boats & marines on shore 
to destroy the arsenal of the fleet’. The party destroyed ‘23 large Piratical Junks & several small’ 
along with ‘a Dock Yard and stores of all description’.47 A week later, Bonham reported the 
engagements with Chui Apo’s fleet near ‘Ping-hoi [Pinghai], in the district of Kweishen 
[Guishan]’ and Daxingwei. The expedition resulted in 
the total annihilation of Tsü á pò’s [Chui Apo’s] fleet… 350 guns had also been 
destroyed; and two new junks on the stocks, at a place in the vicinity; as also two small 
dockyards, and a large supply of naval stores had been burned. There were besides some 
400 pirates killed, and the rest, some 1400, dispersed—with arms, indeed, but without 
any means of continuing to exercise their dangerous vocation. 
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Bonham further mentioned that Chui Apo had allegedly escaped the battle wounded and 
requested that ‘immediate orders’ be sent to ‘the local authorities of the Coast districts… to 
search for and seize him; and to lose no time in following up this successful attack upon his band, 
and utterly exterminating them’.48 
Despite this wholesale killing of Qing subjects in Chinese waters and territory, Xu Guangjin 
responded to Bonham’s report with ‘great joy’. He also pointed out examples of Qing actions 
against pirates by the Pinghai garrison and District Magistrate Shen of Guishan. These actions 
had driven Chui Apo’s fleet to Shanwei, where ‘Shanwei soldiers and braves attacked the 
pirates and drove them to the outer oceans, where they met with your honourable country’s 
cruisers’. This engagement, likely referring to HMS Columbine and the Canton’s attack of 28 
September, forced the pirates to the harbour of Duntou, where the Huizhou authorities opened 
fire from a battery and captured eighteen pirates. Xu affirmed that he ‘immediately issued orders 
to the coastal districts and garrisons to make searches and seizures’ and concluded that ‘since 
Chui Apo has been injured, I imagine it will be difficult for him to escape very far. If he has not 
yet died, when he has been captured and committed to trial, he will certainly be dealt with and 
punished severely’.49 Xu thus emphasised the role of Qing officials and their initiative in the 
victory against Chui Apo. By mentioning the action of HMS Columbine and Fury and the 
Canton and not rebuking the British for violating Qing maritime and territorial sovereignty, Xu 
tacitly approved of a closer collaboration with British forces in suppressing piracy. Such 
cooperation resulted in one of the most impressive examples of Anglo-Qing collaborative 
imperial hydrarchy – the defeat of ‘the most audacious marauder who has appeared since the 
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Suppressing Piracy in ‘Barbarian Seas’: The Expedition against Shap-ng-tsai 
Though British and Chinese officials celebrated the defeat of Chui Apo, the menace posed by 
Shap-ng-tsai (Shi Wu Zi, an alias of Zhang Kaiping) persisted. British sources record Chui Apo 
as a subordinate to Shap-ng-tsai.51 It was thus to Shap-ng-tsai that the Royal Navy turned its 
attention after the defeat of Chui Apo. British officials believed Shap-ng-tsai was responsible for 
the disappearance of several British merchant ships. A week after the defeat of Chui Apo, Rear-
Admiral Collier gave Captain Hay command of a flotilla consisting of HMS Columbine and Fury 
and HEICS Phlegethon along with a ‘carte blanche’ to go after Shap-ng-tsai.52 On 8 October, the 
ships set off after the ‘energetic Chinaman, called Shap-ng-schi, known to the Hong Kong 
people as a desperate robber’.53 
Though the recent disappearances of the Sylph, Greyhound, Coquette, and Ann Eliza, in 
which pirates were suspected, prompted the Royal Navy to take action against Shap-ng-tsai, he 
had been a problem for the Chinese well before 1849. As early as 1846, Hay claims to have 
chased Shap-ng-tsai into Bias Bay in HMS Wolverine. By 1847, Shap-ng-tsai’s pirate band 
spread its activity up north to Fujian, harassing Amoy and Fuzhou, encouraging cooperation 
between Qing and British forces there. 54  In September 1848, the China Mail, based on 
statements in the Peking Gazette, reported that ‘Sa-pong-tsae, the daring pirate from Chek-Chu 
[Chizhu, Stanley], who took possession of several forts on the coast near Teenpak [Dianbai], 
with all the guns in them, still defies the local government’.55 The following month, the assistant 
magistrate of Panyu issued a proclamation stating that ‘there is one man, Shik-woo-sze, who 
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boldly dares to rob the sea, (he is indeed addicted to wickedness), to the great injury of 
merchants’ and to warn against providing any pirates with provisions. The proclamation further 
stated that a ‘great officer has taken command of the troops in order to exterminate pirates’.56 
The announced actions seemed to have little effect, as Shap-ng-tsai continued his depredations. 
By this time, however, piracy by similar figures threatened grain transport from Guangdong to 
Beijing, and Emperor Daoguang increasingly pressured local officials to deal with the problem 
of piracy. The emperor’s demands drove local officials to increase their willingness to cooperate 
with their British counterparts against pirates.57 
The reaction of Qing officials at Haikou to the arrival of Captain Hay and Lieutenant 
Willcox, commanding HMS Fury, on 13 October serves as a potent example of the newfound 
willingness for cooperation. Hay reported that the ‘Governor General (“Ho”) [He Fang]’ 
displayed ‘a most friendly feeling to the English Nation’. 58  Edward Hodges Cree, a naval 
surgeon on HMS Fury, also mentions that the ‘Governor’ treated Hay and Willcox with ‘much 
civility and offered to render any assistance in destroying the pirates, who had been a terror to 
the whole coast’. As a result, He Fang sent the ‘naval commander, Wang-Hai-Quong [Huang 
Kaiguang], an acting major-general in the Chinese service’, to cooperate with the British against 
Shap-ng-tsai.59 Huang commanded ‘8 War Junks’ to accompany the expedition, but Hay ‘gave 
him a passage to prevent delay, on board the “Fury”’. 60  This unprecedented degree of 
cooperation was likely motivated by pressures from the emperor and the increasing threat posed 
by piracy as much as any goodwill Qing officials may have had for British naval officers. Huang, 
for his part, seemed happy to accompany the expedition. Cree described Huang Kaiguang, who 
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was in reality the lieutenant-colonel at Haikou, as ‘a fat good humoured, but active looking 
Chinaman of about 40; he expects to get his promotion, if we catch Shap-ng-schi, of that he 
may, I think, make sure’. The good-humoured Huang acted as a pilot for the expedition.61 
Huang’s piloting, and information from Daniel Caldwell, who acted as interpreter, 
eventually brought the anti-piracy flotilla to ‘Fo-Foong’, in Cochin China (now Vietnam, called 
Annan [Annam] in Chinese sources) on 20 October. There a ‘piratical fleet’ opened fire on the 
British ships.62 Chinese sources record that on the ‘Annamese seas of Huafeng’, British forces 
and Huang Kaiguang attacked a pirate named Zhang Kaiping.63 Many British sources record 
Shap-ng-tsai’s surname as Cheung or Chang (Zhang).64 Given the coincidence between Zhang 
Kaiping in Chinese sources and Shap-ng-tsai in British records, it is almost certain they are one 
and the same person. Captain Hay reports destroying Shap-ng-tsai’s junk on the afternoon of 
20 October and burning another twenty-seven before putting ‘the squadron in position to 
blockade the river’ before nightfall. The next day ‘the Steamers and Boats destroyed 24 more’ 
pirate junks.65 Cree records the blockade as taking place near ‘Chok-am’, spelled ‘Chokeum’ in 
Hay’s report and ‘Chookham’ in the logbook of HMS Fury. He further details that the actions 
of 21 October took place ‘about ten miles farther’ up the river from Chok-am. During the 
engagements, ‘the pirates deserted and were dispatched by the Tonquinese [i.e. the 
Vietnamese]’, and ‘our old general, Wong [Huang Kaiguang], showed some pluck in jumping 
overboard from one of the boats and swimming to a junk and capturing three of the pirates 
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himself’.66 In attacking pirates up an Annamese river, the Royal Navy and Huang Kaiguang 
clearly violated British and Qing maritime law by infringing on a foreign polity’s territorial 
waters. 
This impingement on Annamese maritime sovereignty continued the following day, when 
HEICS Phlegethon and the ships’ boats went ‘14 miles above Chok-am’ to finish off the 
remainder of Shap-ng-tsai’s fleet. Many of the pirates who fled ashore were ‘killed by the 
natives’. Annamese military officials visited HMS Fury and provided ‘boat-loads of wood’.67 
According to a Chinese report, on 22 October, the pirates 
met with a naval patrol under the leadership of Huang Kaiguang. That officer killed 
over five hundred pirates and captured over one hundred. He also captured over a 
hundred large and small cannon, rescued over eighty prisoners, and forwarded them all 
to Qiongzhou for investigation.68 
 
Hay’s report suggests Huang’s actions were less impressive. He wrote that ‘the Mandarins had 
destroyed 4 [junks] and finished 2 others’. Hay nonetheless praised ‘Major General Wong 
[Huang] the Mandarin’ who ‘proved himself a Gallant, Active and efficient ally’ and mentioned 
that Huang ‘took with him about 400 men’.69 The prisoners were taken to Haikou and delivered 
to Qing authorities on 26 October with much pomp.70 On receiving news that British ‘steam 
cruisers attacked pirates on the seas of Annam’ with the ‘assistance of Annamese officers’, Xu 
Guangjin declared the successes against Shap-ng-tsai ‘a cause of great joy’. He further compared 
Shap-ng-tsai, who escaped the battle, to ‘a fish at the bottom of a cauldron’ and reckoned his 
capture would be a simple matter.71 The Admiralty ultimately awarded the participants in the 
expedition against Shap-ng-tsai £42,425, much to the chagrin of the Westminster.72 
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The expense and wanton destruction of the expedition against Shap-ng-tsai ultimately 
incurred Westminster’s disapproval, and proved unsustainable.73 It nonetheless had a lasting 
impact on the modus vivendi between the British and Qing empires for suppressing piracy off 
the China coast and indeed beyond. Qing officials seemed more willing to cooperate with the 
British against pirates after 1849. Huang Kaiguang’s direct involvement set a precedent for Qing 
officials accompanying British expeditions against pirates. The Kowloon official who 
accompanied HMS Medea to Kat-O, discussed above, and Zhang Yutang’s role in the Coulan 
expedition, discussed below, all followed the example of Huang Kaiguang. The fact that the 
engagement against Shap-ng-tsai took place well beyond the maritime jurisdictions of Britain 
and China suggests that the two empires could use each other to justify the extension of their 
respective imperial hydrarchies. Finally, the involvement of the Annamese in the action shows 
that the system of cooperation developed between Britain and China could be internationalised 
to include other states. As the continued prevalence of piracy in the Pearl River Delta proved 
that Anglo-Qing efforts were sometimes insufficient for suppressing piracy, the assistance of 
other naval forces on the China coast, particularly the those of the United States of America and 
Portugal, were on occasion invited in actions against pirates. The capacity of Anglo-Qing 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy to include Annamese participation against Shap-ng-tsai 
helped lay the foundation for an even more international effort against the pirates of Coulan 
(Gaolan) five years later. 
 
‘Putting Down a Common Enemy’: The International Expedition to Coulan 
In early October 1854, Chinese pirates attacked the Chilean barque Caldera after the she lost 
her masts in a typhoon. The Caldera’s crew and passengers, including Captain Matthew Rooney, 
who was a British subject, and Fanny Loviot, a French woman, were captured.74 On hearing of 
Loviot’s capture, the French vice-consul in Hong Kong, George L. Haskell, requested that 
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Captain William Hoste of HMS Spartan send a force to accompany a ‘steamer’ that ‘agents of 
the insurance companies (interested in the cargo of the bark)’ would prepare to rescue the 
‘unfortunate person’.75 Captain Hoste sent ‘85 seamen and marines under Lieutenant Palliser’ 
in the hired steamer Ann to search for Loviot. Palliser was given ‘orders to search for the French 
subject… and to destroy the town of Coulan, should he obtain certain information of the 
inhabitants being concerned in the plunder of the Caldera’. Hoste assured commander-in-chief 
that 
There can be no doubt Coulan is the stronghold of a large piratical fleet that has infested 
this neighbourhood, and committed great depredations for the last seven months. No 
ship on the coast or passing its vicinity is safe. They detach small parties to plunder in 
this neighbourhood who carry their booty to Coulan, where they consider themselves 
impregnable.76 
 
The force under Lieutenant Palliser succeeded in firing on and burning ‘the villages of Coo-
choo-mee’ but when it ‘pulled into Coulan Bay’, Palliser found he had insufficient force to deal 
with the junks and battery there.77 In a Chinese military report that mentioned the capture of 
‘the French woman Fan’, Palliser’s expedition is credited with ‘destroying over ten pirate junks, 
killing over one hundred pirates’. The report claims the remainder of the pirates escaped but 
their junks ran aground and were captured by ‘Xiangshan official cruisers and war junks’.78 
Palliser’s expedition thus represents the extension of a form of indirect cooperation, akin to the 
separate British and Qing actions taken against Chui Apo, to an island under the jurisdiction of 
the Xiangshan district. As neither British nor Qing forces seemed fully capable of dealing with 
the Coulan pirates, a closer cooperation between the two as well as with other states would be 
necessary. 
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 Rear-Admiral James Stirling had been in contact with Ye Mingchen, Xu Guangjin’s 
successor as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, regarding the problem of ‘vessels 
engaged in the business of Robbery upon the waters within [Qing] Imperial Jurisdiction’ and 
requested that Ye take action.79 When Ye confessed that he lacked the forces to deal with piracy 
in Chinese waters, Stirling offered to send a British expedition against the Coulan pirates. He 
‘communicated through Mr. Consul Robertson with the Chinese authorities in the Kwangtung 
[Guangdong] Province, and received their sanction for the coercive measures that he proposed 
to adopt’.80 Despite his infamous mistrust of the British, who now proposed a violation of Qing 
maritime sovereignty, Ye supported Stirling’s initiative and even sent Dapeng Colonel Zhang 
Yutang and a war junk to accompany the British force. Others also supported Stirling’s proposed 
measures. The governor of Macau, Isidoro Francisco Guimarães, sent the Amazona, an armed 
lorcha, to accompany the expedition; the Commodore David Geisinger sent the Queen, a 
steamship hired by the United States Navy; Chinese merchants raised $5,000 and chartered the 
P & O steamers Canton and Sir Charles Forbes to support the British force of HMS Barracouta, 
Encounter, and Styx, along with boats from HMS Winchester and Spartan. 81  A truly 
international force was assembled against the Coulan pirates.  
In mid-November 1854 the expedition, under Captain George William Douglas 
O’Callaghan of HMS Encounter, set out for Coulan. A Chinese observer reported that warships 
at Hong Kong had ‘taken on over one thousand troops’, and that ‘three warships of various sizes 
and three steamships’ sailed out to seek revenge against the pirates who attacked the Caldera.82 
The international flotilla encountered three suspicious junks, which were searched by Royal 
Navy sailors accompanied by one of Zhang Yutang’s officers and Daniel Caldwell, who acted 
as interpreter. When goods from the Caldera and Triad passes were found on board and Zhang 
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Yutang confirmed that the junks were piratical, the ships were burned.83 That evening, the 
flotilla formed a blockade of Coulan to prevent any pirates from escaping. The next morning, 
with approval from Zhang Yutang, a force was landed at Coulan. According to the China Mail, 
a total of three hundred and forty men were landed at Coulan: two hundred and eighty British, 
twenty-five Portuguese, twenty Chinese, and fifteen Americans. 84  The force ‘destroyed 3 
batteries, and some villages at a place called Coulan’ and the ‘Villages were burnt at the desire 
of the Mandarin accompanying’.85 Captain O’Callaghan further reported the destruction of fifty 
junks as well as the capture fifty guns to Rear-Admiral Stirling. He claimed that between fifty 
and sixty pirates were killed, and thirteen pirates were taken prisoner and handed over to Zhang 
Yutang.86 
The Coulan expedition was a high-water mark of cooperation against piracy before the 
Arrow War, discussed in the next chapter. The international expedition extended the 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy between the two sides of Victoria Harbour to an island well 
beyond Hong Kong’s maritime jurisdiction and included Portuguese and American 
involvement. The China Mail celebrated the expedition as ‘the most complete of its kind ever 
sent from this colony’ and ‘singular as one of the phenomena of the age. Here were English and 
Americans, Portuguese and Chinese, hand in hand together, heartily engaged in putting down 
a common enemy’.87 The Boletim do Governo de Macao, Timor e Solor, Macau’s government 
gazette, praised the actions of three marines and Senior Lieutenant João Eduardo Scarnichia, 
who commanded the Amazona; the Boletim also included a poem by J.M. da Fonçeca entitled 
‘To the “Amazona”: For My Friend J.E. Scarnicha’, which included the stanza 
For never until now did the sacred corners 
Of the Portuguese Flag 
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Cover in the waters of Macau 
A more beautiful vessel. 
The poem also included lines on the Amazona’s ‘so lightly pursuing/The fugitive pirate’.88 Even 
Governor-General Ye believed ‘the capture and destruction of a great number of pirates was 
such as to deserve the highest commendation’.89 He wrote to Bonham’s successor as British 
plenipotentiary and governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring, that the expedition was ‘sufficient 
evidence’ of Britain’s ‘sincere designs against a common foe’.90 
Such paeans to the Coulan expedition may have been premature, especially for the British 
and Americans who would send another joint expedition there nine months later.91 The positive 
response to the expedition nonetheless reflected an increased willingness to cooperate between 
the Britain and China, as well as other naval presences in South China, for suppressing piracy. 
The success of the Coulan expedition led Bowring to suggest that in the future mandarins might 
accompany British expeditions against pirates, and Ye Mingchen endorsed Bowring’s plan.92 
For his part, Ye also seemed more willing to accept British assistance against pirates. In the letter 
in which he praised the Coulan expedition, Ye requested to Bowring that ‘your honourable 
country’s warships blockading pirates in the Canton River… advance together with [Qing] 
troops and braves… to annihilate and capture pirates. This is a matter of importance’.93 Ye’s 
approval of the Coulan expedition and his invitation to the Royal Navy to advance up the 
Canton River into Chinese waters show that Qing officials were willing to cooperate with British 
counterparts in suppressing piracy and to allow British forces to operate in Chinese waters and 
territory. As in the case of He Fang during the Shap-ng-tsai expedition, however, this call for 
cooperation may have been motivated by desperation. Furthermore, despite the increased 
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cooperativeness between British and Qing officials for suppressing piracy, there was no 
consensus regarding who had jurisdiction over the prisoners from joint campaigns against pirates. 
Misunderstandings pervaded the development of a collaborative imperial hydrarchy between 
the Britain and China in the Canton Delta. 
 
Misunderstandings in Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy 
The question of the extent of British and Qing jurisdiction over pirates had emerged as early as 
1844. On 1 May, ‘a pirate boat carrying about twenty men’ plundered 12,000 rupees from ‘a 
Chinese boat with a native crew, and guarded by five or six Soldiers’ carrying the treasure to 
Stanley. Governor Davis reported that ‘the soldiers were taken by surprise and overpowered, 
all of them killed or thrown overboard, and the whole of the treasure carried off’.94 On 25 May, 
Hong Kong officials captured a criminal known as ‘Chintae’ in British sources (and variously as 
Chen Da, Chen Yada, Chen Tai, or Chen Yatai in Chinese sources). Colonial officials handed 
Chintae over to the Kowloon authorities, to whom he confessed his guilt. In his deposition, 
Chintae also provided a list of the names of his accomplices. Davis offered to allow him to act as 
an informant against his fellow pirates.95 Davis requested that Qiying ‘take measures for the 
capture of those villains, and their adequate punishment as an example to others’. When 
seemingly no action was taken, however, and Hong Kong suffered another piratical attack on 
17 June, Davis requested that ‘Chintae may be returned for further examination’.96 Qiying 
responded by citing the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue and observing that: 
In cases implicating British merchants and mainlanders, the British merchants are under 
the jurisdiction of British officials, and Chinese are to be tried in China. This is how the 
cases of Fan Yasi and Wu Guanyu were handled. Both cases were of robbery with 
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The British extradition of Fan and Wu to Kowloon helped motivate Qiying’s insistence on 
exercising jurisdiction over Chintae, much to Davis’s chagrin. The governor complained to 
Colonial Secretary Stanley that the governor-general 
altogether evades the question of sending [Chintae] back according to the express 
agreement, and observes he will be executed with the other offenders. Though the ends 
of Justice will be equally answered, I cannot but look upon this as a breach of good faith, 
and shall be more cautious than ever as to the delivery of prisoners to the Authorities 
on the mainland.98 
 
An early attempt at collaborative imperial hydrarchy through the British provision of an 
informer on pirates thus fell through due to a perceived ‘breach of good faith’. 
Interestingly, the case of Chintae emerged again when pirates attacked consulate interpreter 
Thomas Taylor Meadows near Whampoa in 1848.99 When four of the pirates were captured, 
Governor Bonham was distressed to learn that they had not been executed as they were only 
charged with being accomplices and could not be sentenced to summary execution. Bonham 
then referenced the case of Chintae, pointing out that Chintae and all others involved in the 
attack were executed in December 1844.100 Xu Guangjin replied that Chinese law differentiated 
between different types of criminals, and that there were distinctions between the punishments 
for leaders and followers and for first-time offenders and repeat offenders. As not all the captured 
pirates who attacked Meadows were leaders or repeat offenders, they could not be punished as 
such.101 The case of Chintae and its subsequent uses thus serves as an example of the lack of 
agreement on the definition of piracy and how it should be dealt with between British and Qing 
officials, which proved an impediment to collaboration between the two for suppressing it.102 
Even in cases of cooperation, however, misunderstandings still occurred. Within a year of 
Bonham’s complaint about the apparent leniency shown towards the pirates who attacked 
Meadows, British forces killed hundreds if not thousands of Chinese pirates in the expeditions 
against Chui Apo and Shap-ng-tsai. In both cases, the pirate leaders escaped, prompting British 
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officials to request that the Chinese take measures for their arrest. In the case of Chui Apo, 
Bonham, citing Chui’s guilt in murdering da Costa and Dwyer in Hong Kong, requested the 
criminal’s extradition upon his capture.103 After citing the Supplementary Treaty, Xu asserted 
that ‘the murderer Chui Apo is a person of China. If he is captured by British officials, according 
to the treaty, he ought to be handed over to officers of China for trial’. He further posited that 
‘Chinese should be dealt with by Chinese officials’ and cited the example of ‘when many 
suspected of piracy were captured at Jinxingmen… the captured were forwarded to the Kowloon 
office and transferred to the Dapeng garrison, who forwarded them to Canton’.104 Xu Guangjin 
thus understood the British extradition of pirates to Kowloon as affirming Qing jurisdiction over 
them. 
In response, Bonham told Xu that British forces would continue taking actions against 
pirates if they were not brought to justice, adding the veiled threat that ‘if accidents should 
happen through ignorance on our part, the blame must attach to the Chinese Viceroy for not 
having earlier caused this miscreant [Chui Apo] to be apprehended’.105  The threat proved 
effective, and Xu eventually acknowledged that ‘Chui Apo is a criminal because he has 
committed murder, a crime which is severe in all jurisdictions regardless of boundaries’. Since 
Chui was a Hong Kong criminal and ‘all Hong Kong residents and those living there temporarily 
are all under British jurisdiction and administration’, Xu conceded that ‘China has not the 
slightest right to interfere or claim simultaneous jurisdiction’ over Chui Apo.106 Xu thus seemed, 
at least in the case of Chui Apo, to acknowledge piracy as a crime against more than just Chinese 
law and ceded jurisdiction over the case to British authorities in Hong Kong. 
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Bonham considered Xu’s cession of jurisdiction over Chui Apo an ‘occasion to assert the 
inviolability of this territory, and our claim to exclusive jurisdiction in this island’.107 A minute 
in this letter, however, states that: 
the Article of the treaty for rendition of criminals only applies to “persons who have 
committed offences against their own Government”. There is no provision in the Treaty 
for the surrender of a Chinese Subject amenable to Colonial jurisdiction for an offence 
committed in Hong Kong or elsewhere, who may have escaped to China.108 
 
Whitehall thus denied Bonham the right to exercise jurisdiction over Chinese pirates outside of 
Hong Kong. When Chui Apo was captured in Canton in 1851, however, his captors turned him 
over to the Hong Kong authorities for reward. Chui was tried on 10 March 1851 and sentenced 
to transportation for life. Before the sentence was carried out, he committed suicide in prison on 
27 March.109 Bonham’s further request for the rendition of Shap-ng-tsai, for ‘numerous acts of 
piracy and violence, committed in China and on the seas for many years past’, was thus moot.110 
Unlike Chui Apo, Shap-ng-tsai avoided capture. Although Chinese sources state that he 
had intended to surrender when the British attacked his forces in Annam, both Chinese and 
British sources report that he escaped during the attack. Shap-ng-tsai surrendered with ‘a gang 
of 520 people and twenty ships with fifty-two iron and brass guns’ at the end of 1849.111 By 
June 1850, Shap-ng-tsai had ‘defeated the pirate band of Huang Baidou, destroying ships and 
killing many pirates’ on behalf of the Qing, encouraging many of the pirates to surrender and 
handing over captured guns and powder to Qing officials.112 A separate memorial of the same 
date states that Shap-ng-tsai’s actions against Huang Baidou took place in August 1849.113 This 
suggests that he may have already surrendered and been in the service of the Qing when Hay’s 
flotilla attacked his fleet in Annam. If this were the case, rather than defeating a great pirate 
chieftain, the Royal Navy instead attacked a Chinese privateer in the Gulf of Tonkin. Despite 
 
107 Bonham to Earl Grey, 21 November 1849, CO 129/30, 327. 
108 Minute of 30 January 1850 in ibid, 330. 
109 Christopher Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841-1880 (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009; originally published by Curzon Press, 2001), 204-207. 
110 Bonham to Earl Grey, 21 November 1849, CO 129/30, 327-328. 
111 Memorial by Xu Guangjin, DG 30/4/22 (2 June 1850), FO 931/1201. 
112 Memorial by Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen DG 30/4/22 (2 June 1850), FO 931/1202. See also 
Memorial by Xu Guangjin, DG 30/5/22 (1 July 1850), FO 931/1207. 




this setback, Shap-ng-tsai was officially given a military position in the Qing navy on 5 July 
1850 when the emperor issued an edict ordering that ‘Zhang Kaiping and ten others should be 
placed in military posts. They should be tasked with capturing pirates and handing them over 
to local authorities’. In the same order, Emperor Xianfeng worried that ‘though the captured 
pirates have surrendered, it is difficult to ensure they will not again be clouded in their mistaken 
ways’.114 The mention of relapse may explain the seemingly discrepant accounts of Shap-ng-
tsai in Chinese sources. 
 
British officers were not the only ones confused about the status of Chinese ‘pirates’. After 
approving of the victory of the international expedition against the Coulan pirates in 1854, 
Governor-General Ye wrote to D.B. Robertson, the British consul at Canton, that ‘the capture 
and destruction of a great number of pirates was such as to deserve the highest recommendation’. 
He further proposed cooperation between Qing and British forces against ‘the pirates on the 
river’.115 M.C. Morrison, the interpreter at the Canton consulate, pointed out, however, that the 
pirates in the river were part of a ‘Rebel Fleet’, which included ‘the piratical band whose head-
quarters were at Kao lan [Coulan], one of the places lately attacked by the squadron under 
Captain O’Callaghan of H.M.S. “Encounter”’. Morrison mentions that the pirates had initially 
gone up the river to surrender to the Qing, but decided to join the rebel leader, Chen 
Xianliang.116 Chen had previously stated to the British officials that ‘the object of our present 
warlike rising is to destroy the extortionate and oppressive officials and their myrmidons and to 
reestablish the ancient sovereignty of the Ta Ming [i.e. the Ming Dynasty]’. The rebellion was 
thus directed against the Qing, and Chen hoped amicable relations between the Chinese and 
British subjects could persist.117 It is unclear whether Ye saw this ‘Rebel Fleet’ as an insurrection 
against Qing rule or as its component pirates or indeed whether he considered that there was a 
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difference. This difference, however, mattered to Governor Bowring who sought to adhere to 
the principle of neutrality. He responded to Ye’s request for assistance by stating that ‘whenever 
a foreign state encounters foreign enemies or internal troubles, England must keep its hands in 
its sleeve and observe from outside’. Britain would act only if British subjects were affected.118 
In the increasing disorder of the 1850s, however, the distinction between pirate and rebel 
became increasingly blurred producing more misunderstandings in Anglo-Qing collaborative 
imperial hydrarchy, and the unresolved issue of jurisdiction remained problematic. This lack of 
consensus would have tragic effects. 
 





‘Differences Which Have Unfortunately Arisen’:  
Piracy and the Arrow War 
 
The unrest in South China in the 1850s proved problematic for British and Qing authorities 
alike. In an attempt to uphold the law of nations, Britain declared neutrality during the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-1864). The complexity and astonishing scale of rebellion, however, made it 
difficult for British officials to observe strict neutrality. 1  The ambiguous status of pirates 
contributed to this complexity. Pirates and rebels were often associated, if not one and the same, 
as the case of Chen Xianliang in the previous chapter shows. Neutrality prevented British forces 
from intervening against rebels, but international law permitted the Royal Navy to commit 
violence against pirates. The distinction between the two often blurred in the various uprisings 
in mid-nineteenth-century China. Qing officials could use this to their advantage, especially if 
British efforts suppressing piracy also helped quell rebellion. The limits of consular authority and 
the beleaguered Hong Kong criminal justice system meant that British authorities often 
continued to rely on Qing officials to deliver justice to pirates captured by the Royal Navy. The 
British rendition of pirates to courts in China seemed to reaffirm Qing jurisdiction over Chinese 
piracy. This clashed with British notions of universal jurisdiction and pirates as hostes humani 
generis and caused frictions in Anglo-Qing relations. As this chapter will show, British and Qing 
misunderstanding of each other’s conception of and jurisdiction over piracy was one overlooked 
cause of the Arrow War (1856-1860). Though misunderstandings resulted in hostilities, Anglo-
Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy would manage to survive and indeed thrive both during 
the conflict and in its aftermath. 
For the sake of the convenience and efficiency of cooperation against pirates, many British 
and Qing officials often ignored the ways in which it clashed with their understandings of piracy 
and international law. Moreover, as rebellion exacerbated the problem of piracy, both sides 
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became increasingly desperate in their actions against pirates. Acting in exasperation, British 
and Qing authorities took some measures against piracy that violated the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of the other party. British officials tightened their control over Hong Kong waters 
by excluding Qing and Taiping warships from Victoria Harbour and extended it through a 
system of registration and by the unilateral establishment of a system of convoy. Pressured by 
British complaints and the need to maintain order, Qing officials also enforced their maritime 
authority more forcefully. These desperate measures produced misunderstandings over the Qing 
detention of the Arrow, a Chinese-built, -owned, and -crewed lorcha with a colonial register 
from Hong Kong. Ostensibly, Qing officials’ arrest of the ship’s crew was a measure against 
piracy. Unfortunately, British authorities in South China saw the Arrow incident as a violation 
of their sovereignty, and intransigence on the part of British and Qing officials saw the affair 
escalate into another war. 
Despite the outbreak of hostilities between the British and Qing empires, pirates remained 
a common enemy. In a testament to the resilience and importance of the collaborative 
suppression of piracy, British officials continued to deliver pirates to Qing authorities even after 
hostilities commenced. The persistence of this system of cooperation shows the continued 
limitations of British and Qing endeavours to suppress piracy and the need for cooperation even 
in time of war. The state of hostilities, however, disrupted Qing maritime control, even as the 
British officers continued to rely on the Chinese for assistance in dealing with pirates. Ye 
Mingchen’s contumacy and hostility towards Britain, as well as affairs at Canton, eventually 
drove British forces and their French allies who joined the war to avenge the murder of the 
French missionary Auguste Chapeldaine in Guangxi to attack and occupy Canton.2 The allies 
quickly realised that they could not administer so large a city by brute force alone and decided 
to rehabilitate some Qing officials to help maintain order. The joint administration of Canton 
allowed for a more direct cooperation between British and Qing authority that ultimately 
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succeeded in largely suppressing piracy and bringing relative order to the surrounding waters. 
As this chapter will show, confusion over the status of Chinese pirates and jurisdiction over them, 
particularly in a period of rebellion, was a source of conflict between Britain and China; piracy 
remained a common menace to the British and Qing empires, which cooperated in its 
suppression, even when they were at war with each other. The Arrow incident revealed 
inconsistencies and tested the Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy but did not break 
it. 
 
Rebellion, Registration, and the Origins of the Arrow Incident 
The British insistence on neutrality during the Taiping and other rebellions in China during the 
early 1850s made actions against piracy problematic. The distinction between pirate and rebel 
could be difficult to distinguish. Pirates frequently colluded with secret societies with 
revolutionary intent. These secret societies in turn helped fence pirated goods and sometimes 
even cooperated with pirates in raids.3 Qing officials did not necessarily distinguish between 
opportunistic pirates and those with political motivations, and the line between pirate and 
patriot became increasingly blurred in a period of mass rebellion. The porousity of this boundary 
and Britain’s neutrality made it difficult for the Royal Navy to deal with Chinese piracy.4 British 
actions against pirates could become entangled with rebellions against the Qing. Such was the 
case with the Royal Navy’s response to the Small Sword Uprising (1853-1855), which began 
in Amoy in May 1853. The uprising relied heavily on support from Straits Chinese, some of 
whom were British subjects, and pirates. In this instance, piratical activities of the Small Swords 
incurred the wrath of the Royal Navy, which used the suppression of piracy to justify actions 
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against a rebel movement in violation of professed neutrality.5 In a similar manner, despite 
British refusal to take action against Chen Xianliang’s allegedly pro-Ming fleet in the Canton 
River on grounds of neutrality in December 1854, the Royal Navy made no qualms about 
attacking ‘Lee Afyee, a principal leader of the Whampoa “patriots”’, the following year.6 Lee 
commanded ‘a very formidable Fleet’, which ‘caused an entire stoppage to the trade on the 
West Coast’ of Guangdong. When Governor-General Ye Mingchen sent a naval force after Lee, 
the pirate cum rebel responded with ‘open defiance’.7 In early August 1855, HMS Rattler, 
accompanied by three boats and a hundred men from USS Powhatan, went to Coulan to 
confront Lee Afyee and destroyed ten piratical junks, killing an estimated 500 pirates. 8  A 
monument to the expedition still stands in the Hong Kong Cemetery in Happy Valley, testament 
to this Anglo-American attack on rebels under the guise of suppressing piracy. 
Qing officials responded warily to such actions against pirates. Ye Mingchen treated British 
actions against pirates with ambiguity. As discussed in the previous chapter, he praised British 
officers for their ‘sincere designs against a common foe’ during the international expedition to 
Coulan in 1854.9 To his superiors, however, Ye proved less sure about Bowring’s intentions. In 
the aftermath of the Anglo-American expedition to Coulan, he declared ‘Chieftain Bowring is 
very opportunistic’, and when ‘the Chinese commander asks for assistance in punitive 
expeditions against pirates, it is not difficult to achieve their annihilation’. At the same time, 
however, Ye claimed that ‘the barbarians are secretly providing material assistance to the 
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rebellious bandits in the form or arms and munitions, and benefit from selling stolen goods’.10 
Such suspicions may have driven Ye to attempt to exclude the Royal Navy and other foreign 
warships from the Bogue as early as 1852, when the vice-consul at Whampoa offered to send 
warships after pirates who attacked a British merchant vessel in the vicinity. Ye responded by 
declaring that ‘the Bogue riverine space is in the jurisdiction of the provincial naval commander’ 
who held sole authority in the region.11 Two years later, however, when a more pressing naval 
threat appeared in the form of Ming loyalists under Chen Xianliang, Ye sought British and 
eventually American assistance against Chen and his pirate band.12 In desperate situations, even 
the most xenophobic Qing officials were willing to seek foreign assistance against a common foe. 
Qing authorities were not the only ones concerned with rebellion. Hong Kong’s proximity 
to Kowloon meant events in one had implications for the other. In 1846, Qiying fretted that 
disturbances in Hong Kong would ‘echo through Mount Kowloon’.13 The converse was also 
true eight years later when a rebellion in Kowloon would resonate on Victoria Peak.14 On 19 
August 1854, a ‘band of insurgents’ captured ‘the town of Cowloon’. William Caine, now the 
lieutenant-governor of Hong Kong, claimed that the ‘attacking party are reported to be nearly 
all Haka men, most of them Stone Cutters from this Island and the vicinity’.15 The insurgents 
were members of a branch of the Triads from Huizhou, led by Luo Yatian, which included 
many labourers from Hong Kong among its followers.16 Luo and his gangsters ultimately forced 
the Kowloon authorities to abandon the Kowloon Walled City, with one Qing official 
reportedly taking refuge in Hong Kong. The fall of Kowloon disrupted the collaborative imperial 
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hydrarchy between the two sides of Victoria Harbour. Caine lamented that while ‘Official 
Communication ha[d] always been carried on between the Police Authorities of this Colony 
and the Chinese Officers’ in Kowloon, the ‘connection thus long maintained exists no longer, 
and may cause some inconvenience, as we have been in the habit of handing to the Chief at 
Cowloon… Criminals charged with Offences against the laws of China’. 17  Many of those 
criminals were pirates.18 Fortunately for the Hong Kong-Kowloon connection, a Qing force, led 
by the district magistrate and the colonel of Dapeng, accompanied by a group of mercenaries 
from Hong Kong, succeeded in recapturing the walled city at the end of August.19 
The participation of Hong Kong residents on both sides of the rebellion in Kowloon, as well 
as the spread of the unrelated Taiping Rebellion elsewhere, catalysed the passage, less than five 
months later, of Ordinance No. 1 of 1855.20 The ordinance insisted that ‘strict neutrality be 
maintained by all residents within the Colony of Hongkong between the different parties at 
present contending for dominion in the Empire of China’. To this end, residents of Hong Kong 
were forbidden to provide any assistance to ‘either the existing Chinese Government or any of 
the different factions at present engaged or who may be hereafter engaged in opposition to the 
said Government’. The ordinance further decreed that: 
If any armed vessel whatsoever carrying any Chinese flag be found within any of the 
waters of this Colony and such vessel shall not depart therefrom within twenty-four 
hours after a notice to depart from these waters, signed by the Colonial Secretary, has 
been served on board thereof, such vessel shall, with everything found on board of it, 
be seized and sold or made forfeit to the Crown on due condemnation by the said 
Magistrates.21 
 
Enforcing British neutrality during the Taiping and other rebellions included a stronger assertion 
of sovereignty over Victoria Harbour and Hong Kong’s territorial waters, from which Qing and 
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rebel armed ships were now forbidden. In September 1856, in accordance with this prohibition, 
Governor Bowring ‘compelled several Junks having the Flag Taipingwang [leader of the 
Taipings] to quit [Victoria] harbour’ in order to uphold Hong Kong’s neutrality. He further 
added that ‘I could find no evidence of piratical intention or else I would have proceeded to 
confiscate the Junks’.22 Despite a proclamation of neutrality, the Hong Kong authorities were 
still keen to act against pirates, an identification that could give British officials jurisdiction over 
Chinese rebels. Indeed, as shown in the cases of Lee Afyee and the Small Swords, plunder at 
sea, even when politically motivated, could justify British circumvention of neutrality and 
recourse to force. 
Rebellion also disrupted Qing maritime control with implications for Hong Kong. When the 
Small Sword rebels, who included many dislocated Cantonese boatmen in their ranks, captured 
Shanghai and destroyed the Qing customs house there, foreign merchants feared that the 
nonpayment of import taxes would violate the treaties. As a compromise, the consuls set up a 
foreign-run customs house to collect duties on behalf of Qing officials until their recovery of 
Shanghai. This system laid the foundation for the Imperial Maritime Customs, an important, 
foreign-run component of the Qing bureaucracy.23 The concern with protecting legal trade, 
particularly in the chaos of rebellion, also affected Hong Kong. Hoping ‘that legal trading should 
be protected and illegal trading prevented’, the Hong Kong government passed Ordinance No. 
4 of 1855, which established a system of registration for colonial shipping. According to the 
ordinance only ships with approved registration could trade in Hong Kong. Chinese in Hong 
Kong could obtain colonial registers ‘provided the person or persons applying as owners be 
registered lessees of Crown lands within this Colony’.24  These registers gave Hong Kong-
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registered vessels the protection of the British flag.25 Gerald Graham went so far as to claim that 
the measure turned the Hong Kong Chinese into ‘British Chinese’.26 
The willingness of British colonial and consular authorities to support the ‘British Chinese’ 
was put to the test when the Canton authorities seized two colonial-registered lorchas for 
smuggling salt in May 1856. British authorities demanded restoration of the lorchas and 
threatened to call on the Royal Navy to exact retribution. Pointing out that ‘the right of 
confiscation does not extend to the vessels but only to the Cargo’, Bowring insisted that in cases 
of Qing seizures of ships with colonial registers on charges of smuggling, British officials should 
demand the ships’ return, after which the Hong Kong authorities would prosecute the owners 
for ‘violation of the conditions on which the Register or Sailing letter may have been granted’.27 
Britain thus zealously guarded its imperial hydrarchy in Chinese waters, which it extended over 
Hong Kong-registered Chinese ships by colonial law. 
Qing authorities eventually acceded to the extraterritorial jurisdiction that British 
authorities exercised over smuggling craft. By 1856, Qing customs officials were accustomed to 
detaining lorchas flying foreign flags on suspicion of salt smuggling without insult to the flag or 
violation of extraterritorial privileges. 28  Piracy, however, proved a different matter. While 
officials in late imperial China initially saw smuggling as a maritime crime akin to piracy, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, the problem of piracy had worsened to the point that British and Qing 
officers took increasingly drastic measures to suppress it. 29 In 1854, the British consul at Canton 
requested that Qing officials organize convoys between Canton and Whampoa.30 Ye Mingchen 
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refused to assent to this request.31 By 1856, however, piracy had become so problematic that 
the Royal Navy arranged its own system of convoy on the China coast to protect shipping from 
‘the abominable outrages which have so long impeded the free course of Trade between the 
Ports open to Foreign Commerce’. Rear-Admiral James Stirling announced that one warship 
would sail at the first of each month, calling at each of the treaty ports and Hong Kong. Such 
warships had ‘orders to take under Convoy all Vessels of every Nation, who may see fit to avail 
themselves of the occasion thus afforded to pass in safety from Port to Port’.32  
Piracy in the Canton delta became such a dire problem that despite previously refusing to 
organize a system of convoy, Ye Mingchen tacitly accepted the system proposed by Stirling. 
Though Ye remarked that he had issued orders to local Qing officials and naval forces to 
cooperate against piracy and that ‘continuous reports of captures of pirates are made, and the 
number captured is excessive’, he nonetheless proved willing to accept British convoys. He 
ordered all coastal military and civil official to give notice of the convoys to allay any 
suspicions.33 Though Anglo-Qing cooperation against piracy became more frequent after the 
Shap-ng-tsai expedition in October 1849, the British convoy system marked a unilateral action 
for protecting the China coast against pirates who were often implicated in rebellion. British 
actions, which sometimes violated neutrality, and the need to maintain order may have shamed 
or pressured Qing officials into increasing the zealousness of own their efforts. It was in this 
context that Qing soldiers detained twelve members of the Chinese crew of the Hong Kong-
registered lorcha, Arrow, in Canton on 8 October 1856. 
 
‘The “Arrow” Outrage’ 
Harry Parkes, the British consul at Canton, complained about the Arrow incident to Ye 
Mingchen. Parkes claimed that the lorcha, allegedly flying the British flag, was anchored in the 
waters of Canton when a Qing vessel under the command of Commandant (shoubei) Liang 
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Guoding pulled alongside her. Li Rongsheng and several other soldiers boarded the Arrow and 
forcibly detained twelve of her crew. Parkes further stated that the Qing soldiers hauled down 
the British flag, a ‘national insult of the highest degree’.34 Parkes told Bowring that he considered 
the affair a ‘significant insult’.35 John Wong discusses in detail the circumstances of the detention 
of the crew of the Arrow and challenges the veracity of British assertions that the flag suffered 
insult in the scuffle. He also provides meticulous analysis of many other latent forces, including 
personalities, British politics, and economics that helped turn the Arrow incident into the 
flashpoint of the Arrow War.36 Nonetheless, a Qing exercise of imperial hydrarchy over the 
Arrow was the most salient provocation that justified armed retaliation and another war in China. 
Though the alleged insult to the British flag and the many other causes Wong discusses all 
contributed to the outbreak of war, the immediate pretext for the Arrow incident was a Qing 
attempt to detain the vessel’s Chinese crew on suspicions of piracy. The arrest of the crew had 
implications in British, Qing, and international law, and both sides’ responses reveal a continued 
lack of understanding over each other’s authority and jurisdiction over pirates. 
Much about the Arrow was suspect, and its ambiguity vis-à-vis British and Qing jurisdiction 
caused confusion. Ye Mingchen asserted that Su Yacheng, a Qing subject, built the Arrow, 
which was completed on 7 August 1854. 37  The following year, Qing officials decried 
‘treacherous people’ building lorchas and seeking licences from foreigners. Noting that ‘some 
lorchas are selling smuggled salt and goods, thus causing loss in revenue’ and that ‘others 
opportunistically commit piracy against merchants’, the judicial commissioner (tixing ancha shi 
si) at Canton forbade the construction of lorchas, which were considered ‘barbarian ships’, and 
re-issued notices against smuggling and piracy.38 Shortly before this prohibition, a Hong Kong 
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resident purchased the Arrow and registered her there on 27 September 1855. 39  Ye 
acknowledged that the Arrow had ‘received a licence from the foreigner Bo-lu [Block]’ and that 
it had a foreign master. Given the prohibition on Qing subjects building lorchas and obtaining 
foreign registers, however, Ye refused to acknowledge foreign ownership of the Arrow. He 
restated his assertion that the crew of the Arrow, if not the ship itself, fell under Qing jurisdiction 
by claiming that there were pirates among the detainees. In support of this assertion, he provided 
a deposition from Huang Liankai, who claimed to recognize pirates who attacked his ship in the 
seas of Sanzhoutang off Xinning on 6 September 1856 among the crew of the Arrow. Huang 
reported this matter to Qing naval officials, who proceeded to arrest twelve crewmen. Huang’s 
claims were corroborated by a deposition from Wu Yaren, one of the detainees from the Arrow, 
which stated that Li Mingtai, alias Liang Mingtai, and Liang Jianfu joined the crew of the Arrow 
at Macau on 21 September 1856; Wu deposed that Mingtai admitted that he committed piracy 
along with Jianfu and a gang of over thirty pirates at Sanzhoutang. Ye concluded from the 
depositions that ‘there were criminals among the detainees, and they were not inappropriately 
arrested’. In asserting jurisdiction over this incident of piracy, Ye insisted on detaining Wu 
Yaren, Li Mingtai, and Liang Jianfu, but had the remaining nine detainees returned.40 Notably, 
Ye made no mention of the Arrow’s flag at all. For him, the incident was a disagreement over 
jurisdiction and had nothing to do with national insult. 
Parkes was indignant at Ye’s response to ‘the “Arrow” outrage’: ‘Nothing it appears to me 
can be more unsatisfactory than the reply of the Imperial Commissioner who offers no redress 
or apology but upholds the acts of his officers throughout, and denies that the Lorcha is British-
owned’. He pointed out that in the Arrow’s expired register, ‘she is therein said to belong to 
“Fong A Ming of Victoria Hong Kong, Chinese Trader”, but the place and date of her build is 
not given’. He further pointed out that ‘Mr. Block (Danish Consul at Hongkong)’ hired 
‘Thomas Kennedy, a native of Belfast, and a very respectable man of his class’, to act as the 
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Arrow’s ‘nominal master’.41 Parkes’s superior, John Bowring, admitted that technically ‘the 
Arrow had no right to hoist the British Flag. The licence to do so expired on the 27 of September 
during which period she has been out of our protection’. He insisted, however, that the Qing 
authorities would not have known about the expired register and did not have ‘any other ground 
for interference than the suspicion that the owner is not a British Subject’. He also believed Qing 
officers violated Article IX of the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue in not requesting the 
rendition of Chinese on a British vessel through British consular authorities.42 For Parkes and 
Bowring, key ‘personalities of imperialism’ in advocating for war, the crux of the Arrow outrage 
lay in the insult to the vessel’s flag, which they asserted gave it British protection.43 Little is 
made of the fact that the alleged insult occurred during Qing officials’ arrest of pirates in Chinese 
waters. As Ye’s initial reply to Parkes’s grievances does not even mention a flag, he likely 
understood the incident differently. 
Parkes repeated his complaints and further demanded ‘an apology for what has taken place, 
and an assurance that the British flag shall in future be respected’.44 In response, Ye repeated 
that the Arrow was built by Su Yacheng and had merely received a licence from a foreign firm. 
He insisted that the ‘lorcha is not the property of foreigners’ and asserted Qing jurisdiction, 
claiming to ‘have already issued orders for an investigation’ when Qing officials boarded the 
Arrow. In the first instance in which he addressed the issue of the Arrow’s flag, Ye stated that 
when Qing officials boarded the Arrow to make arrests ‘they did not see any foreigners on board 
the ship, and the ship was not flying any flag’. He considered that in this instance, ‘Chinese 
officers did not without cause board a foreign lorcha and make arrests’.45 In Ye’s understanding, 
the fact that the Arrow was built by a Qing subject and had no foreigners on board meant she 
fell under Qing jurisdiction despite holding a foreign register and having a foreign flag, which 
may not have even been flying. 
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The collaborative imperial hydrarchy for suppressing piracy that had haphazardly emerged 
between the British and Qing since the colonization of Hong Kong provides insight into the two 
sides’ misunderstandings during the Arrow incident. Since at least 1842, British officials had 
been handing captured Chinese pirates to Qing authorities, particularly at Kowloon. Xu 
Wenshen, the first deputy magistrate of Kowloon, likely mediated many of these interactions. 
At the time of the Arrow incident, he had been promoted to magistrate of Nanhai and was the 
official initially deputed to return nine of the twelve detainees from the Arrow. Given Xu’s 
familiarity in dealing with pirates extradited by the British from Hong Kong, it may not be 
coincidental that Ye Mingchen sent him to attempt to resolve the Arrow ‘outrage’. By deputing 
Xu to deal with the matter of arrests and renditions, Qing authorities treated the Arrow incident 
in a similar manner to the British capturing Chinese pirates and delivering them to Kowloon. 
The British practice of handing captured Chinese pirates to Qing officials likely affected 
Qing understandings of the events of 8 October 1856. Despite the occasional British reprimand, 
such renditions reaffirmed the Qing authorities’ belief that they alone had jurisdiction over 
maritime crimes, including piracy, committed by Chinese subjects. When British officials did 
attempt to claim jurisdiction over Chinese pirates, they often used the language of hostis humani 
generis in the law of nations to do so. British authorities asserted a right, through universal 
jurisdiction, to deal with Chinese pirates, portrayed as a common enemy of both Britain and 
China. Moreover, they repeatedly called for their Qing counterparts to take stronger actions in 
suppressing piracy. Contrary to British complaints, Qing efforts against pirates were not entirely 
fruitless. Chen Yu-hsiang points out that Qing officials reported capturing an average of about 
1,000 pirates a year in the mid-nineteenth century.46 Though rarely mentioned directly in the 
reports, these numbers likely included pirates captured by the Royal Navy and delivered to 
Qing authorities, a tacit recognition of the British contribution to suppressing piracy.47 In this 
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context, Ye was understandably confused when an attempt to arrest pirates, a common enemy 
of Britain and China, met with such furious reprimands. Given British pressures for Qing action 
against pirates, and the established British practice of extraditing pirates to Qing authorities, Ye 
insisted on retaining jurisdiction over the two pirates captured from the Arrow.48 For Qing 
officials, the outrage of the Arrow incident lay in a British attempt to block a Qing exercise of 
authority over Chinese pirates on a Chinese ship in Chinese waters. 
Unfortunately for Ye Mingchen, by 1856 British authorities were desperate to increase their 
access to China’s market and believed the Qing government was not upholding treaty 
stipulations. Ye had rejected treaty revision, leaving war as the only recourse Parkes and 
Bowring believed they had left. While Ye saw the Arrow incident as a matter of suppressing 
piracy, British authorities saw it as a justification for a war to expand British trade interests in 
China. This may have driven Parkes’s aggressiveness in using the Arrow ‘outrage’ as a pretext 
for war.49 On 14 October 1856, he met with Commodore Charles J.B. Elliot, who agreed with 
Parkes on the injustice of the Arrow affair and seized ‘an Imperial War Junk’.50 The vessel turned 
out to be ‘a cargo vessel belonging to a mainland merchant’. Ye, not understanding that the 
vessel was taken as a form of reprisal, accused Parkes of ‘ordering needless trouble to this 
innocent vessel’, but also offered to return all the detainees from the Arrow, including the alleged 
pirates. He further conceded that ‘if there are pirates hidden on board foreign ships, the consul 
should be notified and cooperate in dealing with the matter’. He still, however, insisted that the 
Arrow was a Chinese ship. 51  Ye’s statement reveals continued confusion in the matter of 
jurisdiction over pirates, and his concessions proved too little too late. The day before Ye wrote 
his letter, Parkes met with Bowring and Rear-Admiral Michael Seymour in Hong Kong. 
Seymour left for Canton, and his forces began bombarding forts guarding the approach to the 
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city, capturing them 23 October.52 Ye wrote to Parkes stating that for the sake of ‘good relations 
with your honourable country’, Qing forces did not counter the attacks on the forts. Even in the 
face of British bombardment, however, Ye still insisted that as the Arrow was anchored in 
Chinese waters and originally belonged to a Qing subject, he had done nothing wrong in 
arresting pirates onboard.53 
Ye Mingchen’s forbearance would be tested as the cannonade continued. On 24 and 25 
October, the Royal Navy captured the ‘forts in the immediate neighbourhood of the City of 
Canton’.54 On 26 October, Ye issued a proclamation that the ‘English barbarians’ attack on and 
disturbance of Canton, which has injured soldiers and people, is a most detestable crime’. In 
retaliation, he called on the populace of Canton to unite with Qing forces to attack ‘English 
bandits’ and offered 30 yuan for British heads.55 Parkes saw this as a declaration of hostilities 
against Britain, claiming that Ye ‘considered himself at war with the English’.56 On 28 October, 
Royal Navy guns breached the walls of Canton city, and ‘at about 3 P.M. the English colors 
were planted on the Wall by Captain Bate’.57 Three days later, the ‘Gentry and Scholars of 
Canton’, seeking reconciliation, issued a notice proclaiming that ‘the military officers employed 
in search for robbers “do not understand the Treaties”’, conceding that Qing officials were in 
the wrong in the Arrow affair.58 
But Governor-General Ye remained adamant, continuing to insist that the Arrow ‘was not 
a foreign ship’ and that the ‘arrests were not made by mistake’.59 He asserted that the seizure of 
the Arrow’s crew was a matter of Qing jurisdiction and rejected British infringement. By 11 
November, Ye declared the cannonade of Canton an act of hostility and cited the indignation 
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of the city’s residents as justification for his refusal to submit to British demands.60 With British 
and Qing officials acknowledging each other’s engagement in hostilities, the Arrow War had 
unofficially begun.61 More than a year after the commencement of hostilities, James Bruce, the 
Earl of Elgin and Kincardine and new British plenipotentiary in China, noted that the war was 
the result of ‘differences which have unfortunately arisen between certain of the authorities and 
subjects of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and certain of the authorities and subjects of 
his Majesty the Emperor of China’.62 British and Qing understandings of piracy and the extent 
of their jurisdiction over it was one such unfortunate difference. 
 
Continuation and Change in Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy 
A day after acknowledging British hostility, Ye Mingchen wrote to John Bowring reaffirming 
that he considered the Arrow incident a matter of ‘arresting Chinese criminals’ and continued 
to insist that the Arrow was a Chinese vessel under Qing jurisdiction which had merely 
‘borrowed a flag on false pretences’. He further mentioned that he had deputed Xu Wenshen to 
deal with the matter and lamented Harry Parkes’s refusal to deal with Xu especially as ‘that 
magistrate is commissioned by China to handle foreign affairs’. 63  Ye acknowledged Xu’s 
experience with dealing with British officials. He reported that Xu ‘had been managing 
barbarian affairs for a long time’ and that while Xu ‘was serving as the Kowloon deputy 
magistrate, every time he met with the chieftain of the barbarians at Hong Kong, they often 
came to an agreement, and there was mutual trust’.64 Xu’s successors as deputy magistrate of 
Kowloon continued this close association with colonial officials in Hong Kong even after the 
commencement of hostilities. 
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In the months before the Arrow incident, British warships were still taking actions against 
Chinese pirates to Qing indifference if not approval. In August 1856, Captain Keith Stewart in 
HMS Nankin, accompanied by HMS Coromandel, made three expeditions against pirates in the 
Canton Delta. These sallies consisted of an expedition to Coulan and two to Mirs Bay, one of 
which involved the participation of the Spanish warship Reina de Castilla. During these 
expeditions, nine pirate junks were destroyed and one captured and taken to Hong Kong.65 As 
the pirates were captured outside of Hong Kong’s territorial waters, they were beyond British 
Admiralty jurisdiction and likely handed over to Qing authorities at Kowloon.66 During the 
expedition to Coulan, Stewart fell in with Qing forces engaging ‘Rebels’. On learning the 
purpose of Stewart’s presence, the Qing officers ‘appeared quite satisfied and were quite 
indifferent’ to his actions against pirates.67 Despite the commencement of hostilities between 
Britain and China in the vicinity of Canton in October 1856, that December, the Admiralty 
expressed ‘satisfaction’ at the result of Stewart’s proceedings.68 Qing sanction and Admiralty 
approval of Royal Navy actions against pirates less than two months before the Arrow incident 
suggests that the system for cooperating against piracy, which had developed between the 
British and Qing local officials, remained strong despite the increasing tensions in Sino-British 
relations. Indeed, even the outbreak of hostilities at Canton did not prevent the continuation of 
a collaborative imperial hydrarchy elsewhere in South China. 
Qing officials continued to send knowledgeable officers to help guide Royal Navy 
expeditions against pirates throughout the Arrow War. 69  Reciprocally, British officials 
continued sending pirates to Kowloon despite the outbreak of hostilities. In response to 
‘repeated complaints… made of the obstruction caused to market vessels supplying this Colony 
by a Piratical Squadron cruising near the entrance of our Harbor’, Governor Bowring requested 
that Rear-Admiral Seymour send a force to deal with them. On 16 February 1857, Seymour 
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dispatched HMS Niger and HEICS Auckland to go after the pirates. The two ships succeeded 
in capturing eight piratical vessels and seventy-three pirates. Investigation by the chief 
magistrate revealed that ‘evidence of repeated acts of piracy could be produced against these 
men and that on the very day preceding their capture they had murdered ten of their prisoners 
in cold blood’. Bowring, however, surmised that: 
were the Criminals tried before the Supreme Court capital convictions would have 
ensued in a great number of cases which must either have been carried into effect in a 
wholesale manner or a distinction drawn without any sufficient cause between these 
Capital Convicts and others who have already undergone the extreme penalty of the 
Law. Furthermore the whole administration of Criminal Justice in cases connected with 
Piracy is so defective from the difficulties attending interpretation in various dialects, 
keeping the witnesses in attendance and various other causes that I felt convinced the 
trial of such a great number should be avoided if possible. 
 
Many of the problems that had impeded the Hong Kong criminal justice system’s ability to 
effectively prosecute pirates persisted at the time of the Niger and Auckland expedition. Bowring 
thus resorted to the established practice for dealing with such matters and ‘caused the 73 
prisoners in question to be handed over to the Chinese Authorities at Cowloon who received 
them from the Colonial Police in a most satisfactory manner’. He qualified his actions by stating 
‘I caused these men to be handed simply as Pirates and Murders without reference to their 
connection to the civil discord existing in China as I carefully avoid every act that can look like 
a violation of the neutrality I would preserve’.70 Bowring makes no mention of Britain’s war 
with China at the time. 
He must have been aware of the state of Anglo-Qing relations when he had the seventy-
three pirates delivered to Kowloon nearly half a year after the bombardment of Canton. By that 
time, French and American naval forces had withdrawn from Canton to Hong Kong. Needing 
forces to both protect Hong Kong and attack Canton, Bowring had asked the governor of the 
Straits Settlements for reinforcements a month before the pirates’ capture.71 His own insistence 
on obtaining permission  for British subjects to enter the city of Canton, which he saw as a 
condition of the treaties, played an important role in turning the Arrow incident into a 
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justification for commencing hostilities.72 That Bowring extradited pirates to Kowloon during a 
war he helped cause testifies to the resilience of the modus vivendi between Hong Kong and 
Kowloon for dealing with pirates. Hong Kong authorities needed the efficiency of the Qing 
criminal justice system to effectively prosecute piracy, a necessity that did not recede when 
Britain and China were unofficially at war. 
Though Bowring made no mention of the war in his report of the rendition of pirates to 
Kowloon, officials at the Colonial Office, noting the state of hostilities extant when the pirates 
were extradited, decried the impropriety of the measure. One believed that Bowring had shirked 
his duty by delivering the pirates to Kowloon, pointing out that ‘one great object of establishing 
a Supreme Court at Hong Kong’ was to deal with ‘piracy and murder on the sea’ including that 
committed by ‘persons who, though not apparently colonial residents, were engaged in traffic 
with the Colony’ regardless of ‘the present anomalous state of affairs’.73 He further stated that 
even in time of war, Hong Kong’s Supreme Court had jurisdiction over piracy committed ‘either 
in the waters of the Colony’ or ‘on the high seas’.74 Ultimately, the Colonial Office reprimanded 
Bowring for calling on ‘the armed forces of Her Majesty… to arrest a body of pirates, who had 
been preying on the lives & properties of the people of Hong Kong’ and then 
hand[ing] them over to Chinese Officials under circumstances, which must make it very 
doubtful whether they will be brought to justice & which even have room for a fear, 
that they may be again employed in committing acts of atrocity, & perhaps against the 
persons & property of British subjects.75  
 
Another Colonial Office official elaborated, minuting that Bowring’s rendition of pirates to an 
enemy official in wartime was ‘a most extraordinary proceeding’ and that ‘at this moment in 
China… Commissioner Yeh [Ye Mingchen] will enrol these pirates & condone any number of 
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past murders on condition of their killing’ British subjects.76 The tensions of suppressing piracy 
in the vicinity of an enemy would emerge more clearly in later expeditions. 
One month after the expedition that captured the seventy-three pirates contentiously 
handed over to the Kowloon authorities, Commander Charles Forsyth of HMS Hornet, 
accompanied by Daniel Caldwell and a Chinese victim of piracy, went after a ‘Piratical Fleet’ 
which had taken the victim’s vessel. The boats of the Hornet encountered the ‘Pirate Fleet 
consisting of large Lorchas and Junks, seventeen in number’ at ‘Sandy Bay, St. Johns Island 
[Shangchuan]’, to the west of Macau. Being vastly outnumbered, Forsyth ‘thought a diversion 
might be made in our favour by landing’ and scaled the heights overlooking the pirate fleet’s 
anchorage with a party of Marines who ‘opened a brisk fire with Rifles, whilst the Gun and 
Rocket Boat engaged in flank’. Fire from the Hornet’s men and boats eventually caused the 
pirates, reportedly three hundred and fifty in number, to flee ashore. On boarding the 
abandoned vessels, Forsyth found two dead pirates and concluded that ‘from the appearance of 
the blood on [the ships’] decks many [pirates] must have been wounded’. He also encountered 
‘one Portuguese and a native of Goa’ who participated in firing on the boats of the Hornet. The 
Portuguese participant claimed to have been a captive of the pirates and reported that other 
Europeans were among the pirate crew that escaped. Despite this information and having 
already violated Qing territorial sovereignty by landing forces, Forsyth decided not to pursue 
the pirates. He was instead satisfied with burning the abandoned ships, destroying their guns, 
and restoring a stolen vessel to the Chinese victim who accompanied the expedition. 
On her way back to Hong Kong, the Hornet called at ‘Lingting’, an island in the Canton 
Delta. There, Forsyth reported that a ‘villager informed us that a Fleet of Mandarin Junks had 
been seen cruizing yesterday between Lingting and the Lama Island, directly in the track of 
vessels bound for [Hong Kong]’. The junks constituted a hostile force. Britain being at war with 
China, Qing war junks in the vicinity of Hong Kong could threaten the trade upon which the 
 






colony relied. Distressed by the proximity of a Qing fleet to a British possession, Forsyth 
‘immediately stood over in that direction but could hear nothing of them’.77 An expedition 
against pirates, the enemy of all, became a search for ships of Britain’s circumstantial enemy in 
the Arrow War. British suppression of Chinese piracy continued in Guangdong despite the state 
of hostilities between Britain and China, and the Royal Navy attacked pirate junks and Qing 
warships alike. 
‘Lingting’ (Lingding, known as Lintin Island in English sources) served as an opium depot 
in the early nineteenth century. By mid-century, Chinese pirates often used it as a 
headquarters. 78  Though notoriously beyond the control of Qing authorities, it technically 
formed part of Xin’an district and fell within the military jurisdiction of the colonel of Dapeng 
at Kowloon. 79  During the first Opium War, Lai Enjue reported on the situation there. 80 
Considering that the Dapeng colonel, now Zhang Yutang, had a number of ‘war-junks… under 
his command at the various stations of the district’, the mandarin junks reported by the villagers 
at Lintin were likely under his orders.81 A month after mandarins at Kowloon, under Zhang’s 
authority, received the seventy-three pirates captured by the Royal Navy, a ship from the same 
force sought to engage his squadron. Hong Kong’s incapacity to deal with pirates may have 
driven British officers to continue cooperating with the Kowloon authorities, but, as reprimands 
from the Colonial Office and Forsyth’s search for Qing war junks show, the war between China 
and Britain complicated the matter. 
With relations between Hong Kong and Kowloon strained by hostilities at Canton, British 
authorities turned to other partners in suppressing piracy. On 8 June 1857, Captain George 
Hand of HMS Sampson set off for Mirs Bay along with Caldwell and a Chinese informant in 
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search of piratical assailants who had attacked the informant. On the information of some 
fishermen, the Sampson sailed to Kat-O, where it encountered ‘one large Junk mounting nine 
Guns’. Seeing the Sampson, the crew of the junk abandoned ship only to be attacked by villagers 
ashore. The boats of the Sampson further succeeded in capturing ‘two large Junks and a lorcha 
carrying the Portuguese Flag’ after exchanging fire.82 Hand delivered the prisoners from the 
Portuguese-flagged lorcha to Macau. Governor Izidoro Guimarães considered the prisoners 
within the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of Macau and declared Hand’s account ‘satisfactory 
enough’, believing it ‘sufficiently justifie[d] the destruction of the Lorcha No. 139’.83 Guimarães 
also forwarded ‘particulars’, which he thought ‘should be known by the Cruisers of Foreign 
Powers to enable them to discriminate those boats that are legally entitled to carry the 
Portuguese Flag from such as do so without authority’. 84  Guimarães forwarded this 
memorandum to the main naval powers on the China coast shortly after the Macau government 
gazette published the proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies on 9 March 1857, which 
contained complaints about the deplorable state of the Portuguese fleet in China.85 Guimarães’s 
approval of HMS Sampson’s actions against a piratical Portuguese lorcha and his request for 
assistance from ‘Cruisers of Foreign Powers’ in the context of the Chamber of Deputies’ 
desperation at the weakness of the Portuguese navy suggests a willingness on the part of the 
Portuguese officials to participate in the collaborative imperial hydrarchy of the Canton Delta.  
Bowring’s complaints about the limits of the Hong Kong criminal justice system in dealing 
with piracy and the rendition of pirates to Kowloon and Macau show that British authorities 
continued to accept assistance in suppressing piracy in South China. Despite the outbreak of 
hostilities at Canton, British officers proved willing to cooperate, if warily, with the Canton 
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authorities’ subordinates at Kowloon. As Canton’s criminal justice system held the ultimate 
authority over pirates in Guangdong, however, the provincial capital was an important linchpin 
in the Anglo-Qing modus vivendi for suppressing piracy in that province. Hostilities between 
Britain and the Canton authorities caused a disruption in this cooperation, with Whitehall 
prohibiting the rendition of Chinese pirates to enemy officials. War between Britain, and later 
France, and China became an obstacle to an effective collaborative imperial hydrarchy over 
Chinese pirates, one which was removed by the Anglo-French occupation of Canton. 
 
Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy in Occupied Canton 
The bombardment of Canton and impressive British naval victories against Qing forces in the 
Canton River, particularly at Fatshan (Foshan) Creek in May and June 1857, failed to move Ye 
Mingchen to apologise for the Arrow incident or to agree to further concessions.86 As naval 
battles had limited effect, Rear-Admiral Seymour declared that ‘the River of Canton should 
continue in the sole occupation of the British Forces’ and announced a blockade of the ‘River 
and Port of Canton, by all its entrances’ to commence on 7 August.87 Seymour concluded in a 
letter to the Admiralty that the blockade was ‘the only legal remedy’ against Qing intransigence 
and attempts to exclude British trade from Canton.88 The blockade also proved ineffective, 
undermined by Chinese smuggling craft.89 Many of these vessels also participated in piracy. 
Shortly after the establishment of the blockade, Seymour reported that while the Qing navy had 
been driven from the river, ‘the Creeks abound with small Piratical Row-Boats’.90 
While Ye, hostile towards the British, remained in power in Canton, the Royal Navy was 
limited in the action it could take against pirates in the Canton Delta. Captain Harry Edgell, 
senior naval officer at Hong Kong, wrote to his fellow officer, Captain Hand, that ‘we are not 
expected to do the duty of River Police to the High Commission and you will on no account 
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send your boats away in search of Pirates up the Creeks’.91 As during the first Opium War, 
however, the British destruction of Qing naval forces disrupted Canton’s imperial hydrarchy. 
Despite a blockade and the state of hostilities, British officials still relied on Qing authorities to 
prosecute pirates captured by the Royal Navy. The limits on actions permitted to British 
warships meant that the Royal Navy could not act as an effective suppressor of piracy. The 
situation was worsened by hostilities, which precluded Anglo-Qing cooperation though the both 
sides still participated in it. In these circumstances, piracy flourished beyond British and Chinese 
control. In a letter to John Pakington, a former colonial secretary and soon to be first lord of the 
Admiralty, Seymour proposed a solution: ‘the simplicity and certainty of a military control’ of 
Canton.92 
The confidence of Rear-Admiral Michael Seymour and his military counterpart, Major-
General Charles Thomas van Straubenzee, in their ability to take and hold Canton with French 
support pressured Lord Elgin into authorizing such action.93 Elgin issued an ultimatum to Ye 
Mingchen: 
an insult to the British flag, followed by the refusal of the Imperial Commissioner to 
grant adequate reparation, or even to meet in the city the representative of her Britannic 
Majesty, for the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement, has forced the officers who 
are charged with the protection of British interests in this quarter to have recourse to 
measures of coercion against Canton.94 
 
Ye continued to insist that the Arrow incident was a matter of ‘the arrest of Chinese pirates on 
board a Chinese boat, by the Chinese executive’.95 Still believing that the Arrow and her crew 
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were under Qing jurisdiction, Ye refused to admit to any impropriety and rejected the ultimatum, 
and British and French forces launched an attack on Canton.96 
The bombardment of Canton began on 28 December 1857, allied forces landing the 
following day.97 By 31 December, the allies ‘had possession of the walls and Canton was at [their] 
mercy’.98 On 5 January 1858, British forces captured Ye Mingchen and imprisoned him aboard 
HMS Inflexible, eventually sending him to exile in Calcutta.99 Having deposed Qing authority 
at Canton, order quickly collapsed. Days after the capture of Canton, British authorities were 
receiving ‘petitions… praying for protection against marauders, both foreign and native’.100 The 
petitions included a request that ‘the navy will not allow the piratical boats now scouring the 
neighbourhood of Samchau to continue their violence’. According to a British report, the 
petitioners, a group of Canton gentry also ‘begged to know whether if they seized vagabonds 
and robbers, we would punish them; if we would assist them in capturing such persons’.101 In 
the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-French occupation of Canton, local elites requested that 
the allies take action against pirates and offered assistance. A collaborative imperial hydrarchy 
could be recreated in occupied Canton. 
British and French forces needed support. The allies quickly realised they lacked the means 
to administer so large and heavily populated a city as Canton ‘without the assistance of the 
Governor Pih-kwei [Bogui]’. They decided that Bogui, ‘must be accepted as a necessity of the 
situation’ and that he ‘should return to his yamun and resume his functions as Governor, but 
that there should be established at the same time in his yamun a tribunal of officers selected by 
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the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces, and acting under their authority’.102 British and 
French authorities required Bogui to consult with this tribunal, known collectively as the Allied 
Commissioners, before issuing any proclamations, all of which required the commissioners’ 
approval. 103  Furthermore, Rear-Admiral Seymour, Major-General van Straubenzee, and 
Contre-Amiral C. Rigault de Genouilly decreed that the Allied Commissioners 
will assist the Governor in maintaining order. To this end they will be supported by a 
military force, parties from which will, from time to time, patrol the city… Beyond the 
limits of the positions held by the allied force, all cases in which Chinese alone are 
concerned shall be disposed of by the Chinese authorities; but the above Committee 
will take cognizance of all in which foreigners alone, or in which foreigners and Chinese 
are concerned. Offences committed within the limits above indicated will be dealt with 
under martial law.104 
 
Bogui’s yamen, counselled by the Allied Commissioners, established a joint police force of 
European and Qing soldiers.105 By the end of the month, the police force consisted of ‘One 
hundred English and thirty French, distributed between six stations’, each of which was 
supported by ‘an equal number of Chinese police being associated with them, and taking part 
in the discharge of their duties’.106 The joint police force ‘severely punished’ any disorder, 
‘which soon put a stop to that kind of work’.107  
According to James Hevia, the occupation of Canton resulted in the city being 
‘reterritorialized’, through the imposition of ‘British-style colonial law and order’.108 Indeed, 
Lord Elgin believed that the joint-administration of Canton was ‘the most important experiment 
which we are now making in that city’.109 He hoped that if ‘the affairs of the city, in so far as the 
allies are concerned, be wisely, temperately, and firmly administered… the people at its close 
may regret our departure. In that event a result will have been achieved of great political 
importance’.110 Steven Leibo, however, points out that occupied Canton was far from a peaceful 
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place. The allies needed the assistance of Qing officers to maintain a precarious control over the 
population in and around Canton.111 Under the tenuous administration of rehabilitated Qing 
officers subordinate to the Allied Commission (which was itself under the authority of military 
commanders) disorder persisted, and pirates ran rampant in the waters of Canton. The direct 
cooperation between European and Chinese police and the assigning of the Allied 
Commissioners to the governor-general’s yamen, however, permitted a closer form of 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy to develop in response to the problem of piracy. 
Bogui proved willing to cooperate with the allies against piracy. On 16 January 1858, he 
‘supplied a return of war-boats which he is prepared to employ in the suppression of piracy on 
the river, in co-operation with the allied naval forces’.112 Ten days later, Captain Edgell, who 
was now senior officer on the Canton River, issued a memorandum with the order: ‘Should any 
Chinese be guilty of petty thefts or other minor acts on the River and be detected by any of Her 
Majesty’s Ships or Vessels the case is to be reported to me, and the Prisoners with the Witnesses 
held in readiness for Examination’.113 British forces thus expanded jurisdiction over crime in 
Chinese waters. The Anglo-French occupation of Canton permitted this infringement of Qing 
sovereignty, though Qing assistance and participation in operations against pirates remained 
necessary. Two weeks after issuing his memorandum, Edgell ordered Lieutenant Graham of 
HMS Lee to ‘proceed with the Gun Boats… in support of a Division of Mandarin Boats towards 
Hamilton Creek for the purpose of assisting the Chinese Government in suppression of Piracy’; 
Graham would also command ‘Two Pinnaces of our [French] Allies’. Edgell told Graham that 
‘the Commander in Chief wishes… that every support both by Arms and Towing should if 
necessary be given to the Chinese Squadron, but they are to choose their own ground and take 
the initiative’. Edgell warned Graham to ‘bear in mind that this Expedition has reference solely 
to the suppression of Piracy and has nothing whatever to do with Rebels or Mandarin Junks 
belonging to any other Districts whom you may fall in with not joining this Squadron’.114 Direct 
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participation by British naval forces in Chinese-led expeditions against pirates was possible 
through the joint administration of Canton. The situation of that city, being under the Allied 
Commissioners as well as Qing authorities, however, made it a unique entity in China. Joint 
police authority was limited to the immediate vicinity, and districts beyond Canton’s 
jurisdiction were under a separate regime less willing to cooperate with the allies and vice versa. 
While the anti-piracy expedition up Hamilton Creek seems to have been an initiative of the 
Qing authorities, British officers took the lead in other operations against pirates. A month after 
the Hamilton Creek expedition, pirates captured a cargo boat belonging to ‘Messrs. Siemssen 
& Co.’ near ‘a village between Canton and Whampoa named Chaypee [Chepi]’. Edgell 
complained to the Allied Commissioners that piracy was ‘not only a disgrace to any 
Government, but unless at once checked, must be prejudicial to the interests of Trade, now 
happily reviving’. He requested that the Allied Commissioners ask Bogui ‘to send the Officer 
appointed, to act with the Squadron; for the suppression of Piracy in one of my Gun Boats, with 
his Staff, or accompanied by a mandarin Boat’.115 The Qing officer never appeared, and the 
British force, accompanied by French boats, went after the pirates without him.116 The Allied 
flotilla, consisting of six gunboats and boats and men from various other ships, opened fire on 
the village of Chepi and landed a force to interrogate the village elders and capture pirates.117 
Edgell delivered the prisoners ‘over to the Allied Commissioners that their evidence may be 
taken preparatory to drawing up the case for presentation to His Excellency the Acting Imperial 
Commissioner’.118 The Allied Commissioners, on investigation of the sixteen prisoners, decided 
that all were innocent of piracy. They concluded that ‘to have handed over these sixteen 
prisoners to H.E. Pihkwei’s [Bogui’s] would in the opinion of the Commissioners have done 
little… at the expence [sic] of much injustice to the innocent parties seized’. The prisoners 
themselves preferred to indemnify Siemssen & Co. for losses than be delivered to Qing 
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authorities. The detainee ‘Kau-a-foo’, however, was sent to Bogui, ‘not under charge of Piracy, 
but mainly with the view of enabling the Chinese authorities by means of the information which 
his avowed connexion to Kau Too Chow [an alleged pirate chief], will enable him to supply to 
take steps for the apprehension and punishment of this notorious outlaw and his confederates’.119 
The Allied Commissioners, holding authority over Canton, still hoped Qing officials would do 
their share in suppressing piracy. 
Though Chinese officers did not participate in the March expedition to Chepi, Rear-
Admiral Seymour approved of this British action against Chinese subjects.120 British officers 
continued to attempt to include the Qing authorities in suppressing piracy. On 1 April 1858, 
Captain Edgell met with the ‘Tartar General’ in Canton.121 Given the recent occurrences in 
Hamilton Creek and at Chepi, the issue of piracy was almost certainly discussed. Two days later, 
HMS Algerine engaged three piratical craft. The vessels, with arms and crew, were ‘sent to 
Commissioners Boat’; the commissioners ordered the boats destroyed, and the guns were given 
to HMS Algerine.122 On 11 May 1858, pirates plundered a cargo boat belonging to Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. The following day, Captain Edgell sent HMS Lee, Clown, and Watchful to 
Whampoa to deal with the matter. In the end, ‘two Elders from the Village of Ting-ha and three 
prisoners from Chaypee’ were brought before the Allied Commissioners.123 Suspected pirates 
would ultimately be handed over to Qing tribunals. The system of collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy initially developed between Hong Kong and Kowloon was reincarnated in a more 
direct form in occupied Canton. 
 
Piracy by crewmembers of the Arrow and Qing attempts to deal with them helped spark another 
war between Britain and China. Even amidst hostilities, however, British officers proved 
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incapable of suppressing piracy without Qing assistance. British and Qing officials continued to 
cooperate against pirates throughout the Arrow War and even after the allied occupation of 
Canton. Allied dependence on Qing officials for the administration Canton was perhaps most 
evident in an agreement between the Allied Commissioners ‘that the Chinese Authorities could 
not be allowed to quit the City… [T]o insure that the working Officers should remain, H.E. 
Pihkwei [Bogui], the Acting Judge, and Superintendent of Customs were to be placed under 
surveillance in Pihkwei’s Yamun’. 124  Bogui attempted to escape several times during the 
summer of 1858 and was forced by the allies to remain at his post and cooperate.125 Coordinated 
efforts between the allies and Qing authorities for suppressing of piracy, however coerced, 
eventually had their effect. On 6 June 1858, Captain Edgell reported that ‘on the River there 
have been no acts of Piracy and the Mercantile Traffic appears to progress steadily and 
quietly’.126 
Piracy nonetheless persisted.127 In an effort to suppress piracy the allies issued an order 
forbidding Chinese junks from entering waters near the city of Canton.128 Execution of this 
prohibition required the cooperation of Qing officials who were an important component of 
maritime control at Canton. The Royal Navy also played an indispensable role. Between piracy 
and unrest in Canton, Rear-Admiral Michael Seymour believed ‘it would not be advisable to 
undertake a reduction of our Squadron in China’, highlighting the importance of British 
warships in the administration of Canton.129 Cooperation between Qing officials and the Royal 
Navy, as well as the Allied Commissioners and Anglo-French military forces, ultimately 
succeeded in maintaining control, however tenuous at times, over Canton. The ‘long summer’ 
of 1858, during which the joint administration was strained by piracy and other forms of 
disorder, came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin), after which a 
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relative calm returned to the city.130 The closer cooperation between Britain and China at 
Canton would influence later interactions in dealing with pirates and this, along with other 
developments, would become codified in the treaty, which created a firmer legal basis for Anglo-
Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy. 
 
 





‘Revolutionising the System’:  
Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy in the Treaty of Tientsin and 
Convention of Peking 
 
The outbreak of the Arrow War gave Britain an opportunity to renegotiate its treaties with 
China through gunboat diplomacy. In addition to trying to establish diplomatic relations on a 
more equal footing and increasing access to China’s markets, British diplomats sought to use 
treaty negotiations to mandate cooperation with the Qing government for suppressing piracy. 
The Anglo-Qing negotiations of the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) accordingly helped codify the 
system of cooperation against piracy that had been developing since the colonisation of Hong 
Kong. The treaty clarified ambiguities regarding Qing and British jurisdiction over Chinese 
pirates and expanded the scope for cooperation. While saddling Qing officials with responsibility 
for punishing pirates, the Treaty of Tientsin also permitted an expanded range of activity for 
Royal Navy anti-piracy operations in Chinese waters. China Station commanders were quick 
to act on these privileges, attacking pirates in areas previously closed off to foreign warships and 
delivering captives to Qing officials outside the treaty ports or Kowloon. This chapter examines 
the negotiations between British and Qing officials for the legal basis of collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy in the Treaty of Tientsin, which helped codify many of the developments discussed 
in previous chapters and will assess the implications of this codification for the international law 
of piracy in China. 
Disagreements over certain stipulations of the Treaty of Tientsin, however, impeded its 
ratification by the Qing government. This resistance prompted a resumption of hostilities, which 
resulted in the allied occupation of Beijing and presented Britain with another opportunity for 
treaty negotiations. By this time, colonial officials realised that the pirates from Kowloon, the 
lawless Qing territory across Victoria Harbour from Hong Kong, were threatening the order of 
the colony. Hostilities with China gave Britain an excuse to occupy Kowloon for temporary 
military purposes. Colonial officials, however, decided to use this opportunity to push for the 




Ultimately, it was this argument rather than military or strategic claims that British officials put 
forward when requesting the cession of Kowloon, to which Qing leaders assented at gunpoint. 
Piracy provided a basis for a renegotiation of Anglo-Qing relations and British imperial 
expansion in China. The Treaty of Tientsin, with its stipulations regarding piracy, and the 
British colonisation of Kowloon, while manifestations of British imperial aggression, would also 
provide a basis for new developments in a more effective collaboration against piracy. 
 
Codifying Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy: The Treaty of Tientsin 
Even before the Arrow incident, Britain sought a war with China to revise its treaties and 
increase its access to the China market. The Qing exercise of jurisdiction over a Hong Kong-
registered lorcha in Chinese waters provided an opportunity for British authorities to resort to 
force and obtain treaty revision.1 With the outbreak of hostilities, Whitehall appointed Lord 
Elgin to act as ‘Her Majesty’s High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary for the settlement of 
various matters between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China’. These matters included ‘the 
complete execution at Canton, as well as the other ports, of the stipulations of the several 
Treaties’, the right to carry out diplomacy directly with the Qing court at Beijing, ‘access to 
cities on the great rivers’, in particular the Yangtze (Yangzi), and ‘permission for all Chinese 
vessels to resort to Hong Kong for the purposes of trade, from all ports of the Chinese Empire 
without distinction’.2 The foreign secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, also requested that Lord 
Elgin ‘endeavour to liberate the trade with China’ from current treaty restrictions and make the 
‘best endeavours, with a view to the protection of commerce, to induce the Chinese 
Government to admit, by formal stipulation, the co-operation of Her Majesty’s naval forces in 
China for the suppression of piracy’.3 Among other objectives, Elgin set out for China with a 
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mandate to create a more solid basis for collaborative imperial hydrarchy against piracy in treaty 
law. 
As the previous chapter showed, Ye Mingchen’s refusal to concede to British and French 
demands resulted in the capture of Canton, which failed to bring Qing representatives to the 
negotiating table. With Ye exiled to Calcutta and Canton under allied occupation, the British 
and French plenipotentiaries, accompanied by their American and Russian counterparts, sought 
Qing negotiators elsewhere. Elgin noted that the British strategy during the first Opium War 
was now ‘almost valueless’ as the riverine approaches to the Grand Canal, the capture of which 
prompted Qing statesmen to sue for peace in the Treaty of Nanking, were in the hands of the 
Taiping rebels.4 Elgin nonetheless attempted negotiations at Shanghai. Aware, however, that 
Shanghai’s strategic position vis-à-vis the Qing was lost to the Taipings, he also told Rear-
Admiral Michael Seymour that ‘it may be necessary, in pursuance of the policy prescribed by 
Her Majesty’s Government, to bring pressure to bear at some point near the capital’. 5 
Unsatisfied with proceedings at Shanghai, Lord Elgin, Baron Gros of France, Count Putiatin of 
Russia, and William Reed of the United States decided to attempt negotiations at the Haihe 
(known as the Peiho in English sources), the river approaching Beijing. They met Zhili 
provincial officials at the mouth of the Haihe on 30 April 1858. When these negotiations proved 
unsatisfactory, the allied plenipotentiaries issued an ultimatum threatening to resort to naval 
force.6 
On the morning of 20 May 1858, allied gunboats bombarded the Qing forts at Dagu (Taku 
in English sources) on the Haihe. Originally built during the Crimean War for an attack on the 
Kronstadt, the fortress guarding the port of St. Petersburg, the gunboats, small steam-propelled 
craft with shallow draft and heavy armament, instead proved their mettle against Chinese 
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fortifications on the riverine approaches to Tianjin. Their manoeuvrability and heavy guns made 
short work of the Qing defences.7 Seymour reported that ‘after a heavy cannonade of about an 
hour and a quarter, the forts were completely dismantled by the well-directed fire of the French 
and English gun-boats, and the garrisons driven out’ with the forts in allied control by evening.8 
The allied fleet then advanced upriver to Tianjin, the port closest to Beijing. Laurence Oliphant, 
Elgin’s private secretary, described Elgin and Gros’s progress in HMS Slaney as ‘the 
Ambassadors of the two greatest powers in the world, forcing their way into the heart of a 
country containing 300,000,000 inhabitants, in defiance of the will of the Government’.9 Such 
defiance incensed Emperor Xianfeng, who considered the allied occupation of the Dagu forts ‘a 
most detestable crime’. But menaced by a steam-powered fleet capable bringing a force within 
striking distance of the imperial capital, he sent Guiliang and Huashana to Tianjin to negotiate 
with the allies as a means of ‘preventing them from advancing on Beijing’.10 Guiliang and 
Huashana arrived in Tianjin on 2 June. The next day, they met the ‘barbarian chiefs of the four 
kingdoms’ and began negotiations for a new treaty.11 
 
Negotiating the Treaty 
Horatio Nelson Lay, the inspector-general of the Imperial Maritime Customs, mediated the 
Anglo-Qing negotiations. Lay, rather than Elgin, negotiated the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin 
with Guiliang and Huashana.12 Elgin believed that Lay was ‘thoroughly well-informed on all 
the questions at issue’ between the two governments and that ‘the fidelity with which he has 
discharged the duties of Inspector of Customs on behalf of the Chinese Government at Shanghae, 
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gives him a claim to the confidence of the Chinese officials, greater than, perhaps, any other 
European possesses’.13 On 6 June 1858, Lay met the secretaries to Guiliang and Huashana and 
laid down eight demands, including the right of a British minister to reside in Beijing, the 
opening of the Yangtze to British trade and residence, and the ‘cooperation of the Chinese 
Government in the repression of piracy’. 14  Guiliang and Huashana wanted to reject the 
demands, but the threatening position of the allied forces in relation to Beijing forced them to 
attempt negotiations.15 The Qing court permitted Guiliang and Huashana to ‘decide which 
treaty stipulations to accept and which to reject’ and ordered them to gauge the reaction of the 
barbarian negotiators. The imperial commissioners would also attempt to reach compromises on 
each of the British demands.16 For example, rather than agreeing to open all the Yangtze, they 
could instead offer to open two ports on the river as well as two more treaty ports on the coast 
of Guangdong or Fujian.17 While Qing authorities had capitulated in the Treaty of Nanking and 
opened up coastal ports to foreign shipping, they remained reluctant to allow foreign access to 
Chinese rivers as this was seen as more blatant impingement on Chinese waters than allowing 
access to the inner seas.18 The Qing negotiators adamantly opposed treaty demands they saw as 
threatening Chinese sovereignty. At his next meeting with Guiliang and Huashana, Lay 
complained that ‘all our propositions [were] more or less negatived’.19 Though he conceded that 
the matter of establishing the right for a British minister to reside at Beijing and indemnity for 
the occupation of Canton were beyond his authority, he insisted that the Qing commissioners 
assent to his other demands, including cooperation in suppressing piracy. 
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Guiliang and Huashana eventually accepted British demands to lift restrictions on 
missionary activity, ‘consult’ with British officials ‘in the capture of pirates’, change methods of 
official correspondence, and discuss new tariffs.20 To help facilitate cooperation against pirates, 
British negotiators requested that Royal Navy ships receive the right to visit any port in Chinese 
waters. The Qing commissioners rejected this demand partly ‘on account of the fear [British 
warships] would cause the inhabitants’ but more importantly ‘because of the difficulty of stating 
the proposition as it stood to the Emperor’.21 Qing officials had long attempted to exclude 
foreign warships from Chinese waters, seeing their presence as a violation of China’s maritime 
sovereignty. British negotiators softened the demand for Royal Navy access to all Chinese ports 
with ‘the addition of words, signifying, “when coming with no hostile purpose, or in pursuit of 
the pirates.” This clause, it was also explained to [Guiliang and Huashana], contained nothing 
contrary to the usage of nations’.22 Through treaty law, British officials hoped to introduce their 
notions of the international law of piracy to China. 
The Qing commissioners remained reluctant to accept the terms of the treaty but felt 
pressured to do so by the British threat to advance on Beijing.23 Emperor Xianfeng ordered the 
imperial commissioners to ‘use their mouths and tongues to bring [the barbarians] to reason’ and 
to resist demands for opening the Yangtze and establishing a resident minister at Beijing.24 The 
emperor did not comment on other treaty stipulations. On the eve of the signing of the Treaty 
of Tientsin, Xianfeng seems to have accepted most of the treaty’s articles, including clauses on 
piracy. On 26 June 1858, threatened by ‘warships very close by’, Guiliang and Huashana signed 
the Treaty of Tientsin, agreeing that ‘not a single word could be changed’.25 Emperor Xianfeng 
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gave his assent to the treaty on 3 July 1858.26 He would later retract his support and refuse to 
ratify the treaty resulting in a renewal of hostilities, but for the time being, in Oliphant’s 
triumphant declaration, the treaty ‘effected the great object of revolutionising the system under 
which our political and commercial relations with the [Qing] Empire were to be for the future 
conducted’.27 This revolution also affected collaborative imperial hydrarchy. 
 
Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy in the Treaty of Tientsin 
Britain and China had cooperated, albeit on an ad hoc basis, in dealing with piracy as early as 
1842. Before 1858, this collaboration was often a provisional, local arrangement based on 
inconsistent understandings of Article IX of the Treaty of the Bogue and international law 
between British officials and naval personnel and their Qing counterparts.28 The Treaty of 
Tientsin established a firmer legal basis for Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy. Prior 
to the signing of the treaty, the extent of British and Qing jurisdiction over Chinese pirates was 
unclear, and the Arrow incident served as an extreme example of the disastrous outcomes that 
could result from misunderstandings in the matter. The Treaty of Tientsin established clearer 
limits on British and Qing authorities’ jurisdiction over each other’s subjects in China. Articles 
XVI and XVIII gave Qing officials jurisdiction over Chinese criminals who committed crimes 
against British subjects but also gave these officials a responsibility to indemnify British victims 
of Chinese crime. 29  Chinese criminals, even those who committed crimes against British 
subjects, were by treaty under Qing jurisdiction. Article XIX extended this responsibility to 
Chinese waters, making it ‘the duty of the Chinese authorities to use every endeavor to capture 
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and punish… robbers or pirates’ who plundered British vessels and to restore stolen property to 
consular authorities.30 Article XXI abrogated the problematically executed Article IX of the 
Treaty of the Bogue and established a new regime for extradition in which Qing officials had 
the right to request the extradition of Chinese fugitives from Hong Kong or British vessels and 
residences at the treaty ports.31 These treaty clauses shifted responsibility for and jurisdiction 
over Chinese pirates to Qing officials.32 
While Britain decided to saddle the Qing government with the responsibility for prosecuting 
pirates, the Treaty of Tientsin also stipulated increased British participation in suppressing 
piracy. Article LII, as per negotiations, granted ships of the Royal Navy, ‘coming for no hostile 
purpose or being engaged in the pursuit of Pirates’, access to ‘all Ports within the Dominions of 
the Emperor of China’. Qing officials were to permit British warships to purchase provisions and 
refit or make repairs at any port, including those not open by treaty. Furthermore, British naval 
officers were given the right to ‘hold intercourse with the Chinese authorities, on terms of 
equality and courtesy’.33 This article undermined repeated Qing attempts to exclude foreign 
warships from its inner seas and rivers. It allowed the Royal Navy access to parts of China not 
opened to foreigners, impinging on Qing maritime sovereignty. Suppressing piracy provided a 
justification for the expansion of British naval activity in China. British negotiators intended for 
this expansion to facilitate cooperation with the Qing state against pirates. Article LIII stipulated 
that ‘in consideration of the injury sustained by Native and Foreign commerce from the 
prevalence of piracy, in the seas of China, the High Contracting Parties agree to concert 
measures for its suppression’.34  Articles XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXI, and LII of the Treaty of 
Tientsin set the legal framework for this cooperation. 
The Treaty of Tientsin mandated an Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy for 
suppressing piracy. The system codified in the treaty gave Qing officials responsibility over 
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Chinese pirates while the Royal Navy retained a right to act against them in Chinese waters. 
The treaty thus represented compromise between British and Qing understandings of piracy. 
Britain relinquished universal jurisdiction over piracy in China leaving it, like other crimes by 
Qing subjects, a matter to be dealt with by Qing tribunals. At the same time, British officials 
used cooperation in suppressing piracy to violate Qing sovereignty by granting the Royal Navy 
access to all Chinese waters. The unwritten implication was that the Royal Navy had the right 
to act against pirates anywhere in China and submit them to Qing jurisdiction. The British 
notion of pirates as enemies of all was reconciled with the Qing conceptualisation of Chinese 
pirates as criminals solely within Qing jurisdiction. The collaborative imperial hydrarchy 
codified in the Treaty of Tientsin syncretised an understanding of piracy on the China Coast 
that amounted to what Arnulf Becker Lorca calls ‘mestizo international law’ in which non-
Western jurists’ asymmetric negotiations with the European-dictated law of nations influenced 
the development of international law.35 Cooperation with the British against pirates was one 
way Qing authorities engaged and contributed to the mestizo international law on the China 
coast. 
 
Suppressing Piracy between the Treaties 
News of the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin reached Canton on 13 July 1858, and peace 
proclamations were posted on 26 July.36 Though the treaty nominally ended the undeclared war, 
Whitehall decided that before the payment of indemnities and ‘until the restoration of order, 
and an improved feeling towards British subjects on the part of the population of Canton’, the 
city would remain under allied occupation.37 The effects of the treaty were not immediate. 
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Cuthbert Ward Burton, a Royal Marine stationed with the Allied Commissioners’ yamen at 
Canton, complained that ‘diplomacy is always so slow’ four months after receiving notice of the 
treaty.38 Peace nonetheless mollified the Cantonese and a relative calm eventually returned to 
the city. The problem of piracy was reduced to the point that the allies agreed to allow the 
resumption of Chinese junk traffic in Canton.39  By October 1858, Rear-Admiral Seymour 
remarked that ‘no disturbance of the general tranquillity thus brought about [by the Treaty of 
Tientsin] has arisen; Canton agitations have subsided’.40 That December, Seymour stated to 
Commodore Charles Elliot, senior naval officer in the Canton River, that ‘the police of the River 
is entirely in the hands of the Chinese Authorities… our vessels are not to detain Chinese Craft 
on suspicion of their being Pirates (or River Robbers), except when actually caught in the Act’, 
and even then such pirates were to be ‘delivered over… to the Chinese authorities through the 
medium of the British Consul’.41 The mestizo international law of piracy as stipulated in the 
Treaty of Tientsin, in which Qing authorities were responsible for dealing with pirates but could 
rely on British assistance, was being applied in occupied Canton. It would be executed 
elsewhere along the South China coast as well. 
Though piracy subsided in Canton, the problem persisted in the vicinity of Hong Kong and 
in the waters of western Guangdong. In response, Captain Nicholas Vansittart, in HMS 
Magicienne, along with HMS Inflexible, Plover, and Algerine, set out on an anti-piracy cruise 
accompanied by Daniel Caldwell and ‘three Chinese informers’. The force ‘examined carefully 
the whole coast as far Westward as Mamee’. Between 26 August and 4 September 1858, the 
expedition ‘destroyed one fortified stockade mounting 14 Guns, 26 Piratical fighting junks, 74 
fast row boats, 236 Guns’ with ‘about 372 Pirates killed, 36 Pirates taken alive’. On this occasion, 
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the Royal Navy also rescued ‘6 Cargo Junks… 54 men and 6 women’.42 The expedition engaged 
pirates at ‘Ling-ting [Lintin]’, ‘Coulan Bay’, ‘Hawcheun [Xiachuan] Bluff’, and ‘Tywooshan 
[Dahuoshan]’. British forces landed at Lintin and Coulan where they set fire to a settlement. 
Rather than bring the pirates back to Hong Kong or send them to Kowloon, Vansittart reported 
proceeding ‘to Mamee where sending for the Mandarin I handed over to him 22 Pirates for his 
disposal’.43 Being west of Xiachuan, which was under the jurisdiction of Xinning, Mamee was 
well beyond the territorial waters of Hong Kong or the jurisdiction of the Kowloon authorities 
and their superiors in the district of Xin’an. Nor was Mamee a treaty port. Article LII of the 
Treaty of Tientsin justified Vansittart’s visit to Mamee and his communications with Qing 
officials there. This was not the first time a Royal Navy officer had delivered pirates to Qing 
officials outside the treaty ports. The captives from the expedition against Shap-ng-tsai in 1849 
were handed over to Huang Kaiguang, a military mandarin from Haikou, a decade before it was 
opened as a treaty port. Whereas Commander Hay acted on the authority of a ‘carte blanche’ 
unilaterally issued by the commander-in-chief of the East Indies and China Station, Captain 
Vansittart could justify his actions through the Treaty of Tientsin. 44  The Shap-ng-tsai 
expedition was exceptional in that it involved British and Qing officials outside of the treaty 
ports and Kowloon. The Treaty of Tientsin permitted such an extension of collaborative 
imperial hydrarchy; the Royal Navy could now cooperate with and hand captured pirates to 
Qing officials at any port in China, not merely those opened to foreign trade and residence or 
Kowloon. 
On 21 September 1858, pirates plundered the Pantaloon, a ship belonging to Jardine, 
Matheson & Co., after it was shipwrecked in a typhoon. The pirates came from ‘the town of 
Sow-ah-pow, a well known Piratical Town some miles up the narrow channel on the opposite 
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side of Swatow’.45  As early as the 1820s, Jardine, Matheson & Co. had established illicit 
operations at Swatow (Shantou).46 By 1857, J. Jardine pointed at out that Swatow, a port up 
the Han River on the Guangdong side of the provincial border with Fujian, was ‘the station of 
incomparably the greatest importance which is not recognized by Treaty’. 47  Elgin visited 
Swatow on his way to Shanghai to make his first attempts to negotiate a new treaty. He noted 
a small foreign presence ‘chiefly engaged in the opium and emigrant trades’.48 The Treaty of 
Tientsin opened Swatow, along with Niuzhuang (Yingkou), Dengzhou (Yantai), ‘Formosa’ (in 
this case, the southern city of Tainan), and Qiongzhou (namely the port of Haikou) as treaty 
ports.49 In 1858, however, no British consular authority had been established at Swatow, so the 
visit of HMS Fury to the port in October in response to the attack on Pantaloon amounted to 
an exercise of the Royal Navy’s right under Article LII.50 Also in accordance with that article, 
the naval officer in charge communicated directly with local Qing officials. Commander Charles 
Leckie reported that ‘I placed myself in communication with the Mandarin of the district’, and 
learned that local authorities lacked sufficient force to make the piratical villagers return the 
sugar stolen from the Pantaloon.51 Though Qing officials in the region could not retrieve the 
stolen sugar from the villagers, the pirates could not dispose of their plunder ‘owing to the 
Mandarins having kept back purchasers by intimidation’.52 By preventing the sale of stolen 
British property, local authorities attempted to uphold Qing treaty responsibilities. 
On 16 October, HMS Fury advanced on Sow-ah-pow to recover the plundered sugar. 
Meanwhile, an armed party of Royal Marines and bluejackets ‘advanced up the creek leading 
to the rendezvous appointed by the Mandarin of the district’, but the official never appeared.53 
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When ‘many hundreds of men, armed chiefly with matchlocks & some gingals’ met the Fury 
and opened fire, British forces retaliated. The naval contingent returned the pirates’ fire from 
the boats on the river, and Leckie landed a force to counterattack. The British force continued 
to face resistance, however, and ‘when the Pirates kept up a continuing fire, retreating and 
taking up other positions as they went’, Leckie decided that ‘a good bombardment from the 
boats would be more advisable and more likely to be the means of recovering the sugar, than if 
we went in and set fire to the Town’.54 He reported that, prior to the bombardment, ‘I was 
informed by the villagers on the opposite side of the creek that the pirates had heard we were 
coming and had sent their women and children away the day before, and were quite prepared 
to meet us’. He also emphasised that ‘it was not my intention to fire upon the town unless the 
Mandarin considered it advisable’.55 After the bombardment of Sow-ah-pow, Leckie sent a 
letter to the ‘Heads of the village’ demanding the return of the sugar and threatening a second 
attack if the piratical villagers did not comply.56 The village heads replied that ‘they are willing 
to hand over the sugar, & come to any settlement’. 57  Leckie discussed the results of his 
expedition with the ‘Head Mandarin of the district, stating circumstances, and reporting this 
promise to return the sugar’.58 Having done their duty of attacking pirates, British naval officers 
expected Qing officials to restore stolen property as stipulated in the Treaty of Tientsin. 
The following year, Royal Navy and Qing officers discussed a piracy at ‘Capchi Point [Jiazi, 
also spelled ‘Cupchi’]’, where the SS Five Brothers struck a rock on 28 January 1859. When 
passengers from the steamer landed on the ‘Mainland’, they were ‘beaten, robbed, and when 
resistance was shown, murdered without mercy’. The Five Brothers was eventually surrounded 
by ‘about 80 large boats… filled with men armed with spears &c’ and the master of the steamer 
reported that ‘a large party on shore kept up a continual fire upon us with matchlocks, and about 
4 P.M. they mounted a large gun on the rocks over looking us’, fire from which drove the crew 
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to abandon ship.59 The Royal Navy responded to this attack on a British ship far away any 
treaty port by dispatching HMS Niger, Nimrod, and Plover to Jiazi, ‘about 150 miles to the 
North of Hong Kong’, well beyond the colony’s jurisdiction. 60  Rear-Admiral Seymour 
requested that Governor John Bowring send an interpreter to accompany the expedition.61 On 
2 February, Captain Cracroft of HMS Niger, who led the British flotilla, ‘proceeded to the town 
with the armed boats and demanded an interview with the authorities’. ‘A military mandarin’ 
met with Cracroft and stated that ‘measures were being taken to discover’ the plunderers of the 
Five Brothers. According to Cracroft, the mandarin claimed: 
some of the Villages were wholly beyond the control of the mandarins, and requested I 
would punish them in any way I thought proper, as a warning to deter others from 
committing a similar offence; the South-western suburb of Cupchi itself being especially 
pointed out as requiring to be made an example of, being the resort of men half 
fishermen and half pirates.62 
 
While British officers could use Article LII to access Chinese ports beyond the treaty system, 
Qing officials could use Article LIII and its stipulations for British cooperation with China 
against piracy to deploy the might of the Royal Navy to bolster Qing authority over recalcitrant 
villages. The Jiazi mandarin’s request that Cracroft punish the ‘half fishermen and half pirates’ 
beyond Qing control was an explicit example of Murakami Ei’s claim that the Qing use of the 
Royal Navy amounted to a co-opting of the Royal Navy akin to the zhaofu system of pardon 
and re-assimilation into Qing naval forces offered to the ladrones more than half a century 
earlier.63 The Treaty of Tientsin provided a framework for local Qing officials to apply a similar 
system to support their authority with the most powerful navy in the world. 
With authorisation from Qing officials, Cracroft landed a party at Jiazi on 3 February and 
demanded ‘an indemnity from the Elders for the loss of Life and property that had taken place, 
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threatening them with the destruction of their Villages if my demand was not complied with’. 
When his demands were ignored, Cracroft ‘directed a few Rockets to be thrown into the place, 
and the fishing boats off it to be set on fire’. He reported that ‘these measures had the desired 
effect and [the elders] came off to sue for mercy’. Cracroft ultimately ‘accepted the sum of 
$2,500 Dollars [sic] from the Elders of the suburb and Villages’, which Seymour ordered him to 
forward to Bowring at Hong Kong.64 Seymour approved of Cracroft’s actions ‘in demanding 
reparation and indemnity of the Authorities for the illtreatment of the Passengers and crew of 
the wrecked Steam Vessel “Five Brothers”’.65 The Royal Navy had punished a piratical village 
on behalf of Qing officials to obtain reparations that would be distributed at the British colony 
of Hong Kong. This transnational operation exemplified the new collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy as codified in the Treaty of Tientsin. 
Though the treaty was signed between Britain and China, the system cooperation against 
pirates that it codified allowed for the inclusion of other foreign states on the China coast, 
particularly Portugal, with its settlement at Macau. The alliance between Portugal and Britain, 
one of the oldest in Europe, also applied on the China coast, meaning that Britain had an 
obligation to ‘assist in the defence of the Establishments in [Macau] against Chinese 
aggression’.66 By the mid-nineteenth century, the principal threat to Macau came not from Qing 
forces but from Chinese pirates. The British suppression of piracy in western Guangdong was as 
much a benefit to Macau as it was to Hong Kong. When news of pirates at their ‘old haunt at 
Coolan [Coulan]’ to the southwest of Macau, reached Seymour in March 1859, he sent HMS 
Niger, commanded by Captain George Colvile, along with the gunboats Janus and Clown to 
deal with the problem.67 Colvile proceeded to Macau to seek information on the pirates, where 
he learned that ‘a fleet of Piratical vessels [was] cruising in the vicinity of the Tang Rocks’ and 
went after them. From a fortified pirate camp on Coulan, pirates and villagers fired on the British 
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flotilla. Colvile responded by landing a force and, upon discovering that ‘every house in the 
Town was a Magazine in which large quantities of arms and munitions were stored’, ordered 
the destruction of the entire village along with ‘eight large Piratical Junks, eleven Fast Boats’, 
and ‘the land defences’. After punishing Coulan, Colvile met with ‘a Mandarin Junk force just 
arrived from Macao’, which informed him ‘that seven Pirate Junks were at anchor off Lie-wan-
moon opposite Moto [Modaomen]’ up the West River (Xijiang). The Royal Navy force 
proceeded upriver after the pirates. When one of the pirate junks was driven aground, ‘her crew 
[was] immediately pounced upon by Mandarin Soldiers’. Colvile reported that ‘exclusive of the 
crew who fell into the hands of the mandarins, Twenty one Pirates were killed on this 
occasion’. 68  Rear-Admiral Seymour approved of this ‘essential service rendered to the 
community at large’.69 This community included British, Qing, and Portuguese subjects. 
Coulan, though long a site of operations against pirates, most notably the 1854 expedition 
involving British, Qing, American, and Portuguese forces, was not a treaty port. Prior to the 
Treaty of Tientsin, the Royal Navy had no legal basis to visit the island, let alone land a force 
to burn villages and fortifications on it. With the notable exception of Macau at its mouth, the 
West River had no foreign presence and was not opened to foreign trade until 1897.70 Colvile’s 
expedition to Coulan and up the West River, based on Portuguese and Qing intelligence, was 
the first in the region to have a legal basis in treaty. The cooperation in suppressing piracy 
mandated in the Treaty of Tientsin, however, made no mention of Portugal. Portugal signed 
the Tratado de Tien-tsin with China in 1862, which replicated the cooperative system created 
in the Anglo-Qing Treaty of Tientsin. The Luso-Qing treaty, however, was not ratified until 
1887.71 Before this, Britain’s alliance with Portugal and Macau’s proximity to Hong Kong and 
the perpetual pirate haunt of Coulan occasionally resulted in Portugal’s inadvertent inclusion in 
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the collaborative imperial hydrarchy over Chinese waters. The Treaty of Tientsin in this way 
paved the way for a more international suppression of piracy in China. The treaty was not 
immediately accepted by the Qing government, however. It would take a resumption of 
hostilities, the occupation of the Qing imperial capital of Beijing, and another treaty before the 
emperor assented to the terms of the Anglo-Qing Treaty of Tientsin. 
 
Resumption of Hostilities and the Convention of Peking 
The final article of the Treaty of Tientsin decreed that the ‘Ratification of the Treaty, under the 
Hand of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of 
China, respectively, shall be exchanged at Peking within a Year’ of the treaty’s signing on 26 
June 1858.72 Accordingly, London appointed Frederick Bruce, Lord Elgin’s brother and a 
former colonial secretary at Hong Kong, as ‘Her Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary in China’ to ‘exchange at Pekin, Her Majesty’s ratification of the Treaty of 
Tien-tsin with the ratification of that compact by the Emperor of China’. Bruce was also 
commissioned as ‘Chief Superintendent of British Trade’ and ordered to ‘relieve Sir John 
Bowring of his duties in connection with this office, and… make arrangements for transferring 
the general direction of British affairs in China to Shanghae, at which port it is to be carried on 
until such time as circumstances shall admit of its being permanently established at Pekin’.73 
Thus began the shift of the ‘capital of Anglo-China’ and the hub of Anglo-Qing relations from 
Hong Kong to Shanghai. 74  Guiliang and Huashana, along with two other imperial 
commissioners, Jiangnan and Jiangxi Governor-General He Guiqing and the provincial vice-
director of the Board of Punishments, Duan Chengshi, ‘waited for Chieftain Bruce to arrive in 
Shanghai to continue negotiations’.75 Though Guiliang and Huashana assented to the Treaty of 
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Tientsin and got Emperor Xianfeng’s approval, the emperor believed that certain of the treaty’s 
provisions could be renegotiated and that his subordinates could be lax in its execution.76 A year 
after the signing of the treaty, Qing ministers still wanted to renegotiate the matters of foreign 
ministers at Beijing, opening the Yangtze, opening Tianjin or any other part of the province of 
Zhili as a treaty port, and granting foreign access to the interior of China. The imperial 
commissioners at Shanghai promised to ‘continue to negotiate our way in the four issues’.77 
Bruce suspected that the imperial commissioners were trying to prevent his passage to 
Beijing for the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin.78 Indeed Guiliang, Huashana, He, and 
Duan had in fact ‘secretly made plans to detain the barbarians at Shanghai and exchange 
ratifications there’.79 In defiance of these plans, Bruce declared to the imperial commissioners 
that ‘no stipulation of the Treaty shall be violated’ and insisted that his ‘resolution to proceed to 
Pekin without further delay is inflexible’.80 In response to Bruce’s approach, Emperor Xianfeng 
ordered Sengge Rinchen, the Mongol nobleman tasked with protecting Tianjin, to prevent an 
allied advance up the Haihe and to warn them that ‘there are defences which cannot be easily 
passed and may cause harm’.81  Despite Qing deliberations and warnings against the allied 
advance up the Haihe, Bruce and his French counterpart, Alphonse de Bourboulon, decided 
that ‘we should insist, as much for the sake of our future communications with Pekin as for the 
successful accomplishment of the mission now confided to us, on the right of using the river as 
the natural highway to the capital’.82 On 21 June 1859, Bruce and de Bourboulon handed the 
matter of exercising this right to Rear-Admiral James Hope, authorising him ‘to take any 
measures you may deem expedient for clearing away the obstructions in the river, so as to allow 
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us to proceed at once to Tien-tsin’.83 After the defeat resulting in the signing of the Treaty of 
Tientsin, Qing commanders had realised the vulnerabilities of the Dagu forts and made efforts 
to reinforce them.84  After Sengge Rinchen reported that ‘barbarian boats are continuously 
entering the river from the sea’ on 22 June, he further reinforced Qing defences.85 Two days 
later, the Hope’s force began clearing obstacles in the Haihe for the advance to Tianjin. On 25 
June, the British gunboats commenced an attack on the Dagu forts. 
Qing reinforcements to the Dagu forts proved worthwhile. The forts ‘opened with so heavy 
and well-directed a fire as to render the operation of removing the barriers impossible’.86 The 
improvements to the fortifications withstood the shot and shell of the gunboats. The 
effectiveness of the fire from Qing forces and the strength of the fortifications led British 
observers to suspect that China had received foreign help.87 By the end of the battle, Sengge 
Rinchen’s forces had destroyed six of the eleven gunboats sent up the Haihe and repulsed an 
allied landing party. British forces suffered 519 killed and 456 wounded. The repulse at Dagu 
remains the worst British defeat in China.88 Qing commanders reported that ‘once we opened 
fire, the situation changed entirely’ and declared that the victory ‘slackened the arrogance of 
the barbarians’.89  Indeed, after the Dagu repulse, Rear-Admiral Hope concluded that ‘the 
means at my disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles opposed to your entry at 
the mouth of the Peiho; and that they are of so formidable a nature that any further operations 
cannot lead to a successful result’.90 Bruce, commenting that ‘in this, more than in almost any 
country, we are respected and considered in proportion as we are feared’, lamented that 
‘whatever may be the ultimate decision of this Government with reference to the Treaty of 
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Tien-tsin, I do not think that its provisions can be carried out until we recover our superiority 
in the eyes of the Chinese’.91  
News of the Dagu repulse reached Britain in September 1859 to much criticism.92 Britain 
sought retribution. The French desire to avenge the defeat at Dagu and the arrogance with 
which Qing officials received John Ward, the American ambassador to China, during the 
ratification of the American treaty, pressured the British government to recommence hostilities 
with China. 93  In October, Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell reassured Bruce that 
‘preparations are being made both in this country and in France in order that the Treaty of Tien-
tsin may be fully carried into effect’.94 Later that month, Whitehall ordered Bruce to demand 
an apology ‘for the act of the troops who fired on Her Britannic Majesty’s ships of war from the 
Takoo forts in June last’ and to insist on the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin; otherwise, the 
‘British naval and military authorities’ would ‘adopt such measures as they may deem advisable 
for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for 
him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin’.95 In November, British and French commanders 
made plans to assemble a force at Hong Kong which would then proceed northward to compel 
the Qing authorities into compliance.96 
On 8 March 1860, Bruce issued an ultimatum to the Qing government demanding apologies 
and an indemnity for the Dagu repulse, permission to proceed up the Haihe and ratify the Treaty 
of Tientsin at Beijing, and the right for a British minister to reside at the capital.97 He Guiqing 
rejected the British demands. 98  The following month, Whitehall sent Lord Elgin, as 
‘Ambassador Extraordinary’, back to China to resolve the conflict with authority to apply force 
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possibly even at Beijing if necessary.99 The prime minister, Lord Palmerston, indeed believed 
that ‘the occupation by a barbarian army of a capital into which even a barbarian diplomat is 
not to be admitted… would bring the Emperor to reason’.100 Elgin himself hoped such a measure 
would not be necessary and that the menace of the allied occupation of Tianjin would be enough 
to bring Qing representatives to the negotiating table, as it had in 1858.101 
From March to May 1860, the Anglo-French force meant to assert pressure on the Qing 
Empire to comply with the British ultimatum assembled at Hong Kong. 102  The British 
expeditionary force sent to China numbered some 14,000 men and about 1,800 horses. France 
sent a force of 7,000 men. The allied forces were further augmented by 2,500 men of the ‘Canton 
Coolie Corps’, recruited in Hong Kong and Canton to provide labour and logistical support.103 
Such a massive force could not be easily accommodated on the tiny, rocky island of Hong Kong. 
On the other side of Victoria Harbour, Kowloon, with its abundance of water and large sandy 
plain, was an ideal place for a military encampment, and the allies decided to use it for this 
purpose.104 On 16 March, Lieutenant-General James Hope Grant ordered a detachment the 
44th (East Essex) Regiment to land at Kowloon in preparation ‘to occupy the promontory’ as a 
‘temporary encamping ground for the troops… for whom there is no convenient space at 
Hongkong’. 105  Hercules Robinson, John Bowring’s successor as governor of Hong Kong, 
approved of the measure and hoped that the stationing of British troops at Kowloon would 
‘maintain order among the thieves and pirates who have established themselves in the centre of 
our harbour’.106 Though serving a military function, the British occupation of Kowloon, as 
discussed below, also had implications for British authority in Victoria Harbour. 
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By landing forces at Kowloon, Britain established de facto control over the peninsula. To 
give this occupation a legal basis, Harry Parkes, one of the Allied Commissioners in occupied 
Canton, met Lao Chongguang, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, and 
negotiated a lease of Kowloon on 20 March 1860.107 According to the ‘Deed of Lease’, Lao 
agreed to lease ‘Tseem-sha-tsuy [Tsim Sha Tsui] and its neighborhood situated in the sub-
district of Kowloon in the district of Sun-on [Xin’an]’ to Britain in return for a ‘Rental of Five 
Hundred Taels of Silver’ (about £160) per annum.108 Lieutenant-Colonel MacMahon of the 
44th Regiment officially announced the lease of Kowloon on 24 March 1860 in a Hong Kong 
government notification in English and Chinese. In his announcement, MacMahon gave British 
military forces the responsibility of maintaining order and protecting the inhabitants of Kowloon 
while forbidding foreign settlement from Hong Kong.109 Kowloon became a territory under 
British military occupation. Robinson hoped that this occupation would ‘pave the way towards 
obtaining from the Chinese Government eventually a cession of the opposite promontory’ of 
Kowloon.110 During the resumption of the Arrow War, however, the peninsula remained merely 
a stepping stone for an allied expedition to the heart of the Qing Empire. 
Lieutenant-General Hope Grant and Rear-Admiral Hope met their French counterparts, 
General Cousin de Montauban and Vice-Admiral Leonard Charner, in Shanghai on 18 June 
1860 to discuss plans for an assault up the Haihe.111 By late July, an allied fleet consisting of over 
two hundred vessels had assembled outside Bohai (known in English sources as the Gulf of 
Pecheli) to execute these plans. Allied forces began landing on 1 August. Their advance on the 
Dagu forts began on 12 August.112 The governor-general of Zhili sent multiple communications 
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to Elgin in hopes of starting negotiations, but as none satisfied Bruce’s ultimatum, Elgin decided 
to allow military operations to continue, believing that ‘the occupation of the Peiho forts by our 
military force, and the opening up of the river to Tien-tsin, should precede any serious 
negotiations for the establishment of peace’.113 Accordingly, the allies proceeded with their 
operations and captured the Dagu forts on 21 August. Allied forces then advanced on Tianjin.114 
When negotiations there proved unsatisfactory, Elgin requested that British forces advance 
towards Tongzhou, twelve miles to the east of Beijing, to further pressure Qing leaders to 
concede to allied demands.115 On 17 September, a Qing force captured an advance party sent 
to reconnoitre Tongzhou and attempt to open negotiations there. The capture and maltreatment 
of this group, which included Harry Parkes, incensed the allies, who decided to attack the Qing 
imperial capital of Beijing in retribution. 
On 7 October, French forces began looting the Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan) of the 
Qing emperors. Under the threat of bombardment, the northern gates of Beijing, the Andingmen, 
were opened and an allied force moved in to occupy the city. The allies burned the Summer 
Palace as retribution for the Qing maltreatment of Parkes and other prisoners of war. This 
incident remains a point of national outrage in China. With the imperial capital under allied 
control, Qing authorities agreed to come to terms, signing the Convention of Peking on 24 
October 1860.116 With a few adjustments, including an increase in indemnities, the Convention 
of Peking ratified the Treaty of Tientsin.117 The convention also converted Parkes’s lease of 
Kowloon into a cession of the territory as ‘a dependency of Her Britannic Majesty’s Colony of 
Hongkong’. The stated purpose for the cession was ‘a view to the maintenance of law and order 
in and about the harbour of Hong Kong’.118 Though initially occupied for military purposes, the 
colonisation of Kowloon became an exercise in the imperialism of free seas. 
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Piracy and Empire: The Colonisation of Kowloon 
British officials had designs for occupying Kowloon as early as 1857 when Rear-Admiral 
Seymour recommended the ‘possession of Kowloon Peninsula and Stone Cutters island’ as 
‘imperatively necessary, not only to prevent its falling into the hands of another Foreign Power 
to the disparagement of a British Colony, but as offering security and accommodation needful 
to the increasing Hong Kong Community’.119 Major-General van Straubenzee, who made the 
first overtures about the cession of Kowloon to the War and Colonial Offices and to Elgin, 
agreed. He argued for the ‘advisability, or almost necessity of the cession of a small tract of land 
opposite Hong Kong, called Kowloon Peninsula, to the British Crown’, citing both the 
‘advantages to our shipping to be derived from it being in our possession’ and ‘the danger not 
only to our shipping but to the town of Victoria itself should it become hereafter the possession 
of any other European Power’.120 Governor Bowring also advocated for the British colonisation 
of Kowloon arguing that ‘the possession of this land, useless to the Chinese, would be of great 
value to us not only for military, but for commercial, sanitary and police purposes’.121 By 1858, 
Kowloon had strategic, economic, and political importance to the British colony of Hong Kong 
and military and civilian officials were advocating for its cession to Britain. 
Ironically, Kowloon did not initially have much importance for Hong Kong. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, the Qing military presence in Tsim Sha Tsui was removed after the first 
Opium War. Tsim Sha Tsui became a sparsely populated no-man’s land outside of Qing 
control. 122  William Thomas Mercer, the colonial secretary at Hong Kong, reported that 
Kowloon ‘was for years occupied solely by some half dozen insignificant hamlets tenanted by 
stone cutters and lime burners’. Around 1853, however, a ‘village began to rise at Teem-cha-
tsuy [Tsim Sha Tsui]’ which became ‘well known as a place of reception for stolen goods of all 
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kinds’. 123  Many of these goods were taken piratically. By 1858, William Hall, captain of 
Seymour’s flagship, HMS Calcutta, reported that Kowloon ‘was the resort to & receptacle of 
every Vagabond who escapes from Hong Kong and property afloat to an incalculable amount 
lies under it at their mercy’. 124  The pirates of Kowloon, a territory of the Qing Empire, 
threatened Hong Kong’s shipping but were beyond British control. At the same time, Hong 
Kong’s claims over the whole of Victoria Harbour and defence concerns prevented Qing 
authorities from effectively exercising power over Tsim Sha Tsui. According to Daniel Caldwell, 
the colonel of Dapeng had supposedly ‘denied his power to exercise jurisdiction’ on multiple 
occasions and even ‘questioned his own right’ to do so.125 The captain superintendent of the 
Hong Kong Police affirmed this, reporting that ‘as a fact I know that there is no Government 
Official resident at Teem-cha-tsuy and I never knew an instance of the Kowloon authorities 
exercising authority there’.126 In the absence of Qing authority and the illegality of British 
intervention, Tsim Sha Tsui became a sort of Libertalia, a piratical paradise manifested ashore, 
for Chinese pirates who could realise their lawless lifestyles on land beyond the authority of any 
state.127 
As in the case of Libertalia in the Atlantic world, Tsim Sha Tsui was problematic for British 
rule.128 Indeed, while military and naval officials feared Kowloon becoming a possession of a 
Western rival, colonial officials believed its occupation ‘by irregular settlers, acknowledging no 
order, obeying no rule, and setting the Chinese jurisdiction at defiance’ was a situation ‘still 
more to be feared’.129 To prevent the emergence of a piratical paradise across Victoria Harbour, 
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colonial officials at Hong Kong sought the cession of Kowloon to Britain. By the time they 
resolved on this issue, however, it was too late to include it in the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Tientsin. Bowring suggested the matter could be ‘resumed by local negociations [sic] with the 
Viceroy of Canton’ akin to Portuguese Macau’s annexation of Taipa (Dangzai). 130 
Overshadowed by larger concerns regarding Anglo-Qing relations and negotiations about the 
details of the Treaty of Tientsin, however, the Kowloon question dropped out of official 
consideration. The resumption of hostilities after the Dagu repulse and the allies’ need for a 
staging ground from which to commence operations against Beijing revived British interest in 
Kowloon. As discussed above, the disembarkation of a contingent of the 44th Regiment 
amounted to a British occupation of the Kowloon Peninsula. With Kowloon effectively under 
British control, Parkes carried out Bowring’s initial suggestion of negotiating its transfer to 
Britain with the governor-general. Frederick Bruce considered including Kowloon as part of the 
indemnity the British demanded from the Qing.131 Military contingency gave British officials 
another chance to push for the colonisation of Kowloon. 
With the Kowloon question revived, Bruce authorised Governor Hercules Robinson to 
depute Harry Parkes to negotiate the lease of Kowloon with Governor-General Lao 
Chongguang.132 Though Britain’s immediate interest in leasing Kowloon was to secure space 
for a military encampment, Parkes made no mention of military necessity when he met Lao to 
discuss the matter. Rather, Parkes complained about ‘the disordered condition of the Kowloon 
peninsula, and the inconvenience occasioned thereby to British interests’. This inconvenience 
arose from ‘outlaws and other bad characters’, many of whom were pirates, taking advantage of 
the fact that Kowloon’s mountainous terrain obstructed ‘the surveillance of the Chinese 
Government’ and the region ‘was not interfered with by the British Authorities of Hongkong 
although situated directly under their eyes, because it did not belong to their jurisdiction’. 
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Parkes also complained that the colonial authorities in Hong Kong had ‘repeatedly… 
remonstrated with the Deputy Magistrate of Kowloon and urged him to clear the peninsula of 
this dangerous population but all with no effect’. Ultimately, Parkes proposed that: 
either the Chinese authorities must send officers and troops to the spot to expel the 
present bad population, and must moreover constantly maintain there a competent 
force, or, if it be inconvenient to them to take measures of this nature they should mark 
out a boundary and cede the grounds within it to the British Government in the same 
manner as Hongkong, when it would be in the power of the latter to exercise complete 
jurisdiction over the place, and to take all measures they may deem necessary for 
securing order among the population.133 
 
With British forces occupying the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula, Qing authorities could 
hardly carry out Parkes’s recommendation for sending a force to clear Kowloon of pirates. The 
only choice available to Lao Chongguang was to allow British intervention. Lao agreed ‘to 
temporarily transfer [Kowloon] upon lease’ to the British colony of Hong Kong. He also decided 
to ‘station troops there for its protection… with the view of expelling bad characters and ensuring 
safety to honest people’ while also agreeing that British officials could ‘station officers and troops 
for the control and protection of the site’. Governance of the Chinese in Tsim Sha Tsui would 
become a joint exercise between British and the Qing authorities. Accordingly, Lao would order 
the ‘Magistrate of the said District [of Xin’an] and the township Magistrate of Kow-loon to issue 
a Proclamation, commanding the honest people of the locality in question to continue their 
ordinary employments’, while ‘local civil and Military authorities’ would cooperate with British 
authorities to deal with ‘bad characters’ in Tsim Sha Tsui. Under these conditions, Lao agreed 
to lease Kowloon to the Hong Kong government.134  
Qing authority in Kowloon remained centred on the Kowloon Walled City. The territory 
leased to Britain notably excluded the fort. When British officials formally announced the lease 
of Kowloon, their jurisdiction only began on the ‘part of the Kowloon peninsula lying South of 
a line drawn from a point near to but South of the Kowloon Fort to the Northern-most point of 
Stone-cutter’s Island, together with that Island’.135 Qing authority in the Kowloon Walled City 
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remained intact. Commenting on the success of his negotiations, Parkes pointed out that Lao 
had directed the Kowloon authorities, as well as the district magistrate of Xin’an ‘to cooperate 
with the British Military Authorities in introducing better order’ to the leased territory.136 Like 
Victoria Harbour, the Kowloon peninsula, though under British control, had the assistance of 
Qing authorities in maintaining order. If Libertalia was piratical society come ashore, then 
British authorities sought to check it by recreating the collaborative imperial hydrarchy between 
Hong Kong and Kowloon on land in British-occupied Tsim Sha Tsui.137  
In the same way negotiating the Treaty of Tientsin was an opportunity to codify Anglo-
Qing collaboration against piracy in Chinese waters, the Convention of Peking allowed the 
formalisation of similar arrangements in Kowloon. The cession of Kowloon met with resistance 
from Qing officials. Qiling, the governor of Guangdong, commenting on Lao’s lease, noted that 
‘Kowloon is within the borders of Xin’an and can be accessed by many land routes’ and 
suspected that from there, the barbarians would ‘nibble at the mainland’, a plan he considered 
‘exceedingly detestable’. 138  Beijing sought to overturn Lao’s arrangements. The imperial 
commissioners who negotiated the Convention of Peking claimed they had no evidence of the 
lease of Kowloon and would only agree to cede the territory ‘if the area is contiguous to Hong 
Kong, outside of our port [of Kowloon], and is not an important pass to the mainland’.139 
Though Kowloon did not satisfy these criteria, the Qing negotiators, with their capital under 
allied occupation, were in no position to reject British demands for the territory’s cession. 
Emperor Xianfeng, despite the reluctance of Qiling and the imperial commissioners, agreed to 
cede the ‘portion of the township of Cowloon, in the province of Kwangtung, of which a lease 
was granted in perpetuity to Harry Smith Parkes’ ostensibly for ‘the maintenance of law and 
order’.140 Britain initially occupied Kowloon out of military considerations, but naval, colonial, 
and diplomatic correspondence reveal that a desire to secure Victoria Harbour from a Libertalia 
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developing on the mainland side was a powerful if not the most prominent motivation in 
arguments for the colonisation of Kowloon. British officials placed the ‘burden of piraticality’ at 
Kowloon on the Qing state, using this as an excuse to expand Hong Kong’s authority to Tsim 
Sha Tsui. Britain’s colonisation of Hong Kong may have been driven by the imperialism of free 
trade, but the colony’s expansion was an exercise in the imperialism of free seas.141 
 
The Treaty of Tientsin and Convention of Peking had profound implications for Anglo-Qing 
relations, including collaborative efforts in suppressing piracy. The Treaty of Tientsin 
represented a compromise on the notion of pirates as hostes humani generis under universal 
jurisdiction in international law. British authorities in China gave up ideas of universal 
competence over pirates and ceded jurisdiction over all crimes by Qing subjects, including 
piracy and other acts against British subjects, to Qing judicial authorities. At the same time, the 
treaty expanded the Royal Navy’s range of activity in China and allowed for closer cooperation 
between Britain and China against piracy. Though Britain engaged in the imperialism of free 
seas, using the pretence of suppressing piracy and maintaining order over Victoria Harbour to 
justify the colonisation of Kowloon, the modus vivendi of cooperation between colonial and 
naval officials at Hong Kong and the Kowloon authorities remained intact. The codification of 
this system in the treaties ending the Arrow War revolutionised Anglo-Qing collaborative 
hydrarchy by establishing a legal basis for it, which allowed for the development of new 
strategies and polices for suppressing piracy in the late-nineteenth century. 
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‘Partial Ultimate Success’:  
Cooperative Efforts Suppressing Piracy, 1860-1868 
 
The codification of a collaborative system for suppressing piracy in treaty law allowed for new 
and closer forms of cooperation between Britain and China against pirates. This chapter will 
explore some of these developments, namely joint expeditions against pirates, the establishment 
of the Guangdong steam squadron, and policies adopted at Hong Kong and Canton against 
piracy, and discuss their impact on the Anglo-Qing suppression of piracy. Pirates continued to 
be a problem after the Arrow War and particularly with the end of the Taiping Rebellion. More 
effective forms of dealing with pirates became necessary. British officials in China decided to 
adopt a ‘variety of connected measures for the repression of Piracy’, which were made possible 
by the new treaties.1 Article LIII of the Treaty of Tientsin gave British and Qing officials a 
means of requesting one another’s assistance in dealing with piracy. The treaty thus provided a 
basis for direct coordination and cooperation between British and Qing forces against pirates. 
Though these joint expeditions had mixed results, they represent a closer degree of collaboration 
than had existed previously and allowed both sides to develop a more efficient system for 
working together. A modus operandi in which Qing officials went onboard Royal Navy ships to 
help direct and sanction expeditions against Chinese pirates increased the efficacy of the Anglo-
Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy in Guangdong waters. 
The British and Qing empires also interacted against piracy in other ways. Lacking the naval 
capacity to deal with pirates independently, Qing officials took advantage of the conciliatory 
attitudes of their former enemies, Britain and France, to attempt to purchase steam-powered 
vessels for use in suppressing piracy. The Canton authorities eventually succeeded in buying a 
steam squadron for the police of Guangdong’s waters. While vessels of this force built on the 
system of cooperation with the Royal Navy, they also made independent Qing naval actions 
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more effective, allowing a firmer assertion of Qing maritime sovereignty. The Guangdong steam 
squadron gave Qing authorities at Canton the confidence to insist on their maritime rights by 
international law, to which they were increasingly exposed after the Arrow War. Part of this 
exposure came through collaborative efforts with Britain and other maritime powers against 
pirates. 
As piracy and crime in general plagued Hong Kong, officials there decided to enact 
legislation for its suppression. Implementing some of this legislation, such as a proposal to disarm 
all Chinese junks to prevent them from committing piracy, required an international effort. 
Policies against piracy at Hong Kong implicated civil and naval authorities from the Qing and 
British empires and beyond. With only a fledgling steam squadron and meeting with local 
resistance, however, Qing officials failed to enforce the policies suggested at Hong Kong and 
instead reverted to a modified traditional system of maritime control in Guangdong. Hong 
Kong’s policies were adjusted accordingly. Negotiating this agreement reveals some of the ways 
international, treaty, municipal, and colonial law in the Canton Delta interacted and influenced 
each other and how they affected the policies adopted at the various centres of authority in the 
region. These policies, along with efforts by the Guangdong steam squadron and those of the 
Royal Navy in direct cooperation with Qing officials, produced a more effective Anglo-Qing 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy, which ultimately and substantially reduced piracy in South 
China. 
 
Coordination and Cooperation: Joint Expeditions and Anglo-Qing Imperial Hydrarchy in 
Guangdong 
As discussed in the last chapter, the Royal Navy in Guangdong had acted as if the terms of the 
Treaty of Tientsin were in force when taking actions against pirates even before the Convention 
of Peking had been signed. Between 1858 and 1860, British warships visited areas in Chinese 
waters outside of the treaty ports, and naval officers interacted with local Qing officials in the 
vicinity. While hostilities with China persisted, British officers could justify some of their 




agreed to open Swatow to American commerce on 1 January 1860, while British and French 
commanders were still planning their vengeance for the Dagu repulse. Based on the most-
favoured nation clause in the Treaty of the Bogue, Frederick Bruce decided that this meant 
Swatow would be opened to British traders as well and deputed G.D. Caine to act as consul 
there.2 That July, HMS Sparrowhawk brought Caine to Swatow and its crew gave him a 21-
gun salute upon the hoisting of the British flag at the consulate.3 
Shortly after his arrival, Caine reported that a French missionary had been captured and 
held ransom at a nearby village and requested the presence of gunboat, suggesting that it ‘would 
be of the greatest assistance in keeping these free-booters in check’.4 Though short of accusing 
the villagers of piracy, Caine’s description of them as ‘free-booters’ connoted maritime 
criminality. 5  The missionary, Monsieur Bernon, was more explicit and called his captors 
‘pirates’.6 HMS Acorn and Cockchafer came to the rescue, but by the time they arrived at 
Swatow, Bernon had been freed after his converts paid a ransom. Caine nonetheless suggested 
that ‘the capture of the Ringleaders would be conducive of much good as the place was 
sufficiently strong to have held the local authorities at defiance for fifty years and to have the 
worst effect on trade’. Caine ‘persuaded the mandarin appointed by the Governor General of 
their Provinces to attend to matters connected with Foreigners’ to accompany the punitive 
expedition.7 Supported by the authority of a Qing official, Commander Pearse of the Acorn 
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Language of Private Naval Warfare’, The Mariner’s Mirror 100, No. 1 (February 2014), 10. 
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issued a demand that ‘twelve villains’ implicated in Bernon’s kidnapping ‘be delivered up to me, 
for giving over to the Mandarins, that their crimes may be properly punished’.8 When the 
villagers did not respond, the Cockchafer proceeded to cannonade the village of ‘Kowboe’ and 
landed forces to burn several of its buildings. The display of force had its effect, and the villagers 
handed over four prisoners alleged to have been the principal perpetrators of the kidnapping of 
Bernon and other piracies.9 The local Qing deputy magistrate admitted his own inability to act 
against the villagers of Kowboe, which he designated ‘the most notorious pirate village within 
the jurisdiction of Chaochow [Chaozhou]’. He also had Pearse’s prisoners forwarded to the 
nearest magistrate ‘to be dealt with with the greatest rigor as a warning to others’.10 In punishing 
Kowboe and delivering prisoners to the deputy magistrate, Pearse helped bolster Qing authority 
in the vicinity of Swatow.11 
Contrary to Caine’s belief that a display of force would help restore order in Swatow, the 
port remained disorderly. Captain Robert McClure, the senior naval officer at Hong Kong, 
decided to send a gunboat there with the hope that it would ‘have the effect of maintaining 
order, restoring confidence, and yield protection’. 12  After another punitive expedition in 
September 1860, however, McClure concluded that the ‘constant succession of these 
disturbances’ provided opportunities for ‘wily Mandarins who appear always ready to profess, 
but never willing to act vigorously, [to] induct the Consul to co-operate with them, ostensibly 
to avenge our own quarrels, but actually for motives of their own, namely to inspire fear and to 
extort tribute’.13 Despite this distrust, the eagerness of Qing authorities at Swatow to rely on the 
Royal Navy to bring intransigent villages into line resulted in one of the earliest Anglo-Qing 
joint expeditions for suppressing piracy after the signing of the Convention of Peking. 
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The Tsing-chow Expedition and Direct Anglo-Qing Cooperation 
The Royal Navy’s coordination with Qing forces against the piratical village of Tsing-chow was 
deeper than any that had come before it and was a testament to the new, closer cooperation 
made possible by the post-Arrow War collaborative imperial hydrarchy.14 On 6 April 1861, 
‘Ch’iu’, the regional commander at Nan’ao, reported a series of piracies committed from the 
village of Tsing-chow to Consul Caine. Ch’iu declared that the Tsing-chow villagers’ actions 
‘being a case of robbery and murder on the sea it is right that mutual succour should be given; 
as it is indeed provided for by the Regulations of Trade’.15 The ‘regulations’ were likely a 
reference to the Treaty of Tientsin, making the Nan’ao commander’s appeal an early Qing 
recourse to the codified collaborative imperial hydrarchy in treaty law. Reporting that the ‘Jaou-
ping [Raoping] Magistrate’ had already gone to Tsing-chow to deal with the matter and that he 
had further sent ‘Chin, a commander in my right-hand camp to go speedily with war junks’ to 
Tsing-chow, Ch’iu showed that he was upholding Qing treaty obligations in attempting to 
exercise authority over the pirates. He invoked Article LIII in hopes of getting British officials 
to ‘despatch a steamer to assist in intercepting’ the pirates.16 Caine, in forwarding the request 
for naval assistance, pointed out that: 
Piracies have been frequently reported to me as occurring in the Straits of Namoa 
[Nan’ao], and as by Treaty it is stipulated that measures shall be concerted for its 
suppression this appears to me a good opportunity for destroying this nest of pirates now 
officially brought to my notice by the Mandarins.17 
 
Qing authorities considered Nan’ao, an island on the maritime boarder between Guangdong 
and Fujian, as strategically important, particularly for Guangdong.18 The commander there 
likely understood the importance of putting down piracy, which threatened shipping from 
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provinces that were vital to China’s maritime trade and customs revenue.19 The gravity of the 
matter and new treaty stipulations mandating cooperation against piracy drove Ch’iu to request 
British assistance in dealing with the piratical village of Tsing-chow. 
Rear-Admiral Lewis Jones, second-in-command of the East Indies and China Station, 
deputed Lieutenant Henry Holder of HMS Cockchafer to assist ‘the Mandarin in command of 
the Naval and Military Forces at Namoa’ in an ‘attack [on] the piratical Village of Tsing-chow’. 
Jones ordered Holder ‘to give such assistance in the “Cockchafer” as may prevent the Piratical 
Vessels from escaping from the anchorage off the village’, but emphasised that the Cockchafer 
was ‘not to assist in bombarding the Village and to avoid firing on the Pirates unless absolutely 
necessary’. As Nan’ao was not a treaty port and Tsing-chow was ‘about 12 miles North of 
Swatow’, Jones wanted to limit the extent of the Cockchafer’s actions there.20 Even though the 
treaty granted the Royal Navy access to all Chinese waters to suppress piracy, British naval 
commanders remained reluctant to sanction the use of force beyond the treaty ports and 
especially in Qing territory. 
On 18 April 1861, Holder took on board a ‘district magistrate… by the name (Yeu) together 
with the mandarine [sic] in charge of two War Junks and other boats’. The officials requested 
that the Cockchafer ‘bombard the village and set it on fire in co-operation with their Junks’ in 
coordination with a planned attack by ‘Thirteen Hundred braves’.21 As his orders prevented 
him from firing on Tsing-chow, Holder told the Qing officers that he ‘could assist them only by 
cooperating with their boats in capturing Pirates in Boats attempting to escape’. The attack on 
Tsing-chow would thus be a combination of independent actions by Qing land forces and an 
Anglo-Qing naval contingent, which would blockade riverine approaches to the village. The 
fact that the two were in communication at all, however, made the Tsing-chow expedition one 
of the most coordinated attacks by Britain and China on pirates up to that time. Unfortunately, 
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21 Holder to Jones, 18 April 1861, ADM 125/7, 660. ‘Yeu’s’ name is given as ‘Yu’ below. I have not 




the Qing land assault failed, and Holder was ‘unable to render any Service in the Gun Boat 
unless by destroying the Village’, which Jones’s orders had forbidden. When Holder sent boats 
from the Cockchafer upriver to attempt to cut off the pirates’ escape, upwards of a hundred 
villagers opened fire on them. Holder believed the act warranted a ‘severe chastisement’.22 
In the aftermath of the failed attack, the Nan’ao commandant wrote to Caine again to 
request naval assistance against Tsing-chow, this time asking that the gunboat ‘act in 
conjunction with our vessels… by opening fire with great guns on the said village (of Tsing-
chow) [to] bombard and burn down that nest of pirates’.23 In response to this request and as 
vengeance for the attack on the Cockchafer’s boats, Rear-Admiral Jones sent Captain John 
Borlase of HMS Pearl along with HMS Haughty to ‘act in concert with the Chinese Land 
Forces’ and ‘destroy the said town, securing as many of the Pirates as possible and make them 
over to the Head Mandarin of the district’.24 This time, the Royal Navy would give its full 
support in coordinating with Qing forces to punish the piratical village of Tsing-chow. There, 
Borlase met the District Magistrate ‘Yu’ of Raoping, who sent ‘two Mandarin Junks’ to join in 
the attack on Tsing-chow while ‘Imperial Troops’ would capture any pirates fleeing the 
bombardment.25 Qing authorities decided to reverse their previous tactic, this time attacking 
pirates from the river and sending land forces to cut off their escape. 
On 4 May 1861, Borlase issued a notice to the Tsing-chow villagers stating he had 
‘instructions to destroy the said Town’, which would be executed unless ‘all the Inhabitants’ 
delivered themselves to ‘Chinese Authority’.26 At eight o’clock the following morning, after 
men, women, and children had reportedly fled the village, British naval forces began 
bombarding Tsing-chow. Borlase landed a ‘burning party’ to complete destruction of the village 
while also pursuing pirates. The razing of Tsing-chow lasted for 12 hours. In the end, Borlase 
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reported that ‘not less than 115 Chinese were killed and seventy were made Prisoners’. His force 
suffered five casualties, and the Qing contingent two. In the aftermath, Yu was ‘most profuse in 
his thanks’ and requested that Borlase ‘extirpate’ another town ‘up a neighbouring Creek’ but 
beyond his jurisdiction, to which Borlase responded that his own ‘authority for destruction had 
limits also’ and declined the request.27 
The following day, Yu reported to Caine that ‘the number of pirates killed by the 
bombardment and slain hand to hand was in all upwards of a hundred; and that six-tenths of the 
houses were burnt down’. The British force reportedly handed over eighteen prisoners. In the 
wake of Borlase’s refusal to attack other piratical towns, Yu ‘acknowledge[d] the power which 
has been employed, both in mercy and in terror’ and ‘hoped that the pirate villages will fear, 
and the coast will be more secure’. He also expressed ‘inexhaustible gratitude’ for the Royal 
Navy’s assistance.28 The destruction of Tsing-chow proved that British and Qing forces could 
directly coordinate efforts against piracy and that such cooperation, stipulated in the Treaty of 
Tientsin, could be an effective means for suppressing it. It also showed how Qing officials could 
use British naval assistance to enhance their own authority over unruly villages at the fringes of 
their jurisdiction. The success at Tsing-chow paved the way for similar joint expeditions 
elsewhere in Guangdong. 
 
Direct Cooperation near Hong Kong 
Like Swatow, Hong Kong was plagued by pirates from recalcitrant surrounding villages after 
the war. Between January 1860 and May 1866, more than 640 prisoners in Hong Kong were 
tried for piracy.29 The massive number of pirates processed in Hong Kong continued to strain 
the colonial criminal justice system. In 1861, Vice-Admiral James Hope reported that ‘the Jail 
at Hong Kong, calculated to hold 300 prisoners only’ was ‘seldom occupied by less than 500’.30 
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By 1864, Governor Hercules Robinson complained that the prevalence of piracy ‘in the 
immediate neighborhood of a British Colony, and even within British waters, reflects discredit 
upon the British name and rule’.31 The following month, Captain Matthew Nolloth, senior naval 
officer at Hong Kong, decided to make an effort at rectifying such discredit. He pointed out to 
Robinson that many of the pirates who had attacked Hong Kong were from the villages around 
‘Deep Bay [Houhai] which is about 18 miles from Hong Kong’, particularly that of ‘Yune Leong 
[Yuen Long, Yuanlang]’. As Deep Bay and Yuen Long were beyond Hong Kong’s jurisdiction, 
Nolloth suggested that Robinson coordinate with the Canton authorities and organise ‘the co-
operation of several Gunboats (one of them having on board a mandarin of authority) with a 
sufficient body of native troops acting simultaneously ashore’.32 Nolloth hoped to apply the 
model of cooperation developed at Tsing-chow to Yuen Long. This time, however, a Royal 
Navy officer rather than local Qing officials initiated a call for a joint expedition. 
By 1864, British authorities in China, despite successful actions against pirates at Tsing-
chow and elsewhere, were trying to rein in the activities of the Royal Navy in China. In October 
1862, Royal Navy ships attacked Cantonese privateers in Qing service on the Yangtze River.33 
Prince Gong, head of the Zongli Yamen, a new department in the Beijing bureaucracy tasked 
with managing relations with the West after the Arrow War, complained about the incident to 
Frederick Bruce, now the British minister at Beijing. They decided that ‘vessels of the British 
Navy, falling in with junks, suspected of illegal practice, shall destroy them only if requested by 
a competent Chinese authority to do so’ while, at the same time, Qing officials should have ‘no 
objection to officers of the British Navy, if they are confident that such or such a junk has been 
engaged in piracy, detaining the said junk and handing her over for examination to the local 
authorities’.34 Even before coming to this arrangement with the Zongli Yamen, Bruce sought to 
restrain British consuls’ recourse to naval force, suggesting to the commander-in-chief in 1862 
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that ‘redress for illegal acts’ should not be ‘sought for by force, by the Consul, unless the lives 
and property of Her Majesty’s subjects, at the ports, are endangered by violence’.35 Accordingly, 
Bruce warned the consuls against calling on the Royal Navy for ‘coercing the local authorities 
and people and thus doing the work of the Imperial Government’ of China.36 At Hong Kong, 
Nolloth prohibited any officer under his command from taking action ‘in cases of piracy on the 
coast where no British or European property has been plundered’. Such cases should be reported 
to a British consul to forward to the Qing authorities as ‘it will generally be their duty’, not the 
Royal Navy’s, ‘to take active measures under such circumstances’. 37  Hope’s successor as 
commander-in-chief of the East Indies and China Station, Rear-Admiral Augustus Kuper, 
issued a standing order that ‘Chinese vessels are on no account to be destroyed by Her Majesty’s 
ships, unless the Officers in command are requested, by a competent Chinese Authority, to aid 
in doing so; nor unless on the sea coast of China, a pirate is caught in the act of Piracy’.38 Given 
these restrictions on British naval actions, Nolloth had to seek Qing approval and assistance for 
his planned attack on Yuen Long. 
In forwarding Nolloth’s request to Canton, the colonial secretary, William Mercer, asked 
the governor-general, Mao Hongbin, to ‘take such prompt and effectual measures to remedy the 
evil complained of as will render a representation to Peking unnecessary’. Hong Kong 
authorities would send gunboats to support such measures ‘if a proper Chinese Officer be 
deputed to accompany the expedition’, but Mercer emphasised that a naval demonstration 
‘would be of little use, unless there were a body of Chinese Soldiers ready to co-operate on 
land’.39 The British consul at Canton, D.B. Robertson, met the governor-general, to discuss the 
matter. Mao agreed to send ‘Brigadier General Ling-shan to accompany the Gun Boats’ in a 
Qing war junk.40 Mao insisted that ‘should there be any Pirates, they will be at once be [sic] 
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taken and forwarded for punishment’ at Canton. He further promised that ‘a body of Soldiers 
from the neighborhood’ would be sent for ‘guarding of the road to prevent escape’.41 Qing and 
British forces would thus attempt to replicate the successful strategy from the Tsing-chow 
expedition of naval assault and using land forces to cut off pirates’ escape at Yuen Long. With 
these plans agreed upon, Nolloth sent Lieutenant Richard Adams to take HMS Woodcock and 
Grasshopper and ‘bring justice to some of the notorious piratical villagers in or near “Deep Bay” 
who habitually plunder the native boats trading to Hong Kong’. The gunboats would be 
‘accompanied by a native officer’ while Qing commanders would also ‘employ troops to prevent 
escape inland’.42 
On 26 June 1864, Adams set out for Deep Bay accompanied by ‘the Consular Interpreter, 
Mr. Carroll, a police interpreter, and the Chinese informer whose boat had been fired upon and 
seized’, while Ling-shan joined the expedition in his own junk. Adams believed that a successful 
operation ‘depended on an immediate and sudden landing’, but Ling-shan instead insisted on 
speaking with the village headmen to ask for the rendition of pirates. While this was going on, 
Lieutenant Charles Walker landed a portion of the crew of the Grasshopper, captured ten pirates, 
and searched ‘well-known piratical villages’, the inhabitants of which fled on the landing party’s 
approach. Ling-shan, however, continued to deliberate and attempted to delay any landing until 
Adams ‘pressed, or rather insisted on, the matter’ and a joint force was landed near a piratical 
village. Ling-shan ‘observed that he did not think the force sufficient to burn it’.43 He later wrote 
to Adams that the goal of the expedition was to ‘conjointly… examine into the matter of, and 
look after the pirates and vagabonds of Ün-long [Yuen Long] and several other villages’, but 
that as he could not distinguish ‘between the good and the bad’, there was ‘no way of beginning 
our work’.44 Adams accused Ling-shan of an ‘utter absence of zeal’ but was limited in his own 
actions as ‘the gunboats were not to land their crews on Chinese territory and capture offenders 
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or suspected persons except in co-operation with the General’s party’. The Qing land forces, 
which were to cut off the pirates’ escape, never arrived.45 
Reporting the results of the Yuen Long expedition, Nolloth complained to Robinson that 
‘no service whatever has been executed’.46 Colonial authorities at Hong Kong lamented the 
‘incapacity of the Brigadier General’ and as a result decided to make ‘a complaint to the 
Supreme Government in Peking’. 47  The establishment of the Zongli Yamen, part of the 
revolution in Qing foreign relations that emerged after the Arrow War, provided a means for the 
British to address the problems of piracy directly to high Qing officials at Beijing rather than 
with provincial authorities at Canton thousands of miles from the capital. British complaints 
about piracy would thus have more impact on Qing policy, as discussed below. 48  In the 
meantime, Robinson decided to call on the governor-general at Canton to discuss the problem 
of piracy committed from Qing territory in Hong Kong’s vicinity. According to Robinson, the 
governor-general declared that villages like Yuen Long ‘could be more easily dealt with from 
Hong Kong than from Canton’ and ‘begged’ him to deal with the matter himself. Robinson 
responded that ‘I should have done so before if Deep Bay had not been within Chinese 
jurisdiction’. Despite the colonisation of Kowloon, piracy continued to be a problem for Hong 
Kong due to the absence of Qing authority ‘in Deep Bay, and upon the sea coast in that 
neighbourhood’.49 The limits of Hong Kong’s jurisdiction, however, meant that any punitive 
actions at Yuen Long or other villages around Deep Bay required cooperation with Qing 
authorities. As at Swatow, Qing officials in the areas around Hong Kong came to realise that 
such cooperation could be a means of using the firepower and prowess of the Royal Navy to 
supplement deficiencies in their own authority. 
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In April 1866, officials in Xiangshan requested that Vice-Admiral George King, the first 
commander-in-chief of an independent China Station, send gunboats to attack ‘Pak-shui 
[Beishui], Nam-shui [Nanshui], and other places within the jurisdiction of Heung-shán 
[Xiangshan].’50  King asked that Robertson inquire into the governor-general’s opinion and 
stated that ‘if the Viceroy requires the assistance of the Gun Boats, he should make a distinct 
request to that effect’.51 In response, Ruilin, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, 
cited Article LIII of the Treaty of Tientsin to request the assistance of a British gunboat to 
accompany a Qing customs steamer and ‘together annihilate’ the pirates. He would send 
Guangzhou Prefect (zhifu) Mei and Major (youji) Shang in a customs steamer and a war junk 
or two to rendezvous with a British force at Lintin, while a Qing force in ‘pa boats, which are 
reliant on wind and tide’, would go ahead of time to Yaimen and Modaomen to block the pirates’ 
escape. 52  The governor-general’s request is perhaps the earliest Qing request for British 
assistance against pirates from such a high ranking official. 
Despite its failure at Yuen Long, Ruilin hoped to deploy the Tsing-chow strategy of naval 
assault and land blockade against the pirates of Beishui. At Canton, Robertson reported that 
Qing ‘troops to the number of 1200 have been detailed for the undertaking’. To facilitate 
coordination between British and Qing forces, Robertson ‘instructed Mr. W.F. Mayers, Acting 
Vice Consul and Interpreter at this Port [Canton]’ to accompany the Qing contingent.53 Perhaps 
with the failings at Yuen Long in mind, Robertson decided to alter the strategy of the joint 
expedition and arranged that ‘when captured, these Strongholds [at Beishui] shall be garrisoned 
by Chinese Troops to prevent their return to piratical occupation’.54 In support, Captain Nolloth 
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sent HMS Janus to Lintin to meet the Qing customs steamer, with HMS Opossum and Banterer 
to follow. Lieutenant Henry Craven St. John would command the expedition.55 
The gunboats met the Customs steamer Hai Tsing at Lintin on 30 May 1866.56 St. John 
drew up a plan with the Qing authorities, deciding that as Beishui was triangular in shape, the 
main Qing force would land at the north while the gunboats and the Hai Tsing would guard 
each of the island’s three sides. The Qing land force arrived early, however, and by the time the 
joint steam flotilla reached Beishui, the pirates had abandoned the village and fled to the island 
of Nanshui.57 St. John then attempted to coordinate an attack on Nanshui, but the Qing forces 
botched their amphibious assault, and by the time the troops converged on the village, the 
inhabitants had ‘retreated to the woods and hill sides’. Lieutenant Karl Heinrick Augustus 
Mainwaring meanwhile landed with a force of men from HMS Opossum and one hundred Qing 
troops to attack ‘Man Wan (another village on the south side of the Island)’. Mainwaring’s forces 
succeeded in capturing a ‘12 gun battery concealed in the woods’, but found the town ‘quite 
deserted’. 58  A member of the Xiangshan gentry anticipated the pirates’ desertion as ‘the 
intended despatch of gunboats had been talked of in the Chinese town at Hongkong for four or 
five days past, and would immediately be known on the coast’. The expedition indeed found 
out that ‘no junks had been seen near the straits for about six days’.59 Prefect Mei had Beishui 
and Nanshui ‘completely destroyed’ and left his forces to garrison the area.60 He also left ‘12 
heavily armed junks with smaller gun vessels in the straits’. The expedition took twenty 
prisoners.61 
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Vice-Admiral King commended St. John and Mainwaring’s actions in the Beishui 
expedition.62 Robinson’s successor as governor of Hong Kong, Richard Graves MacDonnell, 
complained that the effort was ‘a complete failure so far as regards the crippling of the pirates by 
depriving them of weapons and their vessels’, but he also considered it ‘a complete success in 
exhibiting the willingness of the Chinese Government to co-operate in their own way with 
others in putting down Piracy’.63 Doubting the naval and military capacity of the Qing but 
requiring their cooperation in suppressing piracy, British officials in China needed a new modus 
operandi for working with Qing counterparts in dealing with pirates. Robertson concluded from 
the Beishui expedition that ‘combined operations must result in failure, so far as the main point, 
the capture and destruction of the pirate vessels, is concerned,’ and that any collaborative anti-
piracy expedition ‘should be organized on a different basis’.64  A new basis of cooperation 
emerged during an expedition to Hainan, which would become the model for joint actions 
against pirates in the waters of Guangdong from the late 1860s onwards. 
 
A New System of Cooperation and Its Limits 
During the summer of 1866, the senior naval officer at Hong Kong, Commodore Oliver Jones 
decided to send HMS Osprey and Opossum to deal with pirates in the vicinity of the island of 
Hainan. Qing cooperation took the form of ‘Liang [Guoding], a Military Mandarin’ from 
Kowloon, who would accompany the expedition and ‘make it lawful for [Commander William 
Menzies] to attack the Pirates in Chinese Waters, or if necessary, though that should be done 
with caution, to land for that purpose’.65 On 18 July, the gunboats encountered ‘the mast heads 
of a great many Junks showing over the South Point of the entrance to Sama Inlet’. When ‘His 
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Excellency Lyang [Liang], mandarin of the Blue Button, pronounced them a Pirate fleet’, the 
gunboats opened fire. While the warships attacked the pirate junks, a party of marines and small 
arms men landed with the orders: ‘Junks to be taken and burnt, every Pirate seen to be shot 
down, and no prisoners to be taken’.66 Menzies estimated that his force engaged five to six 
hundred pirates, killing one to two hundred. A total of ‘21 junks carrying 268 guns and 582 men’ 
were destroyed.67 Unfortunately, during the expedition,  Liang Guoding suffered a ‘Gun Shot 
wound of abdomen’, which perforated his bowels and proved mortal. He ‘died on board HMS 
“Osprey” at Sea, 21st [July] at 9.15 P.M.’. 68  Liang reportedly suffered his wounds ‘while 
gallantly making prisoners of some Pirates who were escaping’. 69  MacDonnell expressed 
‘concern and sorrow at this untoward event’ and lamented that it would be ‘difficult if not 
impossible to adequately supply his place’ as a cooperative official at Kowloon. 
Menzies’s expedition, unlike those to Yuen Long or Beishui, met with unanimous British 
approval. MacDonnell considered it proof that it was ‘quite possible with a small fleet of 
thoroughly effective and swift gunboats to render Piracy so unprofitable a pursuit, so as to free 
the seas from the rascals who now infest them’.70 The success of the Hainan expedition, in which 
‘an officer on the part of the Chinese Government’ accompanied a Royal Navy expedition to 
give ‘legality to any operations that might be made in Chinese waters’, suggested that this mode 
of cooperation might replace the joint expeditions coordinated between British and Qing 
forces.71 Within two years, the precedent of Qing officials going on board Royal Navy ships to 
give legal sanction to British actions was well-established. In April 1868, Vice-Admiral Henry 
Keppel, the commander-in-chief of the China Station, reported that ‘native Officials… are 
always received on board before H.M. Ships depart on any expedition having the suppression 
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of Piracy as its object’.72 Boarding Royal Navy vessels in pursuit of pirates became a duty of 
Qing officials. On 26 May 1868, British officials went to Kowloon and requested that the colonel 
of Dapeng, He Feixiong, send an officer to go aboard HMS Algerine on an expedition against 
pirates. Colonel He deputed Lieutenant (qianzong) Chen Deng to accompany the expedition. 
When Chen failed to go to Hong Kong to join the crew of the Algerine, Governor-General 
Ruilin ordered an investigation into whether he had ‘shirked his duty’.73 Chen seems to have 
learned his lesson. When the British requested that a Kowloon mandarin accompany another 
expedition against pirates the following July, Chen Deng set off for Hong Kong ‘at that instant’.74 
By that time, Ruilin admitted the existence of a well-established system in which Royal Navy 
ships going ‘out to sea on anti-piratical cruises’ would ‘request that a military official from 
Kowloon accompany the expedition to help with distinguishing between the good and the bad 
and for consultation in making arrests’.75 The compromise between the rights given to the Royal 
Navy in Article LII of the Treaty of Tientsin and British attempts to restrain naval action in 
China, as well as Qing sovereign rights and treaty obligations, had produced a model of 
cooperation in which British gunboats, with Qing officials on board, enforced Qing and treaty 
law on the China coast. 
This new system of collaboration had limits, however. Robertson’s accusation that ‘the 
Chinese authorities are so slow and open in their preparations’ for cooperating with British forces 
had some validity, as the example of Chen Deng revealed. 76  One of the most tragic and 
consequential results of delays on the part of Qing officials in cooperating with the Royal Navy 
against alleged pirates was the death of sixty-nine Chinese at the village of Oudingxiang (Ou-
ting-poi in English sources). In January 1869, while boats of HMS Cockchafer went ‘for exercise’ 
on the creek by Oudingxiang, the crews ‘were assailed with Stones thrown from behind the 
bank of the River’ by villagers. Lieutenant Howard Kerr landed a force to capture a village 
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leader to take to Qing authorities at Swatow to give an explanation, but the villagers, who 
gathered in an armed mass, prevented his force from doing so and attacked the boats as they 
withdrew to Swatow. The villagers wounded ten of the Cockchafer’s crew.77 In response, the 
British consul at Swatow, Chaloner Alabaster, ‘urge[d] the necessity of a force being sent hither 
without delay to read the semi-piratical villagers the sharp and decisive lesson’ that Rutherford 
Alcock, Bruce’s successor as British minister at Beijing, had suggested ‘in anticipation of some 
such outrage’.78 Two years earlier, Alcock had declared that all the villages on the Han River 
between Swatow and Chaozhou were ‘piratical and insurgent’ and authorised gunboats making 
a survey of the river ‘to repel any attack or put down any opposition made to their progress’.79 
Alabaster believed that this authorisation gave British forces a right to seek vengeance at 
Oudingxiang. Vice-Admiral Keppel met Ruilin to discuss the punishment of villagers of 
Oudingxiang and its surrounding region who ‘had long resisted the Imperial Power, refusing to 
pay taxes, while they themselves levied blackmail on traders passing from Chow-Chow-Fou 
[Chaozhou]’.80  Article LIII allowed Keppel and other naval officers to interact with Qing 
officials on equal grounds, giving the Royal Navy diplomatic functions beyond those of gunboat 
diplomacy. After his meeting with Keppel, Ruilin agreed to send one of his new gunboats and 
an official to Swatow to inquire into the affair while another gunboat would go to Hong Kong 
to accompany any British force sent to exact retribution. Keppel and Ruilin also discussed the 
general suppression of piracy at their meeting.81 
Keppel gave Commodore Jones command of a flotilla consisting of HMS Rinaldo, Perseus, 
Leven, and Bouncer at Hong Kong, and of Cockchafer and Banterer at Swatow, to punish ‘the 
Piratical Villagers residing on the banks of the River Han’ who were ‘not merely at war with 
themselves but with society generally’. Keppel invoked the notion of pirates as hostes humani 
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generis to justify an act of war against the villagers of Oudingxiang. In conducting this war, Jones 
was to act ‘in accord with the Commissioner despatched by His Excellency the Viceroy’, while 
also keeping ‘communication open with Swatow, and intimat[ing] through the Chinese Officials 
that we are only at war with such of the Piratical Villages as are at war with us’.82 Jones, however, 
ignored orders to cooperate with Qing authorities, and began attacking Oudingxiang and other 
villages without consulting local officials on 29 January 1869. By the time the Qing gunboat 
Anlan arrived at Oudingxiang, most of the destruction was done.83 
In the aftermath, Alabaster believed that ‘the expedition has had the happiest effect on the 
country round’.84 Other officials were less optimistic. Keppel expressed dismay that Jones had 
disobeyed orders in acting alone and expected that Ruilin in Canton and Alcock in Beijing 
would also express disappointment.85 To preempt hard feelings on Ruilin’s part, Keppel hoped 
that Robertson, when forwarding accounts of Jones’s actions would ‘explain away any ill-feeling 
that might possibly result from Commodore Jones having commenced operations before the 
arrival of the Vice Roy’s Commissioner’.86 Ruilin nonetheless ‘expressed much dissatisfaction’ 
at Jones’s hastiness.87 The governor-general considered British naval actions ‘a breach of faith 
beyond reason’. He believed that the Oudingxiang affair, from start to finish, violated of the 
Treaty of Tientsin, which caused him to ‘sigh deeply’.88 At Beijing, Prince Gong deemed the 
killing of sixty-nine men and women, the capture of ‘exceedingly many’, and the burning of four 
hundred and forty-five houses ’reckless behaviour’ that ‘should be punished’. He concluded that 
‘much of the foreign trouble at the various ports has been caused by the Royal Navy’ and 
decided that the Qing should ‘hasten to restrain the British’ lest they set an example for other 
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countries, which might ‘send warships whenever there is disturbance’.89 The Foreign Office 
agreed and ordered Alcock to ‘inform HM Consuls generally that it is their duty to 
discountenance similar acts of imprudence on the part of British subjects’. 90  Accordingly, 
Alcock issued a warning to British consuls to limit their recourse to naval force, pointing out 
their duty was ‘to moderate, not to sanction violence’.91 The Admiralty also condemned the 
expedition.92 Keppel believed that as punishment, the sea lords did not recommend him for a 
GCB on Queen Victoria’s birthday.93 
While the Treaty of Tientsin stipulated that Britain and China should work together to 
suppress piracy and laid the foundation for direct cooperation, such joint actions had limits. The 
successful punishment of Tsing-chow revealed the potential that joint amphibious attacks 
between Qing forces and the Royal Navy could have for suppressing piracy and establishing 
order. The results of the joint expeditions to Yuen Long and Beishui, however, met with 
ambivalence. The success of HMS Osprey and Opossum at Hainan established the more efficient 
model of Qing officials going onboard Royal Navy ships in pursuit of pirates. This had become 
the modus operandi for the Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy against pirates by the 
late 1860s. The disastrous outcome of the Oudingxiang affair, however, checked such 
cooperation. In its aftermath, the Royal Navy and British consuls were reprimanded and 
ordered to limit their intervention in China, while the death and destruction wrought by 
Commodore Jones’s flotilla caused worries and mistrust among Qing officials. Direct 
cooperation between Qing forces and the Royal Navy had ambiguous success in suppressing 
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Establishing the Guangdong Steam Squadron 
In the aftermath of the Arrow War, with peace re-established between Britain and China, the 
British government adopted a more amicable policy towards the Qing and supported them 
against the Taiping rebels. The Royal Navy went from a force for gunboat diplomacy in China 
to one providing important maritime assistance against rebellion. It was the enthusiasm of the 
Royal Navy in putting down the Taipings and other insurgents that led to the aforementioned 
attack on Cantonese privateers in the Yangtze river.94 In reprimanding the Royal Navy’s actions, 
Bruce conceded that there was an ‘absence of any properly organized naval force’ in China and 
proposed ‘substituting vessels commanded by responsible officers of the State for these hired 
corsairs, who are in fact pirates armed with Government authority’.95 Qing officials, however, 
struggled to provide such vessels and instead turned to France and Britain, former enemies who 
had demonstrated the efficacy of steam-powered warships in the Haihe, for support. The 
desperation brought about by the Taiping Rebellion and Britain’s newly conciliatory and 
cooperative attitude created an opportunity for Qing China’s first attempt at acquiring a modern 
navy through the purchase of the Lay-Osborn flotilla of seven steam warships from Britain.96 
On 7 July 1861, Emperor Xianfeng approved of a plan to purchase foreign warships for use 
against the Taipings. Though the Zongli Yamen initiated discussions for the purchase, it 
ultimately deputed Lao Chongguang, then governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, to 
negotiate the details with Robert Hart, deputy commissioner of the Imperial Maritime Customs 
at Canton.97 Though treaty stipulations and the establishment of the Zongli Yamen allowed 
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Western diplomats to conduct diplomacy at Beijing, Qing officials still relied on the Canton 
authorities to negotiate with foreigners over matters of national importance such as the purchase 
of foreign warships. To facilitate the purchase and transfer of such ships, the British government 
exempted Horatio Nelson Lay, inspector-general of the Imperial Maritime Customs, and 
Captain Sherard Osborn, R.N., from the restrictions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which 
prohibited British subjects from participating in conflicts in which Britain was neutral. The order 
allowed Lay and Osborn to ‘enter the Naval and Military Service of the Emperor of China’ to 
command the warships purchased by the Qing.98 When the ships arrived in China in September 
1863, however, Osborn refused to serve under provincial authorities while Qing officials were 
reluctant to allow a naval force under British command to operate in Chinese waters without 
their supervision. The impasse led to the failure of the exchange, and the fleet was disbanded.99 
China’s first attempt at producing a modern navy had failed. 
Though Qing authorities had intended to use the Lay-Osborn flotilla against the Taipings, 
Frederick Bruce complained that the failure of the sale deprived China of ‘a force, which 
combined with an improved coast administration w[oul]d have begun a better order of 
things’.100 He believed a force of steamships would improve the ability of Qing officials to police 
their own waters. This remained important even after the end of the Taiping Rebellion. The 
Admiralty believed that the collapse of the rebellion ‘furnished an ample supply of the most 
desperate characters’ to man pirate crews. 101  In its aftermath, Foreign Secretary Lord 
Clarendon considered piracy ‘no less injurious to the Chinese cities on the sea-board, than were 
the outrages of the Taepings to the Chinese cities in the interior’.102 Though piracy was nowhere 
near as destructive as one of the worst civil wars in history, Qing authorities nonetheless agreed 
that the problem needed addressing. Prince Gong accordingly issued orders ‘to the high 
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authorities of the maritime provinces, and to the Two Ministers superintendent of Trade, to 
make arrangements’ for the purchase of steamers and, in the meantime, local authorities were 
instructed ‘to charter without distinction of nationality any steamer that may appear suited to 
perform the service required’ for suppressing piracy.103 Prince Gong resurrected Qing plans to 
acquire a steam fleet through purchase and hire. 
The following December, citing an order from the Zongli Yamen that Qing officials were to 
‘charter or purchase’ steamers from foreign countries to ‘capture pirates and bandits’, Ruilin met 
Guangdong Governor Jiang Yili, and the two decided to order Colonel Huang Tingbiao to 
charter the ‘Zhanzhibei [Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy]’, which was then sent to Caochong in Xinning 
to ‘blockade and capture pirates’ after ‘the contract was agreed’.104 Consul Robertson approved 
of the charter of the British steamer as well as of the Canton authorities’ purchase of a ‘light 
draught iron steamer suitable for the conveyance of troops and the patrol of the rivers’ around 
the same time. Robertson was ‘glad that the Chinese authorities determined to act for 
themselves’ in taking such measures to deal with piracy.105 His approval was a drastic change of 
heart for someone who only months earlier had complained that the Qing authorities at Canton 
‘had learned nothing from their intercourse with Foreigners, and were as incompetent at this 
moment as they were five and twenty years ago when the war broke out, and would be so five 
and twenty years hence unless they were assisted’. 106  By chartering the Jeejeebhoy and 
purchasing the Feilong, the Canton authorities showed that they were willing to accept such 
assistance. 
Rutherford Alcock also praised the actions of Ruilin and Jiang towards obtaining a steam 
fleet, seeing ‘encouraging signs of an awakening sense in the Provincial Authorities of the 
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necessity of accepting the situation which Foreign intercourse and commerce are forcing upon 
the Empire’.107 The Canton authorities continued to act on this awakening sense. By the end of 
the year, they had concluded that as ‘repeated cases of piracy had occurred in the seas of eastern 
Guangdong in recent years, we must purchase steamships to patrol the waters’. They thus 
purchased three steamers, the Chengqing, Suijing, and Zhenhai from France, as well the Feilong 
and two gunboats, the Anlan and Zhentao, from Britain. Ruilin and Jiang Yili considered the 
success they had in purchasing these ships unprecedented. They personally sailed on the 
Chengqing, Feilong, Zhenhai, and Suijing, and vouched for the vessels’ seaworthiness. The 
steamers had crews of local militiamen chosen for their ‘familiarity with foreign affairs’, who 
served under foreign officers.108 Unlike Osborn in 1863, the commanders of the Guangdong 
steam squadron held ‘appointments under the Provincial Government’.109 Though the Anlan 
and Zhentao were gunboats, Alcock considered that as they were ‘not for war but revenue 
purposes, and the suppression of Piracy and smuggling, which may fairly be considered a civil 
service’, he hoped Lord Stanley would approve of ‘their being efficiently officered by British 
subjects’ despite the restrictions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. 110  The Canton authorities 
believed the vessels, under this arrangement would be ‘great benefit’ to China.111 
Robertson was less enthusiastic about new Guangdong steam squadron. He pointed out that 
the Suijing ‘was originally built some three years since for the Macao Government, but refused’ 
and was ‘said to be unsound in her timbers’. The Zhenhai and Chengqing were also ‘patchwork 
affairs, composed chiefly of old material, and constructed at Hong Kong, where there can be 
but little knowledge or appliances for such work’.112 Robertson had a more positive view of the 
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British steamer Feilong, which he claimed ‘worked hard during the Tsao Chung [Caochong] 
affair in the conveyance of troops, treasure, and despatches, and was of immense service to the 
government’.113 Piratical disturbances in Caochong in Xinning prompted Ruilin’s request to 
charter the Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy in 1866. From Robertson’s report, it seems the iron paddle 
steamer, Feilong, played a key role in finally resolving the issue. Though the steamers that 
suppressed piracy at Caochong were British-built, they were under Qing command and enabled 
the Canton authorities to deal with the problem of piracy at Caochong without calling for 
assistance from the Royal Navy. 
The Guangdong steam squadron also participated with British forces joint expeditions 
against pirates. Despite Robertson’s reservations about its seaworthiness, the Suijing, with the 
lieutenant-colonel of Dengqing, Wu Diwen, onboard accompanied HMS Bouncer, commanded 
by Lieutenant Rodney M. Lloyd, to Jiazi, where Lin Yaqi, of ‘Hingling village’ in Xin’an 
reported that his vessel, the Kum Tsum Yik [Jinquanyi], had been plundered.114 When the 
villagers ‘refused to acknowledge [Qing officials’] authority’, Lieutenant Lloyd ‘moved the 
“Bouncer” in company with the Chinese Vessels, to an anchorage which placed four of the 
delinquent villages within gunshot’. This joint exercise of gunboat diplomacy proved effective 
and the villagers agreed to pay compensation for the Kum Tsum Yik’s losses, even though the 
Qing officials’ investigation proved quite different from the allegations in Lin Yaqi’s report. 
Though the expedition failed to capture any pirates, Lloyd nonetheless considered himself 
‘indebted to Captain Ja[me]s Stewart of the “Sui Tsing” for a kind courtesy and ready 
coöperation throughout these proceedings, also to the Blue Button Mandarin [Wu] for his 
valuable and able assistance at all times’.115 On hearing reports of the expedition, however, 
Ruilin concluded that no piracy had taken place at Jiazi and that the case was rather one of 
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shipwreck and plunder. He nonetheless had ‘strict orders issued for the elders to tell their wards 
to focus on fishing and agriculture’ rather than piracy and plunder.116 
Ruilin was distressed by the naval intervention at Jiazi, where no piracy had occurred. 
While Qing naval forces lacked ‘steam-powered paddle warships’, Ruilin admitted to Robertson 
that he ‘could only rely on your honourable country’s warships for assistance’. With steamers 
under his command, however, Ruilin had the confidence to insist that ‘robberies and kidnapping’ 
on the coast of the mainland were ‘solely the responsibility of local civil and military officials of 
China’ and that the Royal Navy ‘need not be bothered’ with ‘expeditions to capture bandits 
that do not take place on the great ocean’.117 Having control of a steam squadron allowed the 
Canton authorities to more firmly assert sovereignty over the coast and invoke the international 
law concept of territorial waters to limit the Royal Navy’s actions to the high seas of the ‘great 
ocean’. Steamships gave Ruilin more confidence in his ability to police Guangdong’s territorial 
waters. This emergence of an increasingly independent and effective Qing naval force in 
Guangdong coincided with a decision by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they 
did ‘not consider the Protection of the Chinese Home Trade to come within the line of their 
duties; they have placed cruizers to protect British Commerce’. Though seeking to limit the 
Royal Navy’s responsibilities in China, the Admiralty nonetheless harboured ‘hopes that the 
increased Force of armed Cruizers belonging to different Maritime Nations, with such uncertain 
assistance as may be rendered by the newly purchased Chinese Flotilla… will prevent any acts 
of violence against Foreign Merchant Vessels’.118 The Royal Navy would continue to support 
the Qing in suppressing piracy though, even in cooperation with Qing steam vessels, actions by 
warships could be problematic and were limited in their effect. Steam and firepower were not 
the only means of dealing with pirates. Adhering to the adage that the pen is mightier than the 
sword, British and Qing policymakers also used legislation to suppress piracy. 
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Prohibiting Piracy through Policy 
In the aftermath of the Arrow War, piracy, always problematic, became an increasingly common 
issue in Hong Kong. By 1861, the Hong Kong Police had developed a system of ‘Special Reports’ 
of piracy allowing for a closer cooperation between colonial officials and the Royal Navy. Many 
of these reports were forwarded along with witnesses or petitioners to the senior naval officer at 
Hong Kong who would then send a gunboat to try to resolve the matter.119 British officers would 
often involve the Kowloon authorities in this system. The frequency of these reports in the mid-
1860s suggests that the problem of piracy was getting out of control.120 Cooperative expeditions 
between Qing forces, including the Guangdong steam squadron, and the Royal Navy against 
pirates apparently had a limited effect on suppressing piracy. To deal with the problem of piracy 
and crime and general, Richard Graves MacDonnell, on becoming governor of Hong Kong, 
vowed to introduce a policy of ‘selfpreservation [sic] and protection. To root criminals out of 
our midst and cast them back to their own shores, there to look for sustenance and booty’.121 
MacDonnell discovered, however, that Hong Kong’s ‘selfpreservation and protection’ would 
also require measures by Qing authorities to deal with the problem of piracy. The measures 
adopted against piracy at Hong Kong would require dialogue between Hong Kong, Canton, 
Beijing, the Royal Navy, and indeed London and the wider world. Policies adopted at Hong 
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Developments in the Prohibition Regime at Hong Kong 
MacDonnell’s proposed policies included ‘registration and control of Native Craft, 
Improvements in the Police and Sanitary arrangements of the town, a new court for the trial of 
Piracy cases, the Registration of Houses, Servants, &c’, which were all ‘part of one plan’ to 
reduce crime in Hong Kong.122 Notably, many parts of MacDonnell’s ‘one plan’ dealt with 
piracy. Though he was not the first governor to attempt to introduce legislation to suppress 
piracy, his policies were more thorough and effective than those of any of his predecessors.123 
One of the principal problems in dealing with piracy at Hong Kong, according to MacDonnell, 
was that ‘no attempt has ever been made hitherto to take the slightest cognizance of the movements 
by night or by day of the native craft visiting [Victoria Harbour], numbers of which are fast 
sailors – armed to the teeth’.124 These armed vessels could easily and often did turn pirate. 
Though the British colonisation of Kowloon was meant to consolidate control over Victoria 
Harbour, the freedom of navigation that Chinese vessels enjoyed as well as the easy access to 
arms and ammunition at the free port of Hong Kong made the colony a haven for pirates.125 
Given such a state of affairs, the British minister at Beijing pointed out, in response to 
MacDonnell’s complaints about Chinese piracy, that ‘the Chinese Government might urge in 
Justification of their seeming apathy that no efforts of theirs could avail so long as Hong Kong 
and Macao and the former especially afforded a sure refuge to pirates and all the means of 
arriving, refitting, and disposing of their booty’.126 MacDonnell decided to act by implementing 
a system of registration of all Chinese vessels that visited Hong Kong to better monitor potential 
pirates. 
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As early as 1862, a British official observed that ‘parties in Hong Kong’ were committing 
piracies on ‘Vessels leaving the Harbour’ and suggested that Captain Nolloth meet the governor 
of Hong Kong ‘with the view of devising if possible such measures of Maritime Police as will 
insure [sic] a registry of all Boats entering or leaving the Harbour’ to check the problem of piracy 
from Hong Kong.127 MacDonnell’s predecessor, Hercules Robinson, thus asked various colonial 
officials about implementing a system of registration, but most were against it and doubted its 
efficacy. Harbour Master H.G. Thomsett expressed the opinion that ‘two vessels of light draft 
to sail fast with Steam power, and a good Armament kept cruising between Macao and Single 
Island will do more to stop piracy in the vicinity of the Colony than any system of Registery 
[sic]’.128 Charles May, the acting chief magistrate, was of the opinion that ‘Registration under 
the circumstances of clashing nationalities… (viz. Chinese, Portuguese, British) and apart from 
Harbour regulation, as regards Piracy, is a snare and delusion’.129 The international nature of 
the Canton Delta would make any unilateral implementation of a system of registration difficult. 
By 1865, however, the ‘prevalence of piracy in the Chinese seas’ had become so dire that it 
‘had engaged the earnest attention of Her Majesty’s Government’. Whitehall ‘anxiously 
considered whether the Colony of Hong Kong could not and ought not to be enabled to take a 
more effectual part than heretofore in controlling that evil’. The Colonial Office suggested 
improving the ‘efficiency of the Present Police system’ and involving the Royal Navy in a 
system of registration that would provide naval officers with ‘useful knowledge respecting the 
character of the vessels frequenting the Port, and the means of obstructing their proceedings if 
piratical’.130 MacDonnell responded by issuing Ordinance No. 6 of 1866, which required junks 
entering any harbour in Hong Kong to obtain a licence from the harbour master. Licences 
recorded, among other things, the ‘name, address and description of the owner or owners of 
such junk and of the master’, a ‘description of the cargo on board and number of the crew’, and 
 
127 ‘Extract from a Letter to the “Senior Officer H.M. Ships Hong Kong dated 1st May 1862’, ADM 
125/8, 275. 
128 Thomsett to Alexander, 19 June 1862, ADM 125/8, 286. 
129 May to Alexander, 19 June 1862, ADM 125/8, 294. 





‘whether carrying any and what guns and ammunition’. The ordinance also made it ‘lawful for 
any person deputed thereto by the Governor or by the commander of any of Her Majesty’s 
ships-of-war or for any other officer or constable of the Police Forces, at any time to board any 
junk within the waters of the Colony’ to inspect a junk’s licence.131 
To help uphold registration and improve Hong Kong’s policing of its own waters, 
MacDonnell passed Ordinance No. 9 of 1866, which created the ‘High Court of Hongkong for 
the Suppression of Piracy’. In addition to having jurisdiction over cases of piracy that the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong exercised, the piracy court could also try confederates of pirates. 
Anyone who ‘shall knowingly have set forth any pirate or aided, assisted, maintained, procured, 
commanded, counselled, or advised any person whatsoever to do or commit any piracy’; who 
knowingly traded with pirates or received goods or vessels taken piratically; or who was 
onboard a piratical vessel and unable to prove non-complicity, could be sentenced by the piracy 
court.132 In passing the ordinance, however, MacDonnell admitted ‘the difficulty of legislating 
cases of Piracy – an international offence – without in some manner exceeding the power of the 
local Legislature’.133 To help deal with this problem, Consul Robertson at Canton proposed ‘the 
establishment of a Mixed Court, something in the example of the Slave Courts in the [sic] 
Havana’ as ‘all the captures [of pirates] are made in a Chinese territory or jurisdiction rather, 
and consist of Chinese Subjects and their vessels’.134 Robertson’s invoking of slave courts and 
MacDonnell’s comment on piracy as an international offence, make Hong Kong’s measures to 
deal with piracy an example of the jury-rigged ‘prohibition regimes’ that characterised British 
attempts to deal with pirates and slave traders as they sought to impose order on the world’s 
oceans in the nineteenth century.135 May’s 1862 comment on the ‘clashing nationalities’ that 
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would impede an effective system of registration and MacDonnell’s reference to the implications 
piracy had in international law meant a prohibition regime against it at Hong Kong would 
require international assistance in its implementation. 
 
Expanding the Prohibition Regime 
When MacDonnell implemented a system for the registration of Chinese vessels at Hong Kong, 
the Colonial Office decided that if such a policy required the ‘aid of the Chinese Government’, 
he should consider implementing the system ‘with that aid, and the mode in which the co-
operation of the Chinese Government might most usefully be given’.136 MacDonnell was himself 
‘very desirous that a similar enactment should be carried out along the Chinese coasts’.137 
Hoping to expand the system of registration beyond Hong Kong, he apprised Ruilin at Canton 
of the new policy at Hong Kong ‘with a view to ascertaining how far the Chinese could co-
operate with one in legislating for the same purpose’, concluding that there was ‘a fair probability 
of partial ultimate success’.138 From MacDonnell’s proposals, transmitted via Robertson, Ruilin 
admitted he ‘could see the honourable consul and His Excellency MacDonnell’s peaceful and 
good intentions to protect merchant vessels and extirpate pirates’ and declared that such 
intentions were ‘indeed a source of great joy’. He agreed to consult with other Canton officials 
regarding responsive measures.139 Authorities at Canton did not adopt similar measures for 
registering Chinese craft in Guangdong, however. Declaring that ‘extirpating pirates and 
restoring peace was a truly important responsibility of local officials’, Ruilin pointed out that 
Chinese junks ‘when leaving and entering various ports, undergo a system of registration and 
inspection, which is carried out according to local circumstance’. He decided not to change the 
piecemeal, localised system but agreed to discuss ways for its improvement with other Canton 
authorities.140 
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MacDonnell also had ‘a long personal conference’ with José Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral, 
the governor of Macau, on the matter of registering Chinese junks. Amaral agreed to ‘exert 
himself to devise measures for assisting the operation and objects of the recent Legislation here’, 
but MacDonnell expressed doubts, believing that ‘reform at Macao will probably be tardy’.141 
An international system of registration was but a step towards MacDonnell’s ultimate goal of 
the disarmament of all Chinese junks with the exception of Qing warships. He believed 
prohibiting Chinese vessels from carrying ‘cannon, stink-pots, or other munitions of war on 
board’ and prosecuting those that did as pirates was the measure most ‘likely, thoroughly, and 
permanently to put an end to Piracy’ in the China Seas.142 
In the same 1862 report where he advised against implementing a system of registration, 
Charles May also predicted that the disarmament of all Chinese junks ‘would be a species of 
self-immolation, and tend to a diminution of trade with Hong Kong’.143 Despite this warning, 
by 1866, the increasingly desperate situation of piracy gave MacDonnell the courage to enact 
bold legislation for its suppression. Unlike registration or expanding the capacity of colonial 
courts to deal with piracy, however, disarmament could not only be implemented at Hong Kong. 
It would need to be enforced all along the coast to be effective. Executing such a policy would 
require international cooperation. Rutherford Alcock believed that as the Qing government was 
‘consciously and manifestly incapable of affording by its own Cruizers efficient protection to its 
traders there would be palpable injustice as well as impolicy’ in enacting disarmament, which 
‘would answer no other end than to disarm the honest trader and offer a direct encouragement 
to Piracy by leaving them an easier victim’. He nonetheless expressed hope to MacDonnell that 
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‘by the combined efforts of Your Excellency, the naval Commander-in-Chief, and the Central 
Power here working through their very efficient Foreign Custom House administration as well 
as the Provincial Authorities, we may in the end secure a satisfactory result’.144 Vice-Admiral 
Keppel, Governor-General Ruilin, and the Zongli Yamen, as well as MacDonnell and Alcock, 
would thus all have an important role in implementing a prohibition regime against piracy. 
MacDonnell discussed his plans for disarmament with Ruilin first. Noting that Hong Kong’s 
government ‘claims no jurisdiction over the shores of China, and has no authority to enforce 
international Law beyond three miles from its own territory’, MacDonnell suggested 
the expediency of some Legislation being adopted by the Chinese Government to 
prohibit any but vessels of the Imperial Navy carrying cannon, Stink Pots, Guns, 
Gunpowder, or other munitions of war, and declaring that all vessels doing so after a 
certain date shall be regarded as Pirates and liable to forfeiture with their cargoes.145 
 
Robertson, who decried the ‘utter impossibility and futility’ of disarmament, nonetheless 
communicated MacDonnell’s proposal to Ruilin who considered the policy ‘in advance of the 
Times’ and impossible to implement ‘unless security from Piracy could be guaranteed along the 
whole coast of China’.146 The Royal Navy was the force in China most capable of guaranteeing 
such security, but its overseers also sought international support and sanction in suppressing 
Chinese piracy. In January 1866, the Admiralty decided that the ‘great interest of British 
Commerce in those [China] seas demand [sic] that a systematic attempt should be made, in 
concert with the other great maritime Powers, and with the consent of the Chinese Govt., to 
afford that protection which it is unable to give’. The Admiralty’s call for the participation of 
other maritime powers in suppressing piracy sprang partly from the fact that ‘the Commander 
in Chief will not be able with the Force now under his Orders to detach more vessels for the 
suppression of Piracy, looking to the great and continued demands made upon on account of 
British interests and their representatives in China’.147 
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To bolster efforts for suppressing piracy, the Foreign Office issued instructions to British 
ambassadors in various foreign capitals to request naval cooperation. Lord Clarendon suggested 
to Frederick Bruce, now ambassador to the United States of America, that the ‘alarming 
Increase of Piracy in the China Seas’ warranted ‘the serious attention of all nations having 
commercial intercourse with China’. According to Clarendon: 
Great Britain employs on the Coast of China a considerable Naval Armament for its 
protection and exerts her strongest influence at Pekin to endeavour to induce the 
Chinese Govt. to act up to its Treaty Engagements towards the British Crown which 
bind it to concert with England measures for the suppression of Piracy. 
 
Despite the preponderance of British power in China, the Foreign Office, at the behest of the 
Admiralty, nonetheless requested that other maritime powers ‘unite their efforts with those of 
England for the suppression of an evil which alike threatens the commerce of all’. To this end, 
British ambassadors requested that Washington, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, instruct their 
ministers at Beijing and their senior naval officers in China to ‘act in concert with H.M. Minister 
at Pekin in urging the Chinese Govt. to take effective measures for the suppression of Piracy 
and to co-operate with the British Admiral in proportion to the extent of their Naval Force in 
China to effect that object’.148 The Foreign Office also requested its representatives in Spain, 
Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Austria, and Italy, maritime powers with ‘no diplomatic 
representation in China’, to suggest that if the naval forces of those countries could ‘in any way 
contribute’ to the suppression of piracy to ‘not be disenclined [sic] to do so’.149 
With agreements from Austria, Russia, Denmark, Prussia, and Spain to cooperate in 
suppressing piracy, Alcock sought to emphasise to Qing leaders ‘the certainty that they will be 
held to the strict performance of Treaty Engagements’ and ‘may expect from all the Maritime 
Powers representations and remonstrances which may be hard to deal with unless they make up 
their minds to co operate zealously for the suppression of an evil which affects China nearly if 
not more than it does Foreign Powers’. Towards this end, Qing authorities could ‘avail 
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themselves of the support of the Naval forces of Foreign Powers’.150 In support of Alcock’s 
efforts, the Admiralty ordered Vice-Admiral George King to be prepared ‘to organise with the 
Naval Commanders of the several Foreign Powers a system for vigorously repressing piracy’.151 
Vice-Admiral Henry Keppel, King’s successor as commander-in-chief of the China Station, 
would execute this order, meeting with his ‘brother Admirals of France and United States, 
Russia, Prussia, and Netherlands, too’, to discuss disarmament in June 1867.152 Keppel was also 
‘induced by the importance of the subject to visit Peking, and personally confer, not merely 
with Sir Rutherford Alcock, but also his foreign colleagues’.153 Naval officers played a key role 
in diplomatic discussions of the disarmament of Chinese vessels at Beijing. Keppel suggested to 
other naval commanders in China that, among other things, ‘it shall be illegal for any trading 
Junk to carry Ordnance’, and that twelve months after declaration of such a prohibition, ‘all 
such Vessels with Ordinance on board shall be detained and handed over to the Chinese 
Government to be dealt with as Pirates’.154 In treating illegally-armed Chinese junks as pirates, 
Keppel was adapting the British system of considering slave traders as a type of pirate to justify 
naval action against them. Like the Duke of Wellington at the Congress of Verona in 1822, 
Keppel also attempted unify international opinion in condemning a certain type of naval activity, 
in this case the carrying of ordnance in Chinese junks rather than carrying of slaves, as piracy.155 
As well as treating armed junks as pirates, Keppel also suggested that ‘European men of war 
stationed in China’ help protect disarmed junks from maritime predation. He furthermore 
proposed that ‘the Chinese Government shall number and maintain a complete registration of 
their Vessels’, an echo of MacDonnell’s policy of registration at Hong Kong.156 
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Captain W.B.F. Escher of the Dutch navy commented that Keppel’s proposed measures 
would ‘prove highly beneficial to the end in view’ of suppressing Chinese piracy. 157 Contre-
Amiral Pierre-Gustave Roze, commander-in-chief of the French naval division in the China 
Seas, agreed ‘without restrictions’ to Keppel’s proposals, believing they would be ‘a great benefit 
for all nations as well as for China herself’.158 Rear-Admiral Henry Bell, commanding the US 
Asiatic Squadron, considered the disarmament of junks ‘so highly judicious, and should 
Embrace pistols and muskets, as well as cannon’. Though largely agreeing with Keppel’s 
proposed measures, Bell expressed concern that the ‘enforcement of these articles would require 
a degree of vigor, in visitation and search, that would render the procedure vexatious and odious, 
to an extent fruitful of evil, and should be left Exclusively to the Chinese Authorities’.159 Despite 
Bell’s reservations, Keppel reported a ‘perfect unanimity of opinion’ of the naval commanders 
regarding the registration and disarmament of Chinese junks to Alcock.160 Pressured by the 
opinions of the naval commanders, Alcock and his French and American counterparts agreed 
to bring the proposal for the registration and disarmament of Chinese junks before Prince Gong. 
Keppel himself joined Alcock’s meeting with the prince, helping to 
impress upon the Prince and other High Officers there assembled, that the time had 
arrived when they should themselves take steps for the suppression of Piracy, and that 
we should be happy to co-operate with them most cordially to that end, but it would be 
their duty to commence, by striking the two death blows to piracy, namely disarmament 
and registration.161 
 
Keppel, as commander-in-chief of the China Station, thus played an important diplomatic role 
in drafting policy for the international prohibition regime against piracy in China. The foreign 
ministers at Beijing made no amendments to Keppel’s proposals. In response, Prince Gong 
agreed to issue orders to ‘the High Officers of the two Maritime Provinces to devise means for 
giving effect to a Law for the disarmament and registration of all native vessels’.162 Prince Gong 
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further identified the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi as ‘the person entrusted with 
the disposal of the Revenue of those important Provinces, and having the chief power and 
influence for carrying out any measures for the suppression of Piracy in the South of China’.163 
Though Chinese piracy had by this time assumed international implications, Beijing still 
considered that the authorities at Canton could resolve the matter. 
Keppel accordingly met Ruilin at Canton to discuss the matter on 27 February 1868. Ruilin 
was not ‘in favor of a general disarmament, considering that trading vessels which sail with 
cargoes representing a large amount of capital should not be deprived of the means of defence’ 
but decided not to ‘extend this rule to fishing boats, which have no valuable cargo to defend’. 
Ruilin, compromising with Keppel’s proposals for disarmament decided to draft a proclamation 
‘prohibiting fishing junks from carrying guns, small arms, explosive material, or gunpowder’.164 
The governor-general nonetheless continued to resist adopting the system of registration in force 
at Hong Kong, insisting that existing systems were sufficient so that any junk ‘could readily 
prove her occupation’. In response, Keppel suggested that it would ‘surely be practicable to 
supply the Commanders of the Foreign Vessels (who are engaged to cooperate in the suppression 
of piracy) with a translation from the Chinese Shipping List’.165 The Royal Navy was willing to 
enforce Qing law in Chinese waters. The Hong Kong prohibition regime against piracy also 
reacted to policies adopted at Canton. Ordinance No. 2 of 1868 introduced the policy of 
disarmament to Hong Kong. In light of Ruilin’s compromises with Keppel’s suggestions, 
however, MacDonnell was careful to ensure that the Hong Kong executive’s ‘power of framing 
orders for the partial or total disarmament of all fishing and trading Chinese Junks’ would be 
exercised in a way to ‘keep pace with the exertions now being made by the Chinese Authorities 
to put down Piracy’. The ordinance, MacDonnell pointed out, was ‘based on a policy entirely 
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exceptional and experimental’.166 Ruilin’s efforts at disarming Chinese junks at Canton would 
determine the policy adopted at Hong Kong. 
In May 1868, Ruilin issued a ‘stringent prohibition against the carrying of cannon and arms 
by fishing boats for the purpose of cutting off a source of piracy’. In a concession to MacDonnell, 
the proclamation also banned all Chinese craft from carrying stinkpots.167 MacDonnell observed 
that stinkpots ‘appear almost invariably to be used as weapons of offence and not defence’.168 
Noting that ‘the use of what are known as Stink Pots is even more effective for piratical purposes 
than that of Ordnance’, MacDonnell adamantly advocated for their general ban. 169  In 
implementing a system of disarmament at Canton, Ruilin conceded to this demand. Ruilin’s 
proclamation authorised the Royal Navy to help implement the prohibition, which would go 
into effect 19 July 1868, after which time ‘any fishing boat’ found ‘with arms or ammunition on 
board, or any trading vessel carrying stinkpots’ would be seized, ‘confiscated without fail, and 
the penalties of the law shall be inflicted upon their owners’.170 Robertson considered Ruilin’s 
proclamation ‘proof of the earnest desire of the Chinese authorities to assist in the suppression 
of piracy on the Coast of China’.171 
 
‘The Experiment Has Failed’ 
Guangdong’s hydrarchy did not respond positively to Ruilin’s proclamation. A group of junk 
owners from Xiangshan and other districts complained that the ‘various fishing vessels’ in 
Guangdong were ‘numerous and diverse. When they go to sea to fish, some also trade and are 
inspected by officials. The distinction between fishermen and merchants is not definite’ and a 
disarmament of fishing vessels would ‘certainly put them in danger’. Ruilin, ‘noting the general 
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situation’, concluded that there were ‘obstacles’ to enforcing the prohibition.172 Instead, he 
decided to resurrect the system of aojia, or anchorage groups, in which every ten vessels were 
grouped together under an anchorage head and every ten anchorage groups put under a port 
chief. With anchorage heads and port chiefs as well as Qing port authorities regulating junks, 
Ruilin believed that ‘boatmen will not dare become pirates; those who commit piracy will 
without difficulty be captured’.173  As mentioned in the Introduction, the aojia system had 
existed since the early eighteenth century and was based on the baojia system of mutual 
surveillance and household registration on land.174 The system was in abeyance by 1868, but 
the British attempts to implement a prohibition regime against piracy gave Qing officials in 
Guangdong an opportunity to renew it. Rather than implement policies suggested by 
MacDonnell and Keppel, Ruilin decided to rehabilitate a traditional Qing system of maritime 
control. 
Ruilin’s reversion to the aojia system instead of implementing disarmament forced 
MacDonnell at Hong Kong to cancel ‘an Order in Council enforcing disarmament of Fishing 
Vessels here with a view of keeping abreast of similar action taken by the Vice Roy’. The 
disarmament policy at Hong Kong would only be effective if ‘such an attempt was part of a 
system undertaken in unison with neighbouring powers, so as to secure traders visiting Hong 
Kong against any greater inconvenience than they would be exposed to elsewhere’. 175  In 
response, Macau Governor António Sérgio de Sousa retracted a ‘portaria’ (ordinance) regarding 
the disarmament of fishing vessels, though its proclamations regarding registration would remain 
in force.176 The prohibition regimes against piracy at Hong Kong and Canton also affected 
policy at Macau. 
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With the retraction of the disarmament proclamation at Canton, Robertson proclaimed that 
‘the experiment has failed’.177 The failure of the experiment of disarmament led Alcock to bring 
the matter to the attention of the Zongli Yamen and ‘confer with Sir Henry Keppel as to the 
ulterior steps it may be desirable to take in regard to Piracy’.178 In the meantime, Ruilin pressed 
ahead with his resurrection of the aojia system, issuing new registration papers and ordering that 
all junks ‘who have not already taken out registers must hasten to apply for the same; and those 
who have already received a document of the kind must exchange it for the new register without 
delay’, imposing 7 August 1869 as the deadline for completing the new registers.179 The registers 
recorded the name, native place, age, general appearance, family members, and the anchorage 
and group heads of each vessel’s owner. They also recorded the name, age, and general 
appearance of crewmembers as well as the cannon, small arms, and other weapons that the ship 
had permission to carry. In a concession to MacDonnell’s proposals, instructions on the register 
forbade vessels of any class from carrying huoyaobao – stinkpots.180 
 
Though Ruilin refrained from adopting the system of registration introduced at Hong Kong and 
failed to carry out the disarmament of fishing junks, he nonetheless decided to implement 
MacDonnell’s proposed ban on stinkpots. Moreover, he agreed to forward blank copies of the 
junk registers to Keppel to allow the Royal Navy to participate in helping to enforce the 
revamped system of aojia for control of Chinese craft.181 The Queen’s ships had the authority to 
copy the register of any Chinese vessel suspected of piracy and forward it to Canton.182 In this 
reincarnation of the aojia system, anchorage group leaders, Qing officials, and the Royal Navy 
could exert powers of surveillance over potential Chinese pirates. The Qing prohibition regime 
against piracy in Guangdong differed from Hong Kong’s, but they mutually influenced each 
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other. They also shared a reliance on the Royal Navy, which continued to play an important 
role in suppressing piracy. MacDonnell’s policies against piracy at Hong Kong may not have 
been replicated elsewhere, but the prohibition regimes it influenced improved British and Qing 
control over Chinese pirates. Along with other measures such as joint expeditions and the 
establishment of a steam squadron at Guangdong, the linked prohibition regimes at Hong Kong 
and Canton reduced the prevalence of piracy on the South China coast. 183  Though 
MacDonnell’s policies at Hong Kong did not materialise elsewhere in China, the policies and 
prohibition regimes it inspired nonetheless achieved partial ultimate success in suppressing 
piracy in China by 1869. Piracy nonetheless persisted, and Britain and China continued to 
cooperate and devise new plans for its suppression.
 
183 Despite the failure of the policy of disarmament, the Admiralty expressed satisfaction that by the end 
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‘Much Remains to Be Done’:  
The Persistence of Piracy and New Developments, 1869-1899 
 
The various measures adopted by Qing and British authorities and forces against pirates 
discussed in the previous chapter had a significant impact on the reduction of piracy in 
Guangdong. While most scholarship on Anglo-Qing interaction in suppressing piracy ends in 
1869, piratical activity nonetheless continued. Many of the measures, such as the resurrection 
of the aojia system of registration and the prohibition of stinkpots, were at best only partially 
successful, and piratical craft continued to prowl the waters of Guangdong and Hong Kong. The 
persistence of piracy revealed some of the problems of coordinating separate prohibition regimes 
in Hong Kong and Canton against pirates and necessitated new schemes by British and Qing 
officials for enforcing an effective collaborative imperial hydrarchy. Other naval powers in 
China, particularly Germany, became increasingly involved in the international suppression of 
piracy and indeed took the initiative in organising such efforts in the 1870s. This chapter looks 
at new developments in piracy and its suppression in China after 1869 as well as its decreasing 
importance to British and Qing interests. 
More efficient anti-piracy measures and technological change forced Chinese pirates to 
adapt and develop new methods of piracy as steam power began to transform shipping in China. 
A new modus operandi that saw pirates disguised as passengers take over steamships from within 
began to replace the more traditional method of overhauling, boarding, and plundering. The 
superior speed and firepower of the gunboats of the Royal Navy and the Guangdong steam 
squadron were of limited use against this new form of piracy. Cooperation between police 
authorities in Hong Kong and Guangdong began to play a larger role in dealing with piracies of 
this sort. By the mid-1870s, reports of piracy largely disappeared from the Admiralty’s China 
Station Records, even as they pervaded the papers of magistrates and legal officials in Hong 




As piracy diminished as a threat to British interests in China and became a problem managed 
by law enforcement officers in Hong Kong and Guangdong, the Royal Navy turned its attention 
to other matters. In the 1880s, the principal threat to British interests came not from pirates but 
from an increasingly restless Chinese populace. British naval priorities thus shifted from the 
protection of trade against piracy to the defence of the foreign communities at the treaty ports 
against popular uprisings. Unable to guarantee the safety of their subjects against uprisings in the 
most populous empire in the world, British admirals organised cooperation between various 
naval forces in China for the protection of the treaty ports. Though they continued to shoulder 
a disproportionate share of the burden of defending foreign interests in China, the commanders-
in-chief of the China Station also turned their attention elsewhere, particularly to the defence 
of Hong Kong, as other countries began challenging Britain’s primacy in the region. 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, discussions about the defence of Hong Kong 
focused on its role as a depot for coal and munitions in the event of a war between Britain and 
another Western power and the threat of a land invasion to Kowloon. Piracy did not feature in 
these discussions. Whereas the colonisation in Kowloon was an exercise in the imperialism of 
free seas, the expansion of the colony of Hong Kong into the New Territories and surrounding 
islands in 1898 was principally a matter of defence. Piracy did not feature prominently in British 
naval, diplomatic, or colonial thinking, but the Qing retention of the Kowloon Walled City and 
access to the waters of New Territories allowed for the system of collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy, developing since 1842, to continue. An uprising by villagers in the New Territories 
in 1899, however, raised doubts about the retention of Qing officials in the region and, as a 
testament to the declining frequency and impact of piracy, British officials decided to evict the 
remaining Qing forces in the Kowloon Walled City, bringing an end to more than half a century 
of cooperation between the two sides of Victoria Harbour 
 
1869: An Annus Mirabilis? 
By 1869, in executing treaty law, British colonial, consular, and naval officers in China 




Guangdong authorities had acquired a squadron of seven steam vessels with which they could 
enforce a prohibition regime against piracy that arose in response to measures taken at Hong 
Kong. The creation of the Imperial Maritime Customs, which acquired its own steam vessels 
that could be used for suppressing piracy, tied an important source of Qing revenue to maritime 
trade and its protection and increased the significance of the problem of piracy in the Beijing 
official mind.1 Though not as Governor Richard Graves MacDonnell had planned, the different 
prohibition regimes and collaborative imperial hydrarchy nonetheless achieved a degree of 
success in reducing piratical activity in Guangdong. Much scholarship on Anglo-Qing 
interaction against pirates ends with 1869. In these accounts, increasingly competent and 
independent Qing provincial and customs steamers, which allowed the Royal Navy to impose 
stricter limits on its actions in China, seem to have successfully suppressed piracy in South China 
and beyond.2 
The effects of the cooperation and policies adopted by British and Qing authorities for 
suppressing Chinese piracy, however, were gradual, and pirates remained active after 1869.3 
Moreover, British hastiness in punishing Oudingxiang at the beginning of the year showed that 
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joint expeditions could be problematic, while the failure to enforce the disarmament of fishing 
vessels revealed the limits of the prohibition regimes at Canton and Hong Kong. Nor did efforts 
to revive the aojia system at Canton and the outlawing of stinkpots have immediate results. Even 
after the new system came into effect, the British consul reported to Thomas Francis Wade, 
Rutherford Alcock’s successor as British minister to Beijing, that ‘much remains to be done to 
ensure safety and security to life and property on the coast’.4 Henry Thomsett, the harbour 
master at Hong Kong, reported that more vessels were found carrying stinkpots in Hong Kong 
waters in the final quarter of 1869 than during the same period in 1868.5 The following year, 
Major-General H.W. Whitfield, the lieutenant-governor, observed that ‘the vessels arriving 
from Canton and the Vice Roy’s Provinces generally are as usual furnished with Stink pots’ and 
concluded that Hong Kong authorities could not place ‘the least reliance’ on Canton’s ‘paper 
Proclamations’ against the carriage of these contraband weapons.6 The paper proclamations 
continued to lack effect as two hundred and twenty-one more vessels were found carrying 
stinkpots in Hong Kong waters in the first three months of 1870 compared with 1869, leading 
the harbour master to conclude that the ‘Chinese Government either cannot or will not compel 
this prohibition at their ports’. The discrepancy between policies at Hong Kong and in 
Guangdong waters, Thomsett feared, would be detrimental to the junk trade with Hong Kong, 
and he blamed a lack of ‘honesty’ on the part of the Qing and Portuguese authorities for the 
failure to enforce the ban on stinkpots.7 
Canton Consul Robertson raised the issue with the governor-general of Guangdong and 
Guangxi, Ruilin, who responded that ‘Stink pots [sic] prohibitions have been repeatedly issued 
and the regulations with regard thereto have been made most clear’. Given the reinvigorated 
aojia system and the layers of surveillance and accountability it created, Ruilin found it 
‘inexplicable how vessels from Canton and other ports on entering Hong Kong are found to 
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carry stink pots’ and blamed local officials for failure to enforce the prohibition. He agreed to 
make efforts to punish any officials found lax in enforcing the ban on stinkpots while also issuing 
new orders to leaders in the aojia system to adhere to the regulations. At the same time, he 
would order the ‘various Naval authorities’ to ‘institute a search of junks on every possible 
occasion’ seizing and delivering for punishment any junks ‘found without an Official Register, 
or carrying Stink pots’.8 Whitfield continued to doubt the ability of Qing officials to prohibit 
stinkpots and ultimately decided that as ‘the number of vessels arriving from Canton and other 
ports with Stink pots on board had greatly increased’ and ‘stringent measures of suppression’ 
against the practice of carrying them were ‘difficult to carry out and may lead to 
embarrassments’, he would ‘take no further steps’ in attempting to enforce a ban on stinkpots.9 
Whitehall ultimately reprimanded Hong Kong officials for allowing the restriction on stinkpots 
to lapse and insisted it remain in force.10 Colonial officials’ complaints about enforcing the 
stinkpot ban, however, reveal the inefficacy of Canton’s attempts to enforce the resurrected 
aojia system and how it continued to influence developments at Hong Kong. 
As late as 1872, the carriage of stinkpots remained a problem. MacDonnell complained that 
‘little care is taken by the Chinese Authorities in seeing their own Regulations observed as to 
the carriage of Stinkpots on board of trading vessels’, which was ‘a matter of some consequence, 
as the Admiralty Instructions constitute the presence of Stink pots strong primâ facie evidence 
of intended Piracy’.11 Intended piracy continued to materialise as piratical acts. In 1872, H.E. 
Wodehouse, a colonial official who worked with the Hong Kong Police and Fire Brigade, 
believed that the ‘majority of piracies that have been committed in the last two years appears to 
have been planned and executed by an Association at the head of which were eight men, who 
are popularly known as the Band of Brothers’.12 The Band of Brothers reportedly commanded 
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seven junks crewed by about one hundred and thirty pirates responsible for forty-nine of the 
sixty-six piratical attacks recorded in police reports from the beginning of 1870 to the first 
quarter of 1872.13 Though incomparable in size and capacity to the pirate fleets of the likes of 
Shap-ng-tsai in the middle of the century or the ladrones before him, the activities of the Band 
of Brothers give credence to the complaint of colonial officials that piracy was resurgent in the 
neighbourhood of Hong Kong, despite reports to the contrary from Canton.14  Wodehouse 
believed that the lack of action by Qing and British gunboats enabled pirates such as the Band 
of Brothers to ‘become increasingly bold’.15 Indeed, Vice-Admiral Henry Kellett had sought to 
limit the actions of the Royal Navy after Qing attempts to resurrect the aojia system and issued 
a memorandum in 1871 with new orders necessitating Qing approval and involvement in any 
action against pirates in Chinese waters or territory. The Queen’s ships were to confine their 
anti-piracy activities to the high seas, while the Guangdong steam squadron would deal with 
piracy on the coast and rivers of China.16 Meanwhile, Commodore F.H. Shortt, the senior naval 
officer at Hong Kong, complained that the Qing steam squadron was more often deployed to 
collect customs and suppress smuggling than attack pirates. 17  The activity of the Band of 
Brothers and the failure to prevent the carriage of stinkpots showed that the arrangements of the 
late-1860s were not entirely successful in dealing with piracy in South China. Pirates remained 
active after 1869. Further measures would be necessary for suppressing their activities. 
 
New Schemes against Piracy 
Complaining that piracy was becoming more frequent as a result of limited actions by the Qing 
authorities and the Royal Navy and that ‘although murder had been seldom resorted to by the 
Chinese formerly, it was now becoming the rule instead of the exception’ for Chinese pirates, 
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MacDonnell decided to act using the means at his disposal as governor of Hong Kong. 
Recognizing that he ‘had no authority whatever to take any action outside the 3 mile line 
beyond the British soil here’, MacDonnell nonetheless decided to send out vessels, ‘apparently 
ordinary fishing boats’ and manned by ‘well-armed Volunteers from the Police Force’ given 
leave, against the pirates. An ‘Inspector of Police, a Mr. Batten’ would command the off-duty 
police officers who would also be accompanied by ‘a mandarin of Kowloon’.18 On 31 January 
1872, Batten and the Kowloon officer captured two junks with two of the leaders of the Band 
of Brothers onboard off Yau Ma Tei (Youmadi) in British Kowloon.19  The success of the 
strategy of luring pirates out to attack ordinary-looking Chinese craft manned with police from 
Hong Kong led to a repeat operation on 6 March, resulting in the capture of ‘Le Malla’, a ‘half-
Portuguese and half-Chinese’ leader of the Band of Brothers near Macau.20 
At Canton, Robertson complained that the Hong Kong Police had exceeded the colony’s 
jurisdiction and that the commander of the expedition to Macau ‘might, perhaps, be defined as 
a pirate himself’.21 A Colonial Office official also considered the actions of the Hong Kong Police 
‘questionable’, even though the officers were on leave and accompanied by an officer from 
Kowloon.22 Another official decided that MacDonnell’s ‘stratagem’ of adopting the system of 
cooperation developed between the Kowloon authorities and the Royal Navy and applying it 
to policemen given leave and put onboard chartered Chinese vessels ‘cannot be approved’.23 
MacDonnell himself admitted that giving ‘members of the Police Force leave of absence so that 
they might take part in expeditions really countenanced by this Government and projected by 
this Government would be a transparent farce and improper subterfuge, if meant as a permanent 
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policy’, but the temporary measure had served its purpose to prove the persistence of piracy in 
the waters around Hong Kong.24 
Despite the continued existence of piracy as evidenced by MacDonnell’s stratagem, 
Kellett’s successor as commander-in-chief of the China Station, Vice-Admiral Charles 
Shadwell, insisted that ‘in the main the Chinese Government should undertake the suppression 
of piracy on their own coast’, though he considered that a system ‘more prompt and vigorous 
than reference to the Viceroy through Her Majesty’s Consul’ was necessary for efficient 
cooperative efforts. He suggested that ‘local action with the assent of the Chinese Government 
through a superior mandarin at Kowloon might I dare say be got to work well’. 25  British 
authorities continued to see Kowloon as having a key role in collaborative imperial hydrarchy. 
When Robertson addressed the Canton authorities on the matter of piracy, Ruilin confessed 
that ‘the duties of the Chinese Gunboats are very numerous’ and that he could not spare one to 
be always ready to cooperate with any Royal Navy expedition sent against pirates from Hong 
Kong. He instead proposed sending ‘two officials in a guard boat to remain in Hong Kong, who 
on the occurrence of a case of piracy would accompany any vessel the Hong Kong Naval 
Authorities might choose to send off’.26 Commodore Shortt rejected the idea since ‘a Chinese 
Official can be procured at Kowloong, if necessary,’ and stationing Qing officials in Victoria 
Harbour to accompany British expeditions against pirates would ‘shift the onus of suppressing 
Piracy in Chinese Waters from the Chinese Authorities to the British’. Shortt believed that this 
shift violated the Treaty of Tientsin and was thus ‘evidently to be avoided’.27 Colonial officials 
in Hong Kong agreed, believing that ‘piracies are almost invariably committed in Chinese 
waters, and the presence of a Guard Boat with two Officers in the Harbour of Hong Kong would 
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therefore be of little use’. 28  Governor Arthur Kennedy, who succeeded MacDonnell, also 
refused Ruilin’s offer as ‘at present should a Chinese Officer be required for the purpose 
indicated, there is no difficulty obtaining one, according to a recognized arrangement from the 
city of Kowloong’.29 The arrangement that Kowloon authorities would accompany Royal Navy 
vessels on expeditions against pirates proved robust enough to allow colonial officials and naval 
officers to reject a Qing proposal to station a guard boat in Victoria Harbour to facilitate 
cooperation against piracy. 
Though Kennedy rejected further Qing assistance in dealing with pirates, he sought 
additional support from the Royal Navy. By August 1872, he admitted that piracy seemed 
largely suppressed but worried that ‘unless precautionary measures are adopted, the 
neighbouring waters of the Colony are likely to become again infested with the Boats of robbers 
and pirates even now probably on the look-out for opportunities to revive their predatory habits’. 
He thus requested that ‘one or other of Her Majesty’s Gunboats’ be sent ‘to cruize round the 
Island’ to deter or act against pirates. For such a service, Kennedy was willing ‘to authorize the 
disbursement from the Colonial Treasury of such sums as may be required to recoup the Naval 
Establishment for the coals expended’. In addition to deterring pirates, Kennedy believed a 
British gunboat showing the flag in the waters around Hong Kong would ‘have a good effect in 
preventing the numerous Chinese Revenue Cruizers of the Provincial Authorities from 
continuing to commit breaches of law by harassing the native vessels of the Colony, while 
carrying out their lawful occupations within the jurisdiction of this Government’. 30  An 
extension of Qing maritime authority into Hong Kong waters was becoming an important 
problem for the colony, and the governor hoped the Royal Navy would deter the activities of 
Qing customs agents as well as those of Chinese pirates. 
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Whereas Kennedy subscribed to the opinion that ‘prevention is better than cure’, he 
complained that Shortt considered it ‘expedient to let well alone’.31 Shortt believed that ‘the 
rare occurrences of Acts of Piracy is attributable to the more faithful performance of the Treaty 
Obligations by the Chinese Authorities’ and, citing ‘the very small force at my disposal’, was 
reluctant to spare a gunboat to execute Kennedy’s request.32 The Admiralty agreed with the 
naval officer, admitting that ‘the almost complete suppression of Piracy has been effected by the 
efforts of the Chinese themselves’. As Qing authorities were carrying out their responsibilities 
in the Treaty of Tientsin, the sea lords believed that ‘any interference on the part of Her 
Majesty’s Government might convey a covert reproach for non-fulfilment of a contract, which 
in reality had been faithfully observed’. 33  The Royal Navy would henceforward take less 
initiative against piracy in China as Qing imperial hydrarchy proved sufficient to deal with the 
matter without British cooperation or intervention. 
Indeed, the next major naval initiative to deal with Chinese pirates came not from Britain, 
but another rising European power, the newly united empire of Germany. As early as 1870, 
Prussia had made overtures to the United States and Britain for a closer cooperation between 
their navies against piracy in China.34 Whitehall agreed to accept ‘the proposal for cooperation’ 
but decided that ‘the manner of combined action remains (as proposed by Count Bernstorff 
[Prussian Envoy to Britain]) to be determined either by the two Govts. or by their respective 
Admirals’.35 Such discussions for an international cooperation against piracy in China were cut 
short by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the ‘Tianjin massacre’ of 
twenty-one Europeans at the French consulate and Catholic mission in that city on 21 June 
1870, which dampened the mood for cooperation among Europeans and between Europe and 
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China.36 The wreck and plunder of the German schooner Anna near Fuzhou in 1875, however, 
revived German calls for international action. ‘The recent repeated piratical attacks not only on 
German Ships’ but ‘the English ships “Spark” and “Canton”’, in the opinion of Georg Herbert 
zu Münster, German ambassador to Britain, warranted ‘joint remonstrances at Peking so that 
the Chinese Govt. may again be made to understand the perfect accord of the Treaty Powers 
in regard to the safety of their subjects and their shipping interests’.37 While making diplomatic 
overtures, the Germans also sent SMS Tenise and Vinosa to Hong Kong to supplement ‘a 
squadron adapted to coöperate effectually with HM The Queen’s Ships in case of necessity’.38 
To facilitate this cooperation, the Admiralty forwarded Kellett’s 1871 memorandum on the 
limits of Royal Navy action against piracy, which was still then in force, as well as the China 
Station’s standing orders on the matter to its German counterpart.39 
Berlin tried to adjust naval orders regarding piracy according to those followed by ships of 
the Royal Navy’s China Station. The Admiralty approved of the measure and further 
recommended that: 
the subject of captures of Pirates on shore or afloat within Chinese jurisdiction & of the 
Authorities to whom in such cases the Vessels seized & their crews should be delivered, 
should be considered on the present occasion in communication with the German and 
Chinese Governments, with a view to placing the whole matter on a more satisfactory 
footing, and rendering the instructions to British and German cruizers as uniform as 
circumstances permit.40 
 
Using rhetoric similar to that of treaty revision, the Admiralty saw Germany’s agitations in the 
wake of the Anna affair as an opportunity to change the orders limiting the actions of the Royal 
Navy in China. After discussions and adjustments, one significant difference between German 
and British naval instructions remained: German naval officers were permitted to land forces in 
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pursuit of pirates whereas British naval officers were forbidden to do so. 41  In a manner 
reminiscent to invoking the most-favoured nation clause, British authorities capitalised on 
Berlin’s permission for German warships to land forces in pursuit of pirates in order to revise the 
Royal Navy’s orders. Whitehall decided that ‘HM Govt would be glad to assimilate their 
instructions upon this point to those of the German Govt as it is manifest that if piracy is to be 
effectually subdued, pirates should be pursued and captured wherever they may take refuge’ on 
the condition that such designs ‘obtained the assent of the Chinese Govt’.42 The Royal Navy 
remained keen to take actions against pirates and indeed to reduce restrictions on such actions, 
but, by 1878 it did so not on its own initiative but that of Germany. Whereas Vice-Admiral 
Keppel had been at the forefront of rallying international naval opinion in disarming and 
registering junks in the late 1860s as measures to prevent piracy, German naval officers took the 
leading role in coordinating international cooperation against Chinese piracy in the 1870s. 
 
New Piratical Schemes 
German officials were not the only ones taking new initiatives in the China Seas after 1869. 
Chinese pirates also changed their modus operandi. The partial success of the measures adopted 
in the late 1860s, bolstered by the use of steam power on both sides, significantly increased the 
risk to those engaged in traditional modes of piracy. As not only pirate hunting but shipping in 
general transitioned to steam power, the act of successfully overhauling vessels and plundering 
them without being caught by faster, more powerfully armed ships, became increasingly 
difficult. 43  While piracy with stinkpots and swashbuckling continued, particularly against 
Chinese sailing vessels, the perpetrators had to develop different tactics against steamships, 
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which presented new challenges to Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy. One of the 
earliest examples of Chinese pirates successfully attacking a steamship was the piracy of the 
Spark in August 1874. 
The Spark, an American steamer built in 1849, was one of the oldest steamships in the 
Canton River.44 In its heyday, the vessel helped carry American sailors on expeditions with the 
British against pirates.45 The Hong Kong, Canton, and Macao Steamboat Company purchased 
the Spark in 1870, converting the one-time pirate hunter into a passenger ferry between those 
cities. On 22 August 1874, as the Spark passed the Bogue forts en route to Macau from Canton, 
a group of passengers attacked the ship’s crew, killing the American captain, George Brady. The 
pirates also wounded ‘Mr. Mundy a tea-taster in Messrs. Deacon and Coy’s employ’, who was 
the only British subject onboard, as well as many of the crew of Europeans and ‘Manilamen’, 
some of whom jumped overboard. The pirates were in control of the Spark for five hours, 
robbing its passengers before leaving ‘with their booty in a junk that was waiting for them’.46 
The passengers robbed included wealthy Chinese businessmen from Macau and the family of a 
Qing official from Xiangshan. The pirates, numbering about twenty, killed several of the 
passengers who resisted. 47  The plunder of the Spark by pirates disguised as passengers 
represented a new type of piracy and showed how Chinese pirates were adapting to the new 
reality of steam shipping in China.48 Dealing with this novel mode of piracy would require a 
different form of cooperation between Britain and China. 
Upon receiving news of the piracy of the Spark, Governor Januário Correira de Almeida of 
Macau sent the gunboat Camões to the site of the piracy. A Qing gunboat, upon arriving in 
Macau, followed the Camões in search for pirates.49 From Hong Kong, HMS Esk set out for 
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Canton and Macau and to search the area around the Bogue forts.50 With Qing, Portuguese, 
and British naval forces ‘promptly dispatched’ to search for the pirates and ‘large rewards’ 
offered for information, Kennedy commented that the ‘Chinese, Portuguese, and British 
Governments are equally interested in bringing the culprits to Justice’.51 Unlike in previous cases 
of piracy, however, gunboats could not simply overwhelm the pirates with superior speed and 
firepower. The pirates in this instance took over an American-built and -captained British 
steamship from within and then escaped to shore. British and Qing officials would have to make 
concerted efforts to seek out the pirates and bring them to justice. In such efforts, naval forces 
could help transport police and other personnel, but could not alone defeat the pirates. 
In September 1874, one of the pirates of the Spark was captured in Hong Kong and 
committed for trial before the colony’s Supreme Court. By that time, Qing officials had captured 
six alleged pirates involved in the affair. 52  The pirate captured in Hong Kong was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to be hanged.53 Later that year, with the assistance of Qing officials 
who helped secure witnesses, police in Hong Kong captured ‘Chun-A-Yuk’ and ‘Kwok-A-Tsoi’, 
who allegedly participated in the piracy of the Spark. Citing various colonial and imperial laws, 
colonial authorities decided to refuse a Qing request for the suspects’ extradition, concluding 
that Chun and Kwok were under the concurrent jurisdiction of Qing law as criminals in Chinese 
waters and Admiralty law at Hong Kong as pirates of a British vessel.54 Negotiations about 
jurisdiction over piracy continued to be a means of exposing Qing officials to international and 
maritime law. 
According to the Kwok-a-sing case of 1873, cited in much of the discussion over the Spark 
pirates, Hong Kong’s courts, through universal jurisdiction over piracy in international law, 
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could pass judgement even in a case involving two foreign parties.55 The Hong Kong attorney 
general decided that in the case of the Spark piracy, even though it took place in Chinese waters, 
British authorities had Admiralty jurisdiction as the Spark was a British ship. Colonial officials 
decided to commit Chun and Kwok to trial before the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, but Acting 
Governor-General Zhang Zhaodong refused to send witnesses, and Chun and Kwok were 
ultimately discharged without trial.56 According to Robertson, Zhang claimed that he could not 
ensure the witnesses he sent to Chun and Kwok’s trial before a colonial magistrate in Hong 
Kong would go there again. Zhang’s unwillingness to cooperate may have stemmed from the 
fact that he remained firm in ‘his opinion that the present is a case for rendition under the 
Provisions of the Treaty’ of Tientsin.57 Though it got off to an inauspicious start, cooperation 
between Qing and British justice systems rather than naval forces would be a better means of 
dealing with the new modus operandi developed by the Spark pirates.58 
While some Chinese pirates developed new methods for plundering steamships, others 
continued to engage in more traditional modes of piracy in Guangdong in defiance of prohibition 
regimes and gunboats. In 1881, for example, Dapeng Colonel Lai Zhenbian forwarded a report 
from the owner of the Hing Lung (Xinglong), a ‘Pa Lung’ junk, stating that the vessel had been 
attacked by ‘a piratical craft of the ha kau clipper built style’ near ‘Leung Shun Wan 
[Liangchuanwan, High Island]’. On inquiry, Lai found that the police in Hong Kong had 
captured three of the pirates and requested their rendition to Kowloon. He noted that ‘the crime 
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committed by these pirates is one of extreme wickedness and cannot conveniently be dealt with 
leniently’.59 Despite a significant decline after 1869, piracy, even of the traditional variety, 
remained problematic in the waters of Hong Kong. 60 
Piracy persisted elsewhere in Guangdong as well. In June 1886, George Brown, the acting 
British Consul at Haikou on Hainan Island, reported that ‘a native built boat’ belonging to 
‘Messrs. O’Toole & Co, a British firm of this port’ was captured by ‘three pirate junks, who cut 
the hawser and sailed for the mainland with the boat’. In addition to reporting the incident to 
the local Qing authorities and Guangdong and Guangxi Governor-General Zhang Zhidong, he 
decided to notify Commodore George Digby Morant, the senior naval officer at Hong Kong, of 
‘the widespread prevalence of piracy on the coasts of the Kwangtung province’.61 Indeed, piracy 
had become so problematic in Guangdong that Zhang requested the right to perform ‘summary 
execution of criminals, in view of the daily increasing prevalence of crimes of violence in the Canton 
Province’. 62  As discussed in the introduction, executions in Qing China usually required 
approval from the emperor. In times of crisis, such as that caused by the ladrones at the beginning 
of the century, provincial officials could request the authority to carry out expedited executions 
under a banner of royal mandate.63 Zhang’s request gives credence to Brown’s observation on 
the increased prevalence of piracy in Guangdong. When Commodore Morant reported this to 
Vice-Admiral Richard Vesey Hamilton, however, the commander-in-chief of the China Station 
commented that ‘nothing has been heard by the Naval Authorities of this widespread prevalence 
of piracy’.64 By this time, it seems, the Royal Navy had distanced itself from the Anglo-Qing 
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collaborative imperial hydrarchy over Chinese pirates. Brown’s reference to ‘the numerous 
complaints of Piracies committed on junks bound to or from the Colony of Hongkong, which 
are constantly being submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy at Canton, on informations [sic] 
laid before the Captain Superintendent of Police’ shows that Hong Kong’s police and colonial 
officials, rather than the Royal Navy were taking the initiative in cooperating with Qing agents 
in suppressing piracy.65 Though traditional Chinese piracy persisted, by the late-nineteenth 
century, it was no longer a pressing concern of the Royal Navy. 
The next significant case of piracy to appear in the Royal Navy’s China Station records is 
that of the Namoa, a steamship belonging to the Hong Kong merchant Douglas Lapraik, which 
followed the model developed by the pirates of the Spark. On 10 December 1890, while the 
Namoa was sailing from Hong Kong to Swatow, a group of pirates armed with revolvers and 
‘stink bags’ who had boarded disguised as passengers, rose up and took over the ship about 45 
miles north of Hong Kong. Three people were killed and six wounded in the attack. In response, 
Commodore Edmund J. Church, senior naval officer at Hong Kong, proposed to send HMS 
Linnet to search for pirates. 66  On the suggestion of colonial officials at Hong Kong, ‘Mr. 
McLeavy Brown the Commissioner of Customs for the Kowloon District’ offered to send 
‘Captain Steward [sic? Name given as ‘Stewart’ elsewhere] of the Chinese Revenue Cruiser 
“Kaipan”’ who was ‘intimately acquainted with the coast where the pirates may have landed’ 
and ‘conversant with the Chinese language’ to accompany the Linnet.67  The Linnet, with 
Captain Stewart onboard, sailed to Harlem Bay, where Commander Archibald Tisdale ordered 
Lieutenant Amherst C. Pearson to ‘land in company with Detective Sergeant McIver and 
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Ching-On, Chinese detective’ of the Hong Kong Police to meet with the local ‘Military 
Mandarin’, who promised to make inquiries into the matter. In the meantime, ‘Captain 
Stewart’s Interpreter’ and the Hong Kong detectives gathered information from villagers in the 
area, who professed ignorance of the Namoa piracy. Despite the lack of information gained, 
Tisdale nonetheless reported that Captain Stewart’s advice and assistance was ‘most useful’ and 
that ‘Detective Sergeant McIver as well as the Chinese Detective did all that was required of 
them in a very satisfactory manner’.68 
As cooperation with Kowloon Customs officials proved ineffective in this instance, the 
British consul at Canton proposed that ‘some intelligent officer and native detectives should be 
sent in a gun-boat to the scene of the attack (in the neighbourhood of Bias Bay) and stay there 
until they should have gained some information’. He believed British officials had to take the 
initiative and that ‘no active measures will be taken’ by Qing officials ‘unless it is seen that an 
active interest is being taken in the matter by this Government’.69 HMS Linnet and Firebrand 
thus set out in different directions to search for the Namoa pirates, but even with the cooperation 
of Huang Chaoqun of the Qing gunboat Guangsi and Xu Guitian, a military officer at Pinghai, 
neither achieved much success.70 Vice-Admiral Salmon reported to the Admiralty that the 
attack on the Namoa was ‘a serious case of Piracy’ and that ‘severe strictures have been passed 
upon the Naval Authorities for not at once sending vessels to look for the Pirates’. He 
nonetheless pointed out that ‘no precautionary measures within the power of the Navy could 
prevent a similar occurrence’ and that the blame for the piracy should be placed on ‘the 
Hongkong Police, who permitted an armed and organized band of about 40 men, many of 
whom must have been known to them, to embark in a vessel’ at Hong Kong.71 Against the type 
of piracy used in the Spark and Namoa cases, warships were relatively powerless. Dealing with 
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pirates of this type was more a matter for police authorities. Indeed, suspects in the piracy of the 
Namoa were arrested by the colonial police at Macau and by Qing authorities at Canton. To 
help placate British authorities, some of the pirates were executed in the Kowloon Walled City 
on 17 April and 11 May 1891. 72  Kowloon remained important to collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy in the late nineteenth century, but aside from exceptional cases of piracy such as that 




Although, as this chapter demonstrates, piracy persisted in Guangdong after 1869, it became 
less of a priority and source of concern for British authorities in China. Royal Navy involvement 
in suppressing it diminished, and the Admiralty decided to reduce the size of the China Station 
in 1869.73 By 1872, the commander-in-chief of the China Station decided that the ‘North China 
Division’ of the station, covering the ports of Shanghai, Ningbo, Zhenjiang, Jiujiang, Hankou, 
Chefoo (Yantai), Niuzhuang, and Tianjin, ‘requires the largest number of vessels’, eclipsing the 
importance of the southern division, despite the persistence of piracy in there. 74  Even the 
emergence of a new form of piracy capable of threatening foreign steamships did not seem to 
bother Britons on the China coast. The same year as the piracy of the Spark, the mercantile 
community at Hong Kong was more concerned about the ‘Blockade of Hong Kong’ by Qing 
gunboats. According to the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, the Guangdong steam 
squadron intended for suppressing piracy and policing the coast instead disrupted the junk trade 
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at Hong Kong by collecting customs dues just beyond the boundaries of Victoria Harbour.75 
Two years earlier, Governor Kennedy had requested Royal Navy assistance against pirates as 
well as Qing customs agents; by 1874 the latter appeared more menacing to the Hong Kong 
community.76 As Qing customs cruisers, unlike pirates, acted on behalf of a sovereign entity, the 
matter was better dealt with by diplomats and lawyers than gunboats.77 The menace piracy 
posed to Hong Kong and other British interests in China would be overshadowed by other 
threats as well. 
 
Popular Unrest 
Elsewhere in Guangdong, the threat to British interests came less from pirates than from the 
general Chinese populace at the treaty ports. In Swatow, multiple joint expeditions and the 
Royal Navy raid on Oudingxiang, may have deterred pirates, but the threat of popular upheaval 
remained imminent. The consul there reported that ‘it has long been a favorite project of the 
turbulent to raise the standard of revolt as their rivals the Taiping did before them’. He further 
suggested that ‘moral support, and perhaps a few shell [sic] from the gunboat, would enable the 
rising to be crushed in the bud’.78 By September 1870, the British minister at Beijing admitted 
that ‘a very considerable apprehension’ existed at many of the treaty ports. This apprehension, 
however, came not from pirates but popular uprisings by the Chinese against the foreign 
settlements. To allay such fears, Wade suggested to Vice-Admiral Kellett that he 
authorise all Commanders of Her Majesty’s Vessels lying in the Treaty ports to inform 
Her Majesty’s Consuls that, if satisfied that the quarter inhabited by British subjects is 
in danger of being attacked, they are prepared at once to land a force for its protection, 
and to act against any mob or organised body invading it, either singly, or, if Vessels of 
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War belonging to other powers be present, in concert with them, so long as they are 
engaged in purely defensive operations.79 
 
Though prohibited from landing forces in pursuit of pirates, the Royal Navy could still engage 
in such violations of Qing territorial sovereignty to protect British subjects in the treaty ports. 
By 1883, when piracy had largely fallen out of the China Station records, the Admiralty was 
recommending that the commander-in-chief draw up contingency plans ‘in the event of it being 
necessary to give protection to merchants at the various treaty ports if a Chinese rising should 
occur’.80 Anti-foreign activity was now seen as a greater threat to British trade in China, which 
the Royal Navy had the task of protecting, than piracy. 
The fear of a Chinese uprising drove the Foreign Office to instruct the British ambassadors 
in Berlin and Washington to request that German and American naval commanders in China 
devise plans for protecting the foreign communities at the treaty ports. Berlin accordingly 
ordered the German naval commander to concert with the Royal Navy’s Vice-Admiral George 
Willes on ‘measures for protection of British and German Subjects against possible outbreak of 
population’.81 By December 1883, the Foreign Office had also requested that Italy, Russia, 
Portugal, and Japan instruct their naval commanders in China to coordinate with Willes for the 
‘protection of neutral subjects’. 82  In a similar manner to how Keppel had organised the 
cooperation of his brother admirals from various countries to support the registration and 
disarmament of Chinese junks, Willes had the task of devising an international system for the 
protection of the foreign communities at the treaty ports with the naval commanders of other 
countries. Britain may have let Germany take the lead in arranging joint action between 
different naval forces against piracy, but it remained capable of taking the naval initiative for 
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more important matters, such as protecting the treaty ports against Chinese unrest. The Foreign 
Office believed that piracy in China was ‘almost extinct, if not quite so’ as early as 1877, whereas 
the riots at Shamian in Canton in September 1883, in which a Chinese mob attacked and looted 
various foreign buildings on the island, showed that Chinese agitation was a real and credible 
threat.83 The Royal Navy’s priority in China had accordingly changed to protecting British 
interests against popular upheaval rather than pirates. 
Despite arrangements for naval cooperation, commanders-in-chief of the China Station 
acknowledged that the burden of protecting British and foreign interests fell disproportionately 
on the Royal Navy. By 1886, Vice-Admiral Hamilton was complaining that ‘demands from 
Consuls out here for men of war are frequent’ and often spurious as the ‘Chinese Authorities 
have proved quite equal to dealing with their own people’. 84  He further pointed out that 
‘everyone trading in China is as a matter of fact protected by the English; the Germans have 
next to ourselves the largest trade out here; one German Gunboat now represents German 
interests in China’. He considered the plans for cooperation among the maritime powers to 
protect each other’s subjects in China a ‘one ended arrangement’, believing that the size of the 
Royal Navy in China allowed other countries to avoid ‘the necessity of keeping, or sending, a 
Naval Force out here’. To lessen British naval burdens in China, Hamilton proposed abandoning 
‘the old plan of keeping one [warship] permanently stationed at a Port, a sort of standing menace 
to the Chinese, not required under the altered state of its Government, since the suppression of 
the Taiping rebellion’. He accordingly decided not to keep a Royal Navy ship at Canton as the 
Americans had a naval vessel at Whampoa. 85  Overburdened with naval responsibilities, 
Hamilton was happy to let other countries’ naval forces protect the foreign community at 
Canton and elsewhere. 
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In October 1887, Chaloner Alabaster, now the British consul at Canton, reported 
‘considerable excitement’ by Chinese shopkeepers in response to a reclamation project by the 
Imperial Maritime Customs, which threatened to become a ‘serious disturbance’. He thus 
requested ‘the presence of a man of war’ from Commodore William H. Maxwell, senior naval 
officer at Hong Kong.86 Rather than send one of Her Majesty’s ships, Maxwell replied that the 
‘Imperial German Gun Vessel “Iltis”’ had set out from Hong Kong for Canton.87 Alabaster 
believed that the presence of SMS Iltis ‘contributed a good deal to the restoration of a feeling of 
security among foreigners and those connected with them’. He also noted, however, that 
‘although the excitement is not entirely allayed, it shews signs of abatement, the Viceroy having 
ordered a Commission to enquire into the case’ and stationed troops in the vicinity.88 Between 
friendly foreign warships and efforts by Qing authorities, the Royal Navy was relieved of some 
of its duties protecting the treaty ports from Chinese unrest. This allowed its commanders to 
focus on other concerns, such as the strategic position and defence of Hong Kong. 
 
The Defence of Hong Kong 
From the 1880s onwards, Britain’s primacy in China was challenged by a unified Germany 
seeking to make its economic and military might felt abroad, France emerging victorious in the 
Sino-French War (1884-1885), Russia, and Japan.89 The threat from the naval forces of these 
powers far outweighed that from Chinese pirates. Hong Kong played a key strategic role in 
hypothetical situations of the outbreak of war. As early as 1876, Vice-Admiral Alfred Philipps 
Ryder reported that ‘the security of our Coal Depôts from destruction by an Enemy is all 
important’ and 
owing to our having most unfortunately no Territory North of Hong Kong, our Coal 
Depôts there, viz, in China and Japan are indefensible and according to the Laws of 
Neutrality would cease to be available in any war in which we were belligerents if the 
nation on whose Territory the Coal Depôt is situated, were a Neutral.90 
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Hong Kong was important as the only British territory in East Asia from which coal and other 
munitions of war could be obtained in the event of an outbreak of war with another Western 
power. Ryder’s comment that Britain ‘unfortunately’ lacked any other territory north of Hong 
Kong hinted at a future push for British expansion in China. 
Vice-Admiral Willes, before drawing up plans for coordination with other naval forces for 
the protection of foreign communities at the treaty ports, contributed to plans for defending 
Hong Kong against those very forces. He believed that ‘the Harbor of Victoria or Hongkong 
Road, which is teeming with contraband of war, i.e. Coal stores, steamers, docks, and Building 
ships, must like the harbour at Singapore be defended at all hazards’, and he considered the 
defence of Hong Kong ‘a much more serious matter’.91 A decade later, Kowloon, where ‘there 
is & must be always a considerable and valuable depot of naval Stores notably Coal, Torpedoes 
& Torpedo boats’, also factored into strategic thinking about the defence of Hong Kong. 
Whereas Hong Kong island could be protected by ships of the Royal Navy, Kowloon was 
contiguous with the Qing Empire, and the fact that ‘the frontier is practically unguarded except 
for customs purposes’ caused Vice-Admiral Nowell Salmon to worry that it ‘might easily be 
rushed’.92 Three years later, Vice-Admiral Edmund Fremantle, lamented that ‘the possession of 
only half a Channel and the inability to erect batteries on both sides of it must materially hamper 
the defence’ of Hong Kong, and thus suggested expanding the amount of territory under British 
control on the mainland side of Victoria Harbour. He further added that ‘the possession of the 
islands of the Hong Kong Group would be of great advantage in many ways to our expanding 
commerce’.93 
Eventually, British officials in China gave in to a combination of defence needs, particularly 
for Kowloon, anxieties raised by the imperial activities of other European powers and Japan, 
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and pressure from business interests, and expanded the colony of Hong Kong. 94  They 
accomplished this through the Hong Kong Extension Convention, signed with the Qing in 1898. 
The treaty deemed that ‘an extension of Hongkong territory is necessary for the proper defence 
and protection of the Colony’. Accordingly, Qing signatories agreed to lease land and islands 
adjacent to Hong Kong and Kowloon for ninety-nine years from 1 July 1898. Notably, the lease 
stipulated that ‘within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials now stationed there shall 
continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with the military 
requirements for the defence of Hong Kong’. The Kowloon authorities would also ‘be allowed 
as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan [Xin’an]’, and ‘the existing landing place 
near Kowloon city’ would continue to be ‘reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, 
merchant and passenger vessels’. Furthermore, while the lease included ‘the waters of Mirs Bay 
and Deep Bay’, Qing warships would ‘retain the right to use those waters’.95 
Unlike the colonisation of Kowloon, the expansion of Hong Kong into what would become 
known as the New Territories was not driven by concerns about pirates. Vice-Admiral 
Fremantle’s comments in 1894 about the need to control both sides of the channels approaching 
Victoria Harbour as well as neighbouring islands, however, suggest that maritime control helped 
motivate the expansion. That the Kowloon authorities were permitted to remain in the Kowloon 
Walled City and retain connections to the magistrate at Xin’an and control of the Longjin jetty 
reveals the long shadow of Hong Kong-Kowloon cooperation in suppressing piracy, which still 
influenced British thinking about Kowloon.96 Continued Qing access to Mirs and Deep Bay, 
traditional haunts of pirates now ceded to British control, would also facilitate continued 
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cooperation against pirates. Despite insistence on control over Victoria Harbour and anxieties 
about the activities of Qing customs cruisers just beyond its boundaries, British authorities 
permitted Qing warships to visit Kowloon and the waters of the New Territories. The many 
changes and developments in Chinese piracy and British and Qing responses to it between 1869 
and 1898 do not seem to have changed thinking on the opposite sides of Victoria Harbour. From 
1842 until 1898, Hong Kong and Kowloon continuously cooperated against pirates. Piracy and 
its suppression persisted in motivating an Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy despite 
wars, rebellions, and other drastic changes in China. 
 
Kicked Out of Kowloon, 1899 
Though British and Qing authorities agreed in the Hong Kong Extension Convention that the 
Hong Kong-Kowloon connection would persist, this system of cooperation would also succumb 
to the changes on the China coast at the turn of the twentieth century. Britain did not 
immediately occupy the New Territories after signing the Convention. Instead, Colonial 
Secretary John Stewart Lockhart would inspect the region before negotiating its boundaries 
with Nanhai Magistrate Wang Cunshan. British and Qing officials came to an agreement on the 
limits of the cession in March 1899. As most of this territory covered the jurisdiction of the 
Kowloon deputy magistrate, his office relocated to Xin’an while most military personnel in the 
Kowloon Walled City transferred to the fort at Dapeng. Wang Cunshan nonetheless ordered 
that the colonel of Dapeng, Fang Yan, remain in the Kowloon Walled City. From Kowloon, 
Fang Yan helped facilitate the transfer of authority over the various islands in the cession from 
the Qing state to the colonial government of Hong Kong.97 Initially, the colonel of Dapeng, as 
he had since 1842, continued to play an important role in collaborative imperial hydrarchy. 
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Fang Yan proved less capable of exercising control over the largely autonomous clans of the 
various villages in the mainland territories of the cession. Unlike the sparse and largely transient 
populations of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon at the time of British colonisation, the villagers 
of the New Territories were organised and willing to resist British rule.98 Poor communication 
between the Hong Kong government and the various villages of the New Territories between 
the signing of the convention and Britain’s official occupation on 16 April 1899 allowed rumours 
and fearmongering to spread. Additionally, xenophobia and worries about British atrocities and 
interference in the lives and livelihoods of the villagers, galvanised them against their new rulers. 
On 14 April 1899, armed villagers mobilised by clans principally from Yuen Long, where British 
and Qing forces had launched a joint expedition against pirates in 1864, attacked the matsheds 
that British officials had erected for the flag-raising ceremony marking the official establishment 
of colonial control over the New Territories. This marked the start of a clash between villagers 
in the New Territories and British forces known as the ‘Six-Day War’ (14-19 April 1899). 
Though British authorities had initially intended for the for the flag-raising ceremony to take 
place on 17 April, they moved it forward a day to justify military retribution as suppressing 
unrest in a British territory rather than as intervening in China. The Royal Navy played a minor 
role in this short conflict. HMS Fame, Brisk, Humber, Peacock, and Hermione participated by 
firing on fortifications, ferrying troops and supplies, and landing men to help transport provisions 
and munitions to British land forces.99 
Whereas the principal Chinese threat to Hong Kong came from the pirates in the colony’s 
waters in the mid-nineteenth century, by 1899 the seagoing population of the region had largely 
submitted to the maritime control exercised between Hong Kong and Kowloon, as evidenced 
by the relative ease with which British authorities established control over the islands ceded in 
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the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong. Colonial officials were now more concerned 
about Chinese on land than at sea. Flag-raising ceremonies symbolising the transition to British 
rule occurred at Tai Po (Dabu) on the mainland portion of the New Territories and outside the 
Kowloon Walled City but not on any of the islands.100 With the hydrarchy surrounding Hong 
Kong subdued, colonial officials were apparently more concerned with proclaiming their control 
to New Territories villagers and Qing authorities than to islanders and boat-dwellers. 
British authorities in Hong Kong suspected that Qing officials in Canton and Kowloon were 
complicit in the New Territories villagers’ uprising during the Six-Day War, particularly as 
some of the insurgents had military uniforms and flags similar to those used by Qing forces. 
These turned out to be militia raised by village authorities.101 In fact, the Dapeng colonel and 
the Canton authorities initially sought to assist colonial officials in maintaining order over the 
New Territories, with Canton sending six hundred troops to reinforce the garrison of the 
Kowloon Walled City, the last enclave of Qing authority in the Hong Kong region. The Hong 
Kong authorities, suspicious of Qing motives, protested, and the garrison in the walled city was 
reduced to two hundred while Fang Yan withdrew to the Bogue forts.102 On 16 May 1899, as 
retribution for the Qing authorities’ assumed treachery in supporting insurgents, British forces 
occupied the Kowloon Walled City and evicted the remaining Qing forces there. Qing officials 
condemned this action but never sent any representatives to reoccupy the fort. China continued 
to claim jurisdiction over the fort well into the twentieth century. As no Chinese officials ever 
returned to the Kowloon Walled City, however, it became an autonomous enclave in a British 
territory where the Chinese could not, and the British would not, exercise authority. What 
British and Qing officials had intended to be an outpost of Qing authority to help control crime 
in Hong Kong instead became a political vacuum ultimately filled by the Triads.103  
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Though British and Qing officials had hoped to continue the system of collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy between Hong Kong and Kowloon which had existed since 1842, developments in 
the late nineteenth century overshadowed its importance. Piracy persisted in the late nineteenth 
century and onwards, and British and Qing authorities continued to cooperate in suppressing it, 
particularly in the West River.104  The changes discussed in this and the previous chapter, 
however, had substantially reduced the frequency of Chinese piracy and diminished the need 
for Britain and China to rely on each other and cooperate against it. China’s defeat in the first 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the subsequent Japanese colonisation of Taiwan set off a 
‘scramble’ for further concession by foreign powers in China. This context, and the need to 
defend the colony of Hong Kong, motivated the British colonisation of the New Territories 
more than any desire to suppress piracy. 105  When British officials perceived that the 
arrangements for a continued cooperation with Kowloon threatened their control of Hong Kong 
they did not hesitate to remove the remnants of Qing authority from the region. 
Piracy, which had been endemic in South China for centuries, encouraged the development 
of a unique form of cooperation between the British and Qing empires built on compromise and 
collaboration. Their joint efforts succeeded in largely suppressing piracy by the end of the 
century and was no longer vital to British and Qing interests. With the eviction of the Kowloon 
authorities, to whom British officials first began sending captured pirates, the original 
arrangements of Anglo-Qing collaborative imperial hydrarchy ceased to exist.106 An early and 
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unique form of cooperation between Britain and China in an era of British imperial 





Conflict, Compromise, and Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy 
 
In the century after the HMS Providence incident in 1800, which laid bare discrepancies 
between British and Qing understandings of piracy, British colonial authorities, diplomats, and 
naval officers in China worked with local and metropolitan Qing officials to develop a system of 
cooperation for dealing with the problem of Chinese pirates. As this thesis has shown, such 
collaboration required compromise, which redefined piracy on the China coast and provides a 
new angle from which to assess relations between the British and Qing empires. The 
development of a cooperative system was neither smooth nor inevitable but arose from local 
circumstances. Collaborative activities at times transgressed the limits of each side’s authority 
or impinged on the sovereignty of the other party requiring further interactions and negotiations. 
Nor, despite pirates being a common threat to British and Qing interests, was cooperation 
without incident or even conflict. Nonetheless, agents of the British and Qing states worked 
together to control lawless seafarers. The mutual efforts initiated by the Kowloon authorities 
and the colonial government of Hong Kong, as discussed in Chapter Two, expanded into a 
modus vivendi in which British and Qing power, authority, and jurisdiction complemented each 
other in suppressing piracy. This system, despite the friction mentioned throughout this thesis, 
reduced threat pirates posed to British and Qing interests to the point that colonial officials in 
Hong Kong were willing to remove the Kowloon authorities with whom they first began 
cooperating against pirates. Studying the tortuous development of a collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy between the Qing and British empires for controlling the waters of South China 
provides a unique perspective on the international relations and the history of the China coast 
in the nineteenth century. 
British and Qing officials’ interactions in dealing with piracy produced a unique system of 
cooperation. This thesis has argued that concerted efforts against pirates, based on contingency 




international and maritime law of the West beyond and sometimes even within the waters of 
Hong Kong reveals the limits of British power in China. As hostes humani generis in the law of 
nations, pirates, at least in the British understanding, were by definition international criminals 
justifying cooperation between different states against them. Elsewhere in Asia, particularly the 
Malay Archipelago, British officials attempted to negotiate treaties with various polities in the 
region containing clauses to police piracy. When such treaties failed to produce results, allegedly 
piratical activity became a justification for British intervention culminating in imperial 
expansion in the region.1 British interactions with the Qing government followed a different 
trajectory. The Treaty of Nanking ceded Hong Kong to Britain, and the Convention of Peking 
listed maintaining order as a justification for the cession of Kowloon, but British territorial 
sovereignty in China remained limited to the island and adjacent peninsula until the end of the 
century. The Qing Empire may have been subject to ‘unequal’ treaties and asymmetrical 
relations with imperial Britain, but it remained a separate entity over which British influence 
was limited. British authorities never exerted the kind of control in China that their counterparts 
had over the Straits Settlements or India. The limits of British power in China meant that 
indigenous affairs and agents had more influence over maritime developments.2 Qing mandarins 
thus played a greater role in negotiating the status of pirates than Malay sultans, Indian princes, 
or Arab emirs.3 Through participation, however unequal at times, with British efforts, Qing 
agents ensured they had a say in the practices and treaty stipulations for suppressing piracy, 
which had implications for the limits of British and Qing state power in China, China’s 
engagement with international law in the nineteenth century, and Anglo-Qing relations more 
broadly. 
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Piracy and Sovereignty in South China 
Piracy reflected the limits of state power. The frequency of piratical attacks in the waters of 
South China during the second half of the nineteenth century suggests that neither the Qing nor 
British states had the capacity to effectively control the region. The examples of Koxinga and 
the ladrones proved that Chinese piratical activity could exceed Qing capabilities to suppress it. 
Though pirates like Shap-ng-tsai in the mid-nineteenth century never assembled fleets 
comparable to those of their predecessors, Chinese piracy by this time was no longer problem 
for Qing authorities alone. During the ladrones crisis, the Jiaqing Emperor considered piracy an 
issue strictly within Qing remit and refused British offers of assistance on the grounds that 
accepting British aid would damage imperial prestige. Governor-General Bailing accordingly 
refused to discuss the matter with Captain Francis Austen of HMS St. Albans in 1809.4 With 
the establishment of Hong Kong as a British colony, however, one of Bailing’s successors 
reckoned ‘capturing and dealing severely [with pirates] would certainly produce mutual peace 
between Chinese and foreigners’.5 The colonisation of Hong Kong entailed British involvement 
in efforts against piracy, which this thesis argues indeed impacted Anglo-Qing relations. Some 
British actions against Chinese pirates, as discussed in Chapter Three, violated Qing maritime 
and terrestrial sovereignty. The efficacy of Royal Navy in such instances, however, drew wary 
approval from Qing authorities at Canton. 
Though local Qing officials cooperated with British efforts against pirates and expressed 
appreciation for such activity, Qing understandings of piracy and its legal implications did not 
initially change as a result of collaboration with British authorities. Unlike treaties with 
Southeast Asian rulers or those on the Pirate Coast, the post-Opium War treaties did not discuss 
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piracy. 6  Despite having the second largest division of the Royal Navy on hand, British 
authorities on the China coast could not use piracy to justify intervention and imperial expansion. 
International and Qing municipal law limited the actions British warships could take against 
Chinese pirates. Differences between British and Qing understandings of piracy and their 
respective jurisdictions over it helped prevent an exercise of the ‘imperialism of free seas’ in 
China, the colonisation of Kowloon explored in Chapter Six being a notable exception.7 Though 
Qing officials tolerated British violence against Chinese subjects in the waters, islands, and even 
mainland territories of the Qing Empire on the basis of such action helping maintain order on 
the coast, they did not accept the British notion of piracy as a crime under universal jurisdiction. 
Xu Guangjin’s initial insistence that Chui Apo was under the sole jurisdiction of Qing law and 
Ye Mingchen’s unwavering belief that his subordinates had the right to arrest pirates onboard 
the Arrow demonstrate the limited impact Anglo-Qing cooperation against pirates had on 
changing Qing understanding and acceptance of international law before 1856. The analysis in 
Chapter Four shows how disagreements led to a war, which forced an agreement between 
Britain and China on a transnational law of piracy on the China coast; piracy as discussed in the 
Treaty of Tientsin was also a compromise in which British negotiators gave up pretensions of 
subjecting Chinese pirates to universal jurisdiction. Qing conceptions of Chinese piracy as a 
crime strictly within Qing jurisdiction and authorities like Xu and Ye’s insistence on exercising 
sovereignty over pirates left a mark on stipulations regarding piracy in the Treaty of Tientsin. 
 Qing statesmen saw treaties with the West as a compromise between Chinese and 
international law. Through interpreting and implementing such treaties, Qing officials could 
influence the treaty regime, which stood in the place of international law in China.8 The Treaty 
of Nanking and subsequent transnational agreements between the Qing Empire and Western 
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states, many of which were coerced, admitted it into the emerging order of European-dictated 
international law albeit on uneven terms.9 Indeed, according to Governor and Superintendent 
of Trade John Davis, with the ratification of the Treaty of Nanking, ‘the assent of the Emperor 
confirmed the treaty which the power of the Queen dictated – Having thus been admitted, or 
rather compelled, for the first time in the history of the world, into  the family of civilized nations, 
the Chinese are fully entitled to all the rights’.10 His language, however, betrays the inequality 
between the signatories. The history of the introduction of international law to China casts a 
long shadow, and more recent regimes in China have remained wary of its implications for their 
maritime sovereignty.11 Though the treaties discussed in this thesis resulted from wars and were 
largely drawn up by triumphal British negotiators, concessions to the Qing such as extraditing 
pirates to Qing jurisdiction and the acceptance of the Chinese understanding of their legal status 
in the Treaty of Tientsin reveal some of the influences of Qing concepts and practice. The 
vehicles for the Qing government’s recognition in the wider world were also means its agents to 
assert their own ideas of their sovereignty and jurisdiction into the regime of international law 
in China. 
The Anglo-Qing handling of pirates serves as a useful foil to better known manifestations of 
the British exercise of sovereignty in China and reveals a different dynamic between British and 
Qing assertions of sovereignty over persons on the China coast. As discussed in Chapter One, 
British officials zealously established Hong Kong as an island of sovereignty and English law, 
which was seen as a matter of prestige and a key attribute of British civilisation. The rejection 
of Qing extraterritorial jurisdiction over Chinese in Hong Kong coincided with the expansion 
of such privileges for British authorities in China. The British state constructed an elaborate 
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apparatus of extraterritorial courts and regulations in China, which was part of a wider network 
of judicial establishments connecting China to the rest of the British Empire. After 1865, with 
the establishment of Supreme Court for China and Japan in Shanghai, the British legal regime 
in the treaty ports was separated from that of Hong Kong.12 Foreign Office personnel drew on 
their experience in creating a regime of extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire to establish 
this new legal institution, which became an important component of the British state in China. 
Though significant for the British presence in China, the court was a strictly British institution 
and largely isolated from Qing law, drawing from the experience of courts elsewhere in the 
British Empire rather than interactions with Qing courts.13 Indeed, extraterritoriality was a 
means of insulating British subjects from the perceived arbitrariness and barbarity of Chinese 
justice.14  Piracy proved an odd exception. As discussed in Chapter Two, colonial officials 
recognised the efficacy with which the Qing criminal justice system could prosecute piracy, 
which underpinned the British practice of extraditing pirates to Kowloon. Despite notable 
exceptions, such as the British refusal to cede jurisdiction over pirates on the Arrow to Qing 
authorities, the tendency to let Qing justice handle cases of piracy was later institutionalized by 
extradition clauses in Anglo-Qing treaties. Whereas British officials generally sought to protect 
those under their jurisdiction from Qing justice, in the case of pirates, by the law of nations under 
universal jurisdiction, Qing involvement was usually accepted and even requested. The 
common threat posed by pirates brought together disparate legal systems that practices of 
extraterritoriality in China sought to keep separate. 
Piracy flourished in the absence of sovereignty. Neither the might of the Royal Navy nor 
the various Qing state agents in Guangdong could effectively exert control over the waters of 
South China. As an island of British sovereignty, Hong Kong disrupted the tenuous Qing order 
over the Canton Delta, and pirates navigated the interstices between the limits of British and 
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Qing sovereignty in the region to escape the law of both. In doing so, Chinese pirates 
inadvertently encouraged cooperation between Britain and China. The resulting Anglo-Qing 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy, like the pirates it was meant to control, also illuminates some 
of the workings and limits of British and Qing sovereignty on the China coast. In the Treaty of 
Tientsin, which codified cooperation against piracy, Britain relinquished the right by 
international law to exercise jurisdiction over Chinese pirates while Qing authorities recognised 
the Royal Navy’s right to pursue pirates anywhere in China. British officials took treaty 
obligations seriously and attempts to ensure their Qing counterparts upheld the treaties gave the 
Qing government recognition as a sovereign if junior member in the family of nations. While the 
British institution of extraterritoriality in China, as well as some of the actions the Royal Navy 
took against piracy, violated Qing sovereignty, treaties and cooperation in suppressing piracy, a 
means by which Qing law and practice affected international agreements, helped to bolster it. 
 
Collaborative Imperial Hydrarchy and Anglo-Qing Relations 
A common cause against and agreement regarding pirates had wider implications for Anglo-
Qing relations as revealed in comparisons with other forms of cooperation. In his magisterial 
work on the historical context surrounding the start of the Opium War, a conflict that has 
loomed so large in the history of modern China, Stephen Platt asserts that the lack of meaningful 
cooperation between Britain and China against the ladrones in the early nineteenth century was 
a foregone opportunity that contributed to divergent attitudes resulting in war.15 Belatedly, as 
this thesis shows, interactions between the Qing and British officers who succeeded Bailing and 
Captain Austen produced a consensus regarding pirates. With colonial officials in Hong Kong 
sending pirates to the Kowloon authorities as early as 1842, piracy helped catalyse an early form 
of cooperation between Britain and China in the aftermath of the Opium War. As British 
warships so recently engaged in acts of war on the China coast instead turned their guns on 
pirates, Qing officials saw the benefits of British naval power. The Royal Navy in South China 
 




quickly transformed from a tool for gunboat diplomacy to an indispensable ally against a 
common enemy. The Kowloon authorities’ request for British assistance and participation in a 
joint expedition against pirates in 1845 shows that Anglo-Qing cooperation suppressing piracy 
predates an institution that has become the paragon Sino-foreign interaction and influence, the 
Imperial Maritime Customs.16 
Piracy threatened trade, the raison d’être for the British presence in China. Ensuring the 
continuance of this trade to the mutual benefit of Britain and China required its protection. 
British warships first appeared in China to protect East Indiamen and their valuable cargoes. 
The principal function of the East Indies and China Station was to protect British interests, 
which trade largely predominated, hence the Royal Navy’s early activities against pirates. 
Clearing the seas of pirates was an important precondition for the expansion of trade from which 
customs revenue derived. In this sense, the modus vivendi between Britain and China for 
suppressing piracy was a precursor to the Imperial Maritime Customs. To the extent that the 
Marine Department of the Customs Service helped establish and maintain control over the sea 
space and seafarers off the China coast, the Customs could meaningfully be considered a part of 
collaborative imperial hydrarchy.17 Despite overlaps and similarities with the Customs Service, 
the Anglo-Qing suppression of piracy was a distinct arrangement involving different institutions 
and thus provides a contrasting angle from which to assess relations efforts at maritime control. 
While the Imperial Maritime Customs and its foreign staff were part of the Qing 
bureaucracy, the participants in Anglo-Qing efforts against pirates had no such hybridity or 
national ambiguity.18 Murakami Ei suggests that Qing reliance on the Royal Navy amounted to 
 
16 See Hans van de Ven, Breaking with the Past: The Maritime Customs Service and the Global Origins of 
Modernity in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014) and Robert Bickers, The Scramble for 
China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914 (London: Penguin, 2012), chapter seven. 
17 Van de Ven, Breaking, 19. Bickers, Scramble, 264-269 
18 Bickers, Scramble, 193-195. The difference between the Customs and British state institutions is 
highlighted by the ‘Blockade of Hong Kong’ discussed in Chapter Seven when Governor MacDonnell 






a Qing co-optation of  British naval power to uphold maritime order.19 Some Qing officials 
indeed hoped to rely on the British warships to deal with intractable subjects, but the Qing 
government and the Royal Navy were two distinct entities, unlike the Customs. British naval 
officers and their civilian counterparts in China were undoubtedly British subjects working for 
the British state just as Qing authorities on the coast were accountable to Beijing. Nonetheless, 
their interactions had an important impact on Anglo-Qing relations, including building rapport 
and facilitating the trade upon which the Customs was built. As the first four chapters of this 
thesis show, British discussions with Qing officials about and cooperation against piracy 
broached issues of international law long before the establishment of the Customs or the Zongli 
Yamen’s efforts to translate treatises on the law of nations.20 These activities had an impact on 
the treaty regime governing the relations between China and Britain discussed in Chapters Two 
and Five. Though dominated by Britain and China, collaborative imperial hydrarchy, like the 
Imperial Maritime Customs, involved international participation, with Annamese involvement 
in the expedition against Shap-ng-tsai and Portuguese and American forces forming part of the 
coalitions sent to Coulan mentioned in Chapter Three, all of which occurred before the formal 
establishment of the Customs. Cooperation between Britain and China against piracy predated 
that for customs collection and was built on a different institutional basis. A comparison of the 
impacts these two forms of cooperation had on Anglo-Qing relations, while beyond the scope 
of this thesis, merits further research. 
Comparing the Anglo-Qing system of cooperation against pirates with other forms of 
collaboration between Britain and China, such as the British intervention during the Taiping 
Rebellion, also expose its distinctiveness. Chapter Three has discussed the impact the Taiping 
and other mid-nineteenth century uprisings had on the China coast. As the Taiping Rebellion 
 
19 Murakami uses the term zhaofu to describe the relationship between Qing officials and the Royal 
Navy. Murakami Ei, Haiyang shishang de jindai Zhongguo: Fujianren de huodong yu Yingguo Qingchao de 
yinying [A Modern Maritime History of China: Fujianese Activity and British and Qing Responses], 
trans. Wang Shilun (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), 238. 
20 On the Qing engagement with international law through translation, see Rune Svarverud, 
International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse (Leiden: 




was concentrated in the Yangtze valley, far to the north of Guangdong, this thesis only makes 
passing references to it, but the astonishing scale of the uprising impacted China’s relations with 
foreign countries, particularly at the treaty port of Shanghai, which eclipsed Canton as the 
principle port for foreign maritime trade in the mid-nineteenth century. When the Taipings 
threatened the valuable trade conducted at Shanghai in August 1860, British and French forces 
supported Qing troops in attacking rebels in the area even as a different allied contingent was 
advancing towards Beijing to force the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin. Jonathan Chappell 
argues that the differing policies at Shanghai and the Peiho are examples of the different 
‘bridgeheads’ of foreign interest in China.21 The strength of the ties between these bridgeheads 
and their metropoles was a key determinant of whether metropolitan governments would 
countenance armed intervention and the prospect of establishing an imperial presence beyond 
them. In the early 1860s, British interests in Shanghai were significant enough to justify armed 
intervention for their defence but attempts to expand into a protective buffer beyond Shanghai 
met with disapproval in Westminster. The British government instead settled on a policy of 
protecting the treaty ports and indirect intervention by providing Qing forces with arms and 
expertise, a tactic less costly and likely to result in imperial expansion, which Britain could ill 
afford. 22  This indirect intervention included the assembly of the Lay-Osborn flotilla, a 
predecessor to the Guangdong steam squadron discussed in Chapter Six. 
Unlike the brief and limited intervention against the Taipings, British activity against piracy, 
as revealed in this thesis, was sustained throughout the nineteenth century. The violence 
wrought by the Royal Navy against Chinese ships and villages in campaigns against piracy had 
many of the same implications as British actions during Taiping civil war. In the prelude to the 
destruction of Oudingxiang discussed in Chapter Six, Vice-Admiral Henry Keppel believed an 
attack was justified on the grounds that ‘Piratical Villagers’ were ‘not merely at war with 
 
21 Jonathan Chappell, ‘The Limits of the Shanghai Bridgehead: Understanding British Intervention in 
the Taiping Rebellion, 1860-62’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44, no. 4 (2016), 539. 
22 Ibid, 539-543. Van de Ven argues the establishment of the Imperial Maritime Customs was a sign of 
British and French imperial weakness and a way ‘to offload formal responsibility for regulating and 





themselves but with society generally’.23 As hostes humani generis in the British understanding, 
pirates were a distinct type of enemy, one at war with the world. British naval officers could 
treat pirates as belligerents, and rules of neutrality did not apply, though the Small Swords 
Uprising and the outbreak of the Arrow War complicated this situation. Furthermore, though 
the pirates in this thesis operated from territorial bases, including the island of Hong Kong, they 
were not affiliated with any state as they were enemies of the Qing government, which exercised 
clear sovereignty.24 As such, there was little chance that armed action against pirates on the 
China coast would result in costly wars or territorial acquisition. The bridgeheads involved in 
suppressing piracy extended out to sea, where multiple states could exercise control without 
impinging on the sovereignty of others. 25  Intervention in the maritime sphere had fewer 
repercussions than on Qing territory. Thus, cooperating with Qing efforts against a common 
enemy at sea did not entail the same risks it did on land and could be sustained for a much longer 
period. Collaborative imperial hydrarchy was a unique form of cooperation between Britain and 
China involving separate state institutions cooperating against a common enemy. 
 
With the colonisation of Hong Kong, the British state had an interest in suppressing Chinese 
piracy.26 The limits of British and Qing power in the waters of South China drove officials on 
either side of Victoria Harbour to cooperate in controlling neighbouring waters. This system of 
cooperation spread along the coast and even to waters beyond the maritime jurisdiction of 
Britain or China. Though Anglo-Qing collaboration produced impressive victories against 
pirates, disagreements stemming from the status of these pirates in different legal systems 
emerged, none more consequential than the jurisdiction Qing and British officials claimed over 
pirates on the Arrow in 1856. The treaties ending the Arrow War mandated cooperation against 
 
23 Keppel to Jones, 26 January 1869, ADM 125/14, 196. 
24 As discussed above and in the introduction, the distinction between pirates and sovereigns could be 
blurred, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
25 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123. 
26 Jonathan Chappell, ‘Maritime Raiding, International Law and the Suppression of Piracy on the South 




pirates and codified a consensus on the law of piracy in China, which compromised between 
British and Qing conceptions of the jurisdiction each could exert over them. The treaties 
established a basis for closer cooperation against piracy, which produced new methods and 
policies for suppressing it. These measures also entailed further accommodation between laws 
and policies adopted in Hong Kong and Canton. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
problem of piracy, which had prompted unprecedented degrees of cooperation between Britain 
and China, was largely resolved to the point that it was overshadowed by other concerns, and 
the original system developed between Hong Kong and Kowloon disappeared along with the 
Qing presence on the peninsula. Though sometimes with reservations and reluctance, Qing and 
British officials interacted and complemented each other’s efforts create a collaborative imperial 
hydrarchy to maintain maritime order and check piracy. Designs against a common foe 









Amoy (Xiamen) 廈門 
Andingmen 安定門 
Anlan 安瀾 







Beijing (Peking) 北京 
Beishui 北水 
Beng Ya 崩牙 
Beng Yasong 崩牙松 
Bogui 柏貴 
Bohai (Gulf of Pecheli) 勃海 
Bo-lu (Block) 波碌 
canjiang (lieutenant-colonel) 參將 




Chek Chu (Chizhu, Stanley) 赤柱 
Chen Deng 陳登 
Chen Xianliang 陳顯良 
Cheng Yucai 程矞采 
Chengqing 澄清 
Chepi (Chaypee) 車陂 
Cheung Chau (Changzhou) 長洲 
Chintae (Chen Da, Chen Yada, Chen Tai, Chen Yatai) 陳大, 陳亞大, 陳太, 陳亞太 
Chuenpi (Chuanbi) 穿鼻 
Chui Apo (Xu Yabao) 徐亞保 
Coulan (Gaolan, Kulan, Kuhlan) 高欄 
Cumsingmoon (Jinxingmen) 金星門 
Da Qing lüli 大清律例 
Dagu (Taku) 大沽 
Dahuoshan 大鑊山 
Dan(jia) (Tanka) 蛋(家) 
Daoguang 道光 
Dapeng (Taepang) 大鵬 
Dapeng Wan (Mirs Bay) 大鵬灣 
Daxingwei (Tysami) 大星尾 
Daya Wan (Bias Bay) 大亞灣 
Denglongzhou (Kellett Island) 燈籠洲 
Dengqing 澄清 
Dengzhou (Yantai, Chefoo)  登州 (煙台) 





Duan Chengshi 段承實 
Duntou 墩頭 
Duzigang 獨子崗 
Fan (Fanny Loviot) 番 
Fan Yasi 樊亞四 
Fang Yan 方沿 
Fatshan (Foshan) 佛山 
Feilong 飛龍 
Feng Attai (Feng Yadi) 馮亞帝 
Fujian 福建 




Gong Qinwang Yixin (Prince Gong) 恭親王 弈訢 







Guo Chaofan 郭超凡 
Guo Podai 郭婆帶 
guoxingye 國姓爺 
Haiguan (Customs [Superintendent], Hoppo) 海關 







Hakka (Kejia) 客家 
Han 漢 
Han (River) 韓 
hanjian 漢奸 
He Fang 何芳 
He Feixiong 何飛熊 
He Guiqing 何桂清 
Hengfu 恆福 
Hing Lung (Xinglong) 興隆 
Houhai (Deep Bay) 后海 
Huafeng 花封 
Huang Baidou 黃白豆 
Huang Chaoqun 黃超羣 
Huang Kaiguang 黃開廣 
Huang Liankai 黃聯開 




Huang Xinguang 黃信光 
Huang Zonghan 黃宗漢 
Huashana 花沙納 
Huizhou 惠州 
Humen (Bogue, Bocca Tigris) 虎門 
huoyaobao (stinkpots) 火藥煲 
jia 甲 
Jiang Yayou 蔣亞有 








Kat-O (Ji’ao, Crooked Island) 吉澳 
Kowloon (Jiulong) 九龍 
Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) 鄭成功 
kuaichuan (fast boat) 快船 
Kum Tsum Yik (Jinquanyi) 金全益 
Kwok Acheong 郭亞祥 
Lai Enjue 賴恩爵 
Lai Yuanqing 賴元慶 
Lai Zhenbian 賴鎮邊 
Lamma (Nanya) 南丫 
Lantau (Dayushan) 大嶼山 
Lao Chongguang 勞崇光 
Leung Shun Wan (Liangchuanwan) 糧船灣 
li 里 
Li Rongsheng 李榮陞 
Li/Liang Mingtai 李/梁明太 
Liang Baochang 梁寶常 
Liang Guoding 梁國定 
Liang Jianfu 梁建富 
Lin Weixi 林維喜 
Lin Yaqi 林亞七 
Lin Zexu 林則徐 
Lintin (Lingding) 伶仃 
Liu Yashi 劉亞實 
Liu Yongfu 劉永福 
Lo Aqui (Lu Yagui) 盧亞貴 
Longjin (name of jetty of the Kowloon Walled City) 龍津 
Lü Xianji 呂賢基 
Luo Yatian 羅亞添 
Lyemoon (Liyumen) 鯉魚門 
Macau (Macao, Aomen) 澳門 
Man Mo (Wenwu) 文武 
Mao Feipeng 毛飛鵬 




Mei (Prefect of Guangzhou) 梅 
Meng’ala (Bengal) (口旁)孟啊喇 
Ming 明 
Modaomen (Moto) 磨刀門 
Nan’ao 南澳 
Nanhai 南海 






Niuzhuang (Yingkou) 牛庄 (營口) 
Oudingxiang (Ou-ting-poi) 鷗汀鄉 

















Sengge Rinchen (Senggelinqin) 僧格林沁 
Shamian (Shameen) 沙面 
Shandong 山東 
Shang (Major commanding the Beishui expedition) 尚 
Shangchuan (St. John’s Island) 上川 
Shanghai 上海 
Shanwei 山尾 
Shap-ng-tsai (Shiwuzi, Zhang Kaiping) 十五仔 (張開平) 
Shen Zhenbang 沈鎮邦 
Shen, Magistrate of Guishan 沈 
Shi Lang 施琅 
shoubei (commandant) 守備 
Sow-ah-pow (Shaoaopu) 勺凹浦 
Su Yacheng 蘇亞成 
Suijing 綏靖 
Sun Shiyi 孫士毅 
Swatow (Shantou) 山頭 





Taipa (Dangzai) 氹仔 
Taiping 太平 
Taiwan 台灣 
Tan Jiao 譚蛟 
Tianjin (Tientsin) 天津 
tingdao 艇盜 
tingfei 艇匪 
tixing ancha shi si (judicial commissioner) 提刑按察使司 
Tongzhou 通州 
Tsim Sha Tsui (Jianshazui) 尖沙嘴 
tuanlian 團練 
tuo (type of ship) 拖 
waihai 外海 
Wang Cunshan 王存善 
wangming xianxing zhengfa 王命先行正法 
weiyuan 微員 
Wen (Colonel of Dapeng) 溫 
Wenxiang 文祥 
Whampoa (Huangpu) 黃埔 
Wong Ma Kok (Huangmaojiao) 黃茅角 
Wu Diwen 吳迪文 
Wu Guanyu 吳觀玉 
Wu Xiongguang 吳熊光 
Wu Yaren 吳亞認 
Xiachuan (Hawcheun) 下川 
Xiangfeng 咸豐 
Xianggang (Hong Kong) 香港 
Xianggangzai (Aberdeen)  香港仔 
Xiangshan 香山 




Xu Guangjin 徐廣縉 
Xu Guitian 徐桂田 
Xu Wenshen 許文深 
xunfu (governor) 巡撫 
xunjian (deputy magistrate) 巡檢 
Yaimen 崖門 
Yangtze (Yangzi, Changjiang) 揚子, 長江 
Yau Ma Tei (Youmadi) 由麻地 
Ye Mingchen 葉名琛 





youji (major) 遊擊 





Yuen Long (Yuanlang) 元朗 
Zhang Bao 張保 
Zhang Sanfu 張三福 
Zhang Yutang 張玉堂 
Zhang Zhaodong 張兆棟 
Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 
Zhanzhibei (Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy) 占之杯 
zhaofu 招撫 
Zhejiang 浙江 
Zheng Dong (Chingtung) 鄭棟 
Zheng Yi 鄭一 
Zheng Yi Sao 鄭一嫂 




zhifu, shou (Prefect) 知府,守 
Zhilalaba (Jalalabad) 治拉拉拔 
Zhili 直隸 
(zhi)xian (magistrate) (知)縣 
Zhong Changfeng 鐘長鳳 
zongbing, zongzhen (brigadier-general) 總兵, 總鎮 
zongdu (governor-general, viceroy) 總督 
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